Battle of Delion – Wikipedia

Battle of Delion


Schematic representation of the battle curve
Datum 424 v. Chr.
Location Delion, near the street of Euböa
Exit Sieg Böotiens (Thebens)
Parties

Athens

Böotian covenant (Thebes)

Commander

Hippocrates

On Gandas

Troop strength
ca. 7000 Hopliten,
300 Reiter
ca. 7000 Hopliten,
1000 Reiter,
500 fields,
10,000 light -armed
losses

approx. 1200 killed

approx. 500 killed

significant because of the influence on the development of tactics

The Battle of Delion found during the Peloponnesian war in 424 BC. BC. The Athenians and the Böotier faced each other.

In 424 BC The Athenian generals of Demosthenes and Hippocrates wanted to come up with a pliers attack from the sea and from land in Böotia. Demosthenes, the leader of the expedition fleet, was sailed too early. He landed near Siphai, on the Böotian coast of the Gulf of Corinth. Since the Böotier found out about his arrival before Hippocrates could also arrive with the Hoplitenheer, the plan had to be abandoned and demo -stenes withdrawn.

Finally, Hippocrates came to Böotia with his army and built a fortified position at the Temple of Delion in eastern Böotien, not far from Tanagra. After five days, the fortification work was completed and Hippocrates put a garrison after Delion while he sent the rest of the army, about 10,000 light -armed people. Meanwhile, the Böotian army also arrived before Delion. Pagondas of Thebes, the military leader, urged an attack because he was convinced that the Athenians would otherwise return and set up a strong base in Delion on Böotian soil.

He therefore took a position on a hill with his army. The Thebanians presumed that the right -wing wings were based on a natural obstacle (bushes, scree or the like). Contrary to the usual phalanx structure of eight men, Pagondas put her depth with a depth of 25 men. In the center, troops from Haliaartos, Koroneia and Kopai followed, while the left wing was occupied with troops from Thespiai, Tanagra and Orchomenos. Loker later joined them.

While the cavalry had to cover the vulnerable deep flank of the right wing, it is assumed that due to the cramped spatial conditions, the lightly armed people were behind the front. The Athenians had about the same number of hoplites, but only about 300 riders and had only a few light -armed people who were mainly provided by the allies and were largely released before the battle. Since they formed their phalanx according to the ordinary pattern, they had a significantly larger front width (approx. 880 meters) than the Böotier (approx. 700 meters without cavalry). The information is contradictory (covering of the warehouse in Delion or installation on the two wings of the Phalanx), but it did not intervene in the battle about the use of the low Athenian cavalry.

The Athensers attacked the Bohemian army and, despite the start -up, managed to push back the left wing of the Böotier with their traditionally stronger right wing. The defensive population of Thespiais was almost completely destroyed. According to the report of the Thukydides, the left wing of the Böotier was short of a defeat, but when the Athenians had already included the opponent, they taught themselves losses. The external edges of two army departments probably came into a position through the swivel movement when the session, which made it obvious to be obvious to face a front extension of the opponent. At that time, the fighters of a party had no uniform shields; This was only common after the second battle of Mantineia (362 BC). While the Athenians put their own left wing and encompassed, Pagondas attacked the left wing of the Athenians downhill with his particularly shockable, deeply structured right wing, pushed him back and threatened to break through. However, since his left wing was already comprised and there was a attack against the back of the center of his front, he was about to defeat.

So far, however, his cavalry had only had the order to cover the right flank of the deep Theban Phalanx, and was therefore unattached due to the combat success on this wing. Pagondas recognized his chance and used parts of this movable reserve to support the left wing. When the Hoplites of the right Athenian wing, which were already victorious, saw fresh enemy cavalry ride and intervene in the battle, she left courage. The efforts of the storm uphill, the subsequent struggle and the hopes for the tangible victory and the end of the battle did not allow any another stress. At the same time, Pagondas pushed the Athenians back on the other wing (less than 800 meters away!) And was on the back of the Athenian army shortly before the breakthrough. In this situation, the Atheners only remained escape. Around 500 Böotier and 1000 Athenians, including the Athenian general Hippocrates, were killed in the battle.

The Böotier followed the Athenians until sunset. The fleeing managers managed to save themselves in their fortified warehouse in Delion, but the Böotier informed them that they regarded the temple site as a holy place that the Athenians had to leave. The Athenians replied that they had won the place with the right of the conqueror, now he was sacred to them and, moreover, they are only for self -defense. For two weeks they faced each other, but the Böotier meanwhile received reinforcements from 2,000 Corinthian Hoplites. According to Thukydides, the Corinthians then set fire to the position of the Athenians with a kind of flame thrower; Around 200 Athenians died; The rest were granted free deduction. Now Demosthenes, the unhappy leader of the sea expedition, arrived, but since the situation had now fundamentally changed to the detriment of the Athens, he was no longer able to do anything and was quickly sold by the Böotians.

The Böotian-Thebanian victory in the Battle of Delion had no strategic effects. Athens was able to get the relatively low losses more easily than the moral shock of defeat. Sparta, the actual opponent of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, had no noticeable advantages.
The importance of the battle is in the tactical area. Pagondas, as the responsible general, had introduced some innovations that should be preparation for groundbreaking developments. In some cases, the importance of the battle is that tactical developments can be proven for the first time from its well -documented course, which may have been available earlier.

  • Pagondas’ asymmetrical line -up became a model for the Theban general Epaminondas, who gave her a decisive variety (reinforcement of the left instead of the right wing), which would later achieve a brilliant success in the Battle of Leuktra. However, it is not a forerunner of the crooked slaughter regulations, since Pagondas did not hold wings back, but strived and struggled the usual parallel battle.
  • It was the first proven battle -decisive use of a reserve.
  • By using cavalry to defend a Hoplite formation, the role of cavalry was sustainably upgraded and the later development of the cavalry by the Macedonians was prepared.
  • In the warfare of the ancient Greece, the persecution of a beaten enemy was frowned upon until the battle of Delion, although this is only to be won.
  • Athenian participants in the battle later became prominent were the philosopher Socrates and the later general and politician Alkibiades and the former general Laches, who fought as a simple Hoplit. [first]
  • The tragedy of the Euripides, From the stroke (“The protective pleaders”), 423 BC. Written in Athens, the then disgusting treatment of the Athenian deaths at Delion was initiated.
  • The Stadtzentrum experienced an artistic and architectural renaissance thanks to the sale of art objects that were captured by fallen and withdrawing Athensers.
  • Plato: Laches .
  • Thukydides: History of the Peloponnese War , 4, 90–98.
  1. See Plato: Laches , S. 181.