Proposition (linguistics) – Wikipedia

Posted on by

With the expression Proposition In linguistics, more precisely in the linguistic semantics, the content that is testified with a sentence (in a context). Propositions have the most important quality that they accept a truth value, i. H. be true or wrong [first] (in contrast to facts or events).

Proposition and sentence [ Edit | Edit the source text ]

Among the types of sentences described in grammar, there are many who do not directly express a proposition, such as questions or relative sentences – these do not have the property of being true or wrong. However, they can be analyzed in such a way that they contain a proposition scheme that is processed into a different type of meaning through the question of question or relative clause. Types of sentences that express propositions directly are z. B. statement rates (declarative rates) or conditional sentences.

For the propositional content One sentence counts the aspects of a sentence meaning that can be confirmed or contested. Other meaning content that can be resolved in a statement but could not be contested are outside the propositional content; In Paul Grice’s theory, these have been referred to as conventional implicatures.

Proposition, statement and thought [ Edit | Edit the source text ]

A term relative to the proposition and often congruent is that of the logical statement . In the language philosophy of Gottlob Freges, it also corresponds to that Thoughts . In contrast to propositions, according to Frege, however, there are thoughts that are neither true nor wrong, such as the thought expressed by the sentence “Odysseus is King of Ihaka”.

Propositions can act as well as possible as well as possible and intended facts, statements about possibilities provide so -called modal statements, but they also assume truth values.

In semantics and language philosophy, various views are represented to determine propositions: “Whether it is a matter of quantities of situations, quantities of possible worlds or complexes from objects and/or terms, opinions differ greatly.” [2]

The linguistic concept of proposition can be illustrated by the following examples:

  1. The sentence “I say that Hans stands in front of the table.” And the sentence “I command that Hans stand in front of the table!” In the das-sentence, express the same propositional content. [3]
  2. The speech file Determination: “Katrin works diligently”, Ask: “Is Katrin working hard?” Or Request: “Katrin, work hard!” Have a different illocutive role, but the same reference , Predication [work diligently] and the same proposition. [4]
  3. Die Proposition: { [Open the door]} is identical in the sentences: “Karl opens the door. – Karl doesn’t open the door. – The door is opened by Karl. – Karl opens the door? – Karl, open the door! – If Karl opened the door! – When Karl opens the door, […]. ” [5] (This also applies to Interlingual: Charles Open’s the Door. …)

The proposition is therefore something that can be understood with Frege as a common sense of different statements in different linguistic form, questions and commands and which is recorded in a paraphrase. These different complex linguistic expressions from the same sub -expressions (Karl, open, door) are formed. Frege, however, refers to this sense as “thought” [6]

“In speech theory, it is assumed that there are different modes through which a proposition (or its propositional content) can be expressed”. [3]

The criticism by Willard van Orman Quine, propositions, instead of as a purely intensive meaning of sentences, were considered more of pragmatic aspects. Due to the distinction between the propositional content and illocutionary function of a statement made in speech act theory, the proposition can be as an aspect of the individual To be understood and no more than a determination of the sentence as a type of linguistic statements. [7]

Despite the achievements of speech theory, a different understanding of propositions has been held in the formal semantics, which treats the sentence content as a mental object or as an objective thoughts in the sense of Freges. The propositional concept of semantics can therefore also be used for the possibly precautionary object of an act of faith (see epistemic logic), [3] so that statements like the following are possible:

If X believes that M A, but not m b, but A = B, then his belief does not refer to a fact, but only to a proposition.

However, such an understanding of the proposition is ontologically problematic, since it is neither a normal object nor just the result of a linguistic analysis: “In this sense, proposition does not refer to, but belongs to the class of abstract entities.” [8]

  • Scott Soames: Propositions. (PDF; 160 KB) In: Delia grask Fara, Gillian Russell (HRsg.): Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge, New York 2011, ISBN 978-0-203-20696-6.
  • Matthew McGrath: Propositions , The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
  • Max Kölbl: The bill , in: Nikola Kompa (ed.): Handbook Language Philosophy . Metzler, Stuttgart 2015, ISBN 978-3-476-02509-8, S. 99–105. (m.w.N.)
  1. ↑ z. B. Jürgen Pafel, Ingo Reich: Introduction to semantics. Basics – analyzes – theories. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart 2016, S. 11.
  2. ↑ Jürgen Pafel, Ingo Reich: Introduction to semantics. S. 12.
  3. ↑ a b c Bräuer: Proposition. In: Wulff D. Rehfus (ed.): Hand dictionary philosophy. UTB, Stuttgart 2003, ISBN 3-8252-8208-2, S. 570.
  4. ↑ Proposition. In: Homberger: Sprach dictionary on linguistics. 2000.
  5. ↑ so Ulrich: Proposition. In: Basic linguistic terms. 5th edition. 2002.
  6. ↑ Gottlob Frege: The thought. A logical examination. In: Contributions to the philosophy of German idealism. 2 1918–1919, S. 58–77 (online) . Frege also immediately creates ontological conjectures about thoughts that linguistics do without.
  7. ↑ Peter Ernst: Pragmalinguistics: basics, applications, problems. It is Gaych, Finiding/ New 2002, 1113-27-97. 97. 97.
  8. ↑ Bräuer: Proposition. In: Rehfus: Hand dictionary philosophy. 2003, S. 571.