[{"@context":"http:\/\/schema.org\/","@type":"BlogPosting","@id":"https:\/\/wiki.edu.vn\/all2en\/wiki32\/national-coalition-of-opposition-and-revolution-forces-wikipedia\/#BlogPosting","mainEntityOfPage":"https:\/\/wiki.edu.vn\/all2en\/wiki32\/national-coalition-of-opposition-and-revolution-forces-wikipedia\/","headline":"National coalition of opposition and revolution forces – Wikipedia","name":"National coalition of opposition and revolution forces – Wikipedia","description":"The National coalition of opposition and revolution forces (CNFOR), also called the Syrian national coalition (CNS) [ Note 1 ]","datePublished":"2021-02-28","dateModified":"2021-02-28","author":{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/wiki.edu.vn\/all2en\/wiki32\/author\/lordneo\/#Person","name":"lordneo","url":"https:\/\/wiki.edu.vn\/all2en\/wiki32\/author\/lordneo\/","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/44a4cee54c4c053e967fe3e7d054edd4?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/44a4cee54c4c053e967fe3e7d054edd4?s=96&d=mm&r=g","height":96,"width":96}},"publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"Enzyklop\u00e4die","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","@id":"https:\/\/wiki.edu.vn\/wiki4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/download.jpg","url":"https:\/\/wiki.edu.vn\/wiki4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/download.jpg","width":600,"height":60}},"image":{"@type":"ImageObject","@id":"https:\/\/wiki.edu.vn\/wiki4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/download.jpg","url":"https:\/\/wiki.edu.vn\/wiki4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/download.jpg","width":100,"height":100},"url":"https:\/\/wiki.edu.vn\/all2en\/wiki32\/national-coalition-of-opposition-and-revolution-forces-wikipedia\/","wordCount":7142,"articleBody":"The National coalition of opposition and revolution forces (CNFOR), also called the Syrian national coalition (CNS) [ Note 1 ] , is a Syrian transitional political authority created on November 11, 2012 in Doha, Qatar, during the Syrian Civil War, chaired by Ahmad Assi Jarba and sitting in Cairo [ 3 ] . Its purpose is to coordinate opponents of the Bashar El-Assad regime, by means of operations in Syria as well as in third countries. This organization follows requests [Which ones?] pressing from the United States, but also from France and the Gulf Monarchies [ 4 ] . Presidency of Mouaz al-Khatib (2012-2013) [ modifier | Modifier and code ] Upon creation, the coalition brings together numerous components of the opposition, including in particular the Syrian National Council, led by the Christian Georges Sabra and which was so far the main opposition coalition. The new coalition is directed by Mouaz al-Khatib, a Sunni Muslim. The four elected vice-presidents are Riad Seif, Suheir Atassi, Georges Sabra (all of whom took part in the outbreak of the Revolution) and a representative of the Kurdish National Council [ 5 ] . In addition, the coalition has set up “A high military committee which brings together, in five regions or fronts, part of the units that fight on the ground” [ 5 ] . The local coordination committees, which animate the protest in the field, took part in this coalition, a few days after leaving the Syrian National Council [ 6 ] . Nevertheless, it does not understand neither the National Committee for the Coordination of the Forces of Democratic Change of Haytham Manaa, which supports the Russian positions, nor the Syrian Democratic Forum of the historic opponent Michel Kilo [ 7 ] (which will eventually integrate it), the Syrian left, nor the Kurdish party [ 8 ] , nor the two most important armed Islamist groups in Syria (Liwa al-Tawhid and the Al-Nosra front) [ 3 ] . In January 2013, the coalition created a limited committee of 6 people responsible for consulting the forces of the Revolution, the opposition, the free Syrian army and the brothers and friends countries on the composition of a future provisional government. He includes President Moaz al-Khatib, Georges Sabra, Burhan Ghalioun, Ahmed Sayyed Yousef, Ahmad Assi Jarba and Moustapha Sabbagh (Secretary General of the Organization). It is enacted that none of these people can be a member of the provisional government in question [ 9 ] . The organization had planned to give itself a Prime Minister in Istanbul the first is mars 2013 [ ten ] . This decision was finally made on March 18, Ghassan Hitto, a former expatriate in the United States, being elected Prime Minister Interim [ 11 ] . He wins the election \u201cWith 37 votes to 10 for its competitor, and 2 for an outsider. Of the 56 people present (out of the 63 members of the coalition), 7 boycotted the elections, despite the efforts made by the college management, the Sheikh Mouaz [al-Khatib] but also the Communist Georges Sabra and the activist Suheir Atassi ” [ twelfth ] . On March 24, 2013, Mouaz al-Khatib announced his resignation from the presidency. The appointment of Ghassan Hitto as Prime Minister of a provisional government and the insufficiency of the aid provided by the international community are among the reasons for this decision, rejected by the coalition and the authorities of Qatar [ 13 ] , [ 14 ] . A little earlier, the vice-president Suheir Atassi had also resigned [ 15 ] . These dissensions within the opposition reveal the existence of two competing axes: on the one hand, Qatar and Turkey linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and supporting the formation of an interim government; On the other, Saudi Arabia and the United States, which prefer to support military councils led by army dissidents and moderate and secular currents, rather than jihadists (especially those of the Al-Nosra Front) [ 16 ] , [ twelfth ] . This rivalry was notably materialized during the election of the Prime Minister by the support of two separate candidates from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, namely Ghassan Hitto and former Minister Asaad Moustapha respectively [ 17 ] , [ twelfth ] . This rivalry is found at the meeting of CNFOR in Istanbul in May 2013, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates using the organization to include at least 30 new members and thus reduce the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood [ 18 ] . In fact, the CNFOR joined 51 new members at the end of this meeting, which brings its workforce to 114 individuals; The Syrian National Council retaining 40% of seats [ 19 ] . It is then that the General Commission of the Syrian Revolution decided to leave CNFOR, accusing certain leaders of serving their personal ambitions and of having used money for their benefit, and accusing the coalition of not having respected its commitment to reserve a third of the seats for rebels on the ground under the influence of foreign powers [ 20 ] . Presidency of Ahmad Assi Jarba (2013-2014) [ modifier | Modifier and code ] The July 6, 2013 , Ahmad Assi Jarba is elected president of the CNFOR and succeeds Georges Sabra who had assured the interim in this position after the departure of Mouaz al-Khatib; He is supported by Saudi Arabia as part of the fighting of influence that is played out within the organization, while Qatar was close to its rival Mustafa al-Sabbagh [ first ] . Two days later comes the resignation of Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto, whose appointment had been supported by Qatar [ 21 ] . On September 14, 2013, the CNFOR elects a new Prime Minister in the person of Ahmad Toumeh. Secretary General of the Damascus Declaration, “A group of historic opponents who had peacefully disputed the Assad regime before the start of the insurrection in March 2011” , he is qualified in the press of “Moderate Islamist” [ 22 ] . On September 24, 2013, a joint press release of important Islamist rebel groups announced that the national coalition, cannot represent them and recognizes any other source from future legislation than Sharia law [ 23 ] . On November 3, 2013, Ahmad Jarba claims that the coalition “Would not participate in the Geneva Peace Conference if no calendar was set for the departure of President Bashar al-Assad and if Iran participated” . He also ensures “That the opposition undertook to” go to Geneva 2 only a oneie “, reiterating the sine qua unquisite condition by its camp: a cease-fire during the negotiations” [ 24 ] . The Coalition finally agrees to participate after having laid down several conditions, including free access to the besieged areas for humanitarian organizations, the liberation of political prisoners and the objective of a political transition [ 25 ] . On November 12, 2013, Ahmed Toumeh submitted to the vote of the General Assembly the list of twelve ministers whom he wishes to see in his provisional government. Only nine of them obtain the 62 votes required [ 26 ] . This government, which settles in Gaziantp in Turkey for lack of being able to settle in Aleppo as it intended, is shared between “moderate Islamists” and “moderate lay”. On the other hand, “No minister holds a diploma from a Russian university or a country of the former Soviet bloc, which constitutes a break with most of the Syrian governments of Baathist Syria” [ 27 ] . Ahmad Jarba was re -elected, on January 5, 2014 in Istanbul, head of the national coalition, by 63 votes against 13 at Riad Hijab [ 28 ] . On January 18, after the national coordination committee for the forces of democratic change (CCND, opposition of the interior) indicated that it would not participate in the so -called Geneva peace conference, the coalition confirms its participation to The latter: According to Ahmad Jarba, “The negotiations of Geneva II have the sole purpose of satisfying the requests of the Revolution […] and above all to withdraw from the butcher [Bashar el-Assad] all its powers” [ 29 ] . The coalition nevertheless requires the absence of Iran to this conference, which it obtains from the general secretariat of the United Nations which justifies this decision by the Iranian refusal to support a transitional government in Syria [ 30 ] . In May 2014, the American government decided to give the offices of the Syrian opposition being in its territory the status of foreign diplomatic mission [ thirty first ] . The Army manuce Hadi Elhara (2014-2015). [ modifier | Modifier and code ] On July 10, 2014, Hadi El-Bahra was elected president of CNFOR against Mouwafaq Nayrabiyeh [ 32 ] . On November 12, 2012, the Gulf Cooperation Council recognized the national coalition as the legitimate government of Syria. He includes Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar [ 35 ] . It is followed by Turkey, the Vatican, France, which also decides to welcome an ambassador of the coalition in the person of Monzir Makhous [ 36 ] , [ 37 ] , as well as by Italy, the United Kingdom [ 38 ] and, more nuanced, the European Union [ 39 ] and the United States [ 40 ] . On December 12, 2012, the friends of Syria, a group made up of a hundred Arab and Western countries opposed to the Bashar al-Assad regime, gathered in Marrakech and recognized the national coalition of the Syrian opposition as the only representative of the Syrian people [ 41 ] . On March 6, 2013, the Arab League attributed the siege of Syria to the coalition [ 42 ] . The coalition also benefits from the support of the military council of the Syrian army free [ 43 ] . On the other hand, the free Syrian army of the interior does not recognize any legitimacy to the coalition: according to Fahad al-Masri, spokesperson for the joint command, \u201cThe CNS was not created by the revolutionary forces within the country, it was on the contrary imposed by certain regional and Western countries. […] Since its creation, this body has done nothing for the Syrian Revolution, and it has now lost the little credibility that it has ” [ 44 ] . The September 24, 2013 , several brigades of the Islamic Front of Syrian Liberation, the Syrian Islamic Front, the Al-Nosra Front and even a division of the Free Syrian Army declare to reject the Syrian national coalition and affirm that this organization does not represent them [ 45 ] . Unlike the Syrian National Council, the Coalition plans to negotiate with Bashar al-Assad: President Mouaz al-Khatib thus assured that he was not “An opponent of negotiation” with Assad and that peaceful negotiation remains “The least of the two evils” [ 8 ] . This position is notably advocated by Russia [ forty six ] . Nevertheless, Mouaz al-Khatib also asked the international community of “Adapted weapons” For “End the suffering of Syrians and bloodshed” [ 37 ] . On December 27, 2012, Walid al-Bunni, spokesperson for the coalition, said: \u201cWe will accept any political solution that does not include the Assad family and those who have hurt the Syrian people. Apart from that, all the options are on the table \u201d [ 47 ] . In January 2013, the coalition supported the proposal for dialogue formulated by Mouaz al-Khatib on two conditions: the departure of Bashar el-Assad and contact with the regime representatives not involved in the massacres [ 48 ] . In April 2013, CNFOR called the eleven Western and Arab countries which support it to carry out targeted air strikes to destroy the SCUD soil-to-ground missile bases used by the Damascus regime [ 49 ] . From its creation, Qatar donated $ 8 million to the coalition [ 9 ] . On November 26, 2012, the French government announced that it allocates a “Emergency humanitarian aid” amounting to 1.2 million euros [ 50 ] . In December 2012, the friends of Syria, or a hundred countries, promised him $ 145 million (108 million euros), but at the end of January 2013, only part of this sum was transferred to him [ 51 ] ($ 400,000 according to Ambassador Monzer Makhous at the end of February 2013 [ 48 ] ). In parallel, Qatar and Saudi Arabia offer it respectively $ 20 million and $ 3 million in February 2013 [ 48 ] . At the end of February 2013, thanks to the advances of the free Syrian army, the coalition controls according to Monzer Makhous almost the whole north of the country, 20% of the production of Syrian electricity, the largest wheat reserve (the Dj\u00e9zireh ), as well as two large oil deposits and around twenty small, which allows the organization to produce 100,000 to 150,000 barrels of gross per day, or $ 15 million [ 48 ] . In April 2013, the President of the United States Barack Obama released $ 10 million for the Syrian Coalition and Supreme Military Council which oversees the free Syrian army. This amount “Added to the $ 117 million in non -lethal assistance provided to the coalition of the Syrian opposition” , According to Caitlin Hayden, the spokesperson for the National Security Council, the White House foreign policy cabinet [ 52 ] . Control of the Syrian national council and the Muslim brothers [ modifier | Modifier and code ] For the Democratic Forum of Michel Kilo, the creation of the National Coalition still bears too much the brand of the Syrian National Council (CNS). According to political scientist Salam Kawakibi, he managed to take control of the new body: \u201cIt was they who imposed the term coalition, to signify that they keep their identity. They would also have demanded 40% of the positions. They should be able to control the coalition through alliances with groups and self -employed \u201d [ 7 ] . For Fabrice Balanche (November 2012), director of the Mediterranean and Middle East Research and Study Group and Professor at Lumi\u00e8re Lyon 2 University, “The coalition [is] dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, it is hardly surprising to see at its head one of their traveling companions (Mouaz al-Khatib), close to their ideology, which also defends political Islam” . Haytham Manaa, president of the National Committee for Democratic Change, joins this analysis and affirms: “This moderate, although he says he is independent, cannot go in the opposite direction wanted by the Islamist conservatives who have control over this coalition” [ 53 ] . According to Rapha\u00ebl Lef\u00e8vre (March 2013), doctoral student in international relations at the University of Cambridge, their political sense, their alliances and their discipline, “gave the Muslim Brotherhood a major role, especially within the opposition in exile, in The Syrian National Council (CNS) and, today, within the national coalition. Allies objectives of the jihadists, the Muslim Brotherhood, without having named brigades engaged in Syria, would also have acquired a military weight there by funding, arming and causing several groups in the Idleb and Aleppo regions. Chased from the country in the 1980s, they would have returned to the “released” areas and would have “operated on massive recruitment”, having their affiliates elected to the head of municipal councils. To counter the persistent distrust of Syrian society towards them, \u201cthey bet on a powerful communication strategy [\u2026]. They have just launched a newspaper in early February [2013], Al AHD (the promise), and they are about to launch a private television channel in northern Syria. \u00bb. Still according to Rapha\u00ebl Lef\u00e8vre, they are supported by Qatar, but especially by Turkey: “They want to do what Ennahdha did in Tunisia: returning to the country, massively recruiting young people, establishing a social base after years of repression, Participate in elections, make alliances, even if they may seem unnatural. They are aware of the distrust they arouse in Syria, a complex that makes them advance with half -covered face. They are guided above all by a spirit of revenge after the massacre of Hama and that of Aleppo, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. ” [ 54 ] . The second point of the founding document of the coalition provides that “the signatory parties agree to work for the fall of the regime, and of all its symbols and pillars, and for the dismantling of its safety bodies, by pursuing all those who were involved in crimes against the Syrians \u201d. This position makes journalist Georges Malbrunot fear a chaotic scenario similar to that which followed the Iraq war [ 4 ] . According to Denise Natali, professor at the National Defense University, the coalition represents better the interests of its foreign support than those of the Syrians of the interior, and is distinguished from the Syrian national council only by being carried out by Qatar and The other States of the Persian Gulf instead of Turkey [ 55 ] . For journalist Benjamin Barthe, “Like the Syrian National Council, its predecessor in the role of the number one representative of the opposition, the [Coalition] remains the prey of ego quarrels” . Bassma Kodmani, Syrian opponent, joins this observation by also pointing to the international community: \u201cIt is true that there are operating problems. But what is the course? There is no prospect of negotiations or prospects for military intervention or armaments of the insurgents. Everyone is lost. If the international community had a specific project, it would be much easier for us to organize ourselves \u201d [ 51 ] . In July 2015, a survey commissioned by the BBC was conducted in Syria by the Institute International Orb. It relates to a sample of 1,365 people, including 674 in the area controlled by the Syrian government, 430 in the area controlled by the rebels, 170 in the Islamic State and 90 in the zone controlled by the Kurds. However, the results are to be taken with care, the respondents who have been able to guide their responses by fears of reprisals. To the question: “What do you think of the influence of this actor (the Syrian national coalition) on the war in Syria? \u00bbThe answers are [ 56 ] : In the area controlled by the Syrian government: 5% “completely positive”, 6% “rather positive”, 28% “rather negative”, 59% “completely negative”, 2% “do not know”; In the rebels controlled area: 17% “completely positive”, 25% “rather positive”, 24% “rather negative”, 32% “completely negative”, 2% “do not know”; In the Islamic State controlled area: 11% “completely positive”, 26% “rather positive”, 31% “rather negative”, 32% “completely negative”, 0% “do not know”; In the Kurdish controlled area: 12% “completely positive”, 28% “rather positive”, 31% “rather negative”, 26% “completely negative”, 3% “do not know”; Set of Syria: 10% “completely positive”, 16% “rather positive”, 27% “rather negative”, 45% “completely negative”, 2% “do not know”. \u2191 A B and C Syria: Jarba elected president of the opposition coalition , Release , July 6, 2013 \u2191 Ahmad Jarba elected president of the Syrian opposition coalition , The world , July 6, 2013 \u2191 a et b Syria: two of the main Islamist groups reject the national coalition , The world , 19 November 2012 \u2191 a et b “After Assad: does the opposition want to reissue the Iraqi scenario? \u00bb\u00bb , Georges Malbrunot for Le Figaro , 12 November 2012 \u2191 a et b Will the “friends of Syria” finally hear the calls of the Syrian people? , Leverrier Ignatius for The world , December 12, 2012 \u2191 Composition of the “National Coalition of Forces of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition” on The world . \u2191 a et b “The Syrian opposition is gathering” , Le Figaro , 11 November 2012 \u2191 a et b Syria: Moaz al-Khatib, received at the Elys\u00e9e Palace on Saturday as president , Humanity , November 17, 2012 \u2191 a et b Before the Paris meeting, the Syrian national coalition presses the step , Leverrier Ignatius for The world , January 21, 2013 \u2191 Where is the Syrian political opposition? , The new observer , 4 mars 2013 \u2191 Ghassan Hitto elected interim prime minister by the Syrian opposition , The world , 19 mars 2013 \u2191 A B and C Syria: bad diplomatic games destabilize the revolution , Mediapart , April 2, 2013 \u2191 The Syrian national coalition refuses the resignation of its chief , The world , 24 mars 2013 \u2191 Ahmed Moazz al Khatib remains at the head of the Syrian national coalition , Leverrier Ignatius for The world , 24 mars 2013 \u2191 (in) Moaz al-Khatib’s resignation plunges Syrian opposition into chaos , The Guardian , 24 mars 2013 \u2191 Syria: opposition divisions, fruits of rivalries between Doha and Ryad , Release , 27 mars 2013 \u2191 The Syrian brothers under the fire of criticism. 1 \/ The designation of Ghassan Hitto , Leverrier Ignatius for The world , April 4, 2013 \u2191 Syria: the army is advancing in Qoussair, the opponents trample in Istanbul , The world , May 25, 2013 \u2191 Syria. Echos of the General Assembly of the National Coalition (last day) , Leverrier Ignatius for The world , May 31, 2013 \u2191 Syria: the opposition coalition loses a weight ally , L’Express , June 3, 2013 \u2191 Syria: the Prime Minister of the opposition resigns , The world , July 8, 2013 \u2191 The Syrian opposition elects Ahmad Toumeh Prime Minister , The new observer , September 14, 2013 \u2191 Syria: important rebel groups advocate sharia and reject the national coalition , lemonde.fr, September 25, 2013 \u2191 The Syrian opposition sets its conditions before the Geneva 2 conference , The world , November 3, 2013 \u2191 Syria: the opposition agrees to participate in the Geneva 2 conference , The world , 11 November 2013 \u2191 Syria. What does Ahmed Tomeh’s provisional government composition? (1\/2) , Blog of Ignace Leverrier associated with World , 25 November 2013 \u2191 Ignace Blog Leverrier for The world , Syria. What does the composition of Ahmed Tomeh tell us about the composition of the provisional government? (2\/2) , December 16, 2013 \u2191 “Ahmed Jarba re -elected at the head of the Syrian national coalition”, in Le Figaro , Monday January 6, 2014, page 7. \u2191 The Syrian opposition in exile will participate in the Geneva Peace Conference 2 , The world , January 18, 2014 \u2191 Syria: Ban Ki-moon withdraws from Iran its invitation for the Geneva Peace Conference , Le Figaro , January 20, 2014 \u2191 Syria: Washington supports the opposition , BBC Africa, May 5, 2014 \u2191 Syria: the coalition bringing together the opposition has a new chief , Point , July 10, 2014 \u2191 (in) ‘ Syria opposition names interim leader \u00bb , on Al Jazeera English (consulted the July 11, 2014 ) \u2191 (in) ‘ Syrian Coalition Re-elects Presidential Body for 2nd Term \u00bb (consulted the August 10, 2015 ) \u2191 (in) \u00ab\u00a0Syria crisis: Gulf states recognise Syria opposition\u00a0\u00bb , BBC News , 13 November 2012. \u2191 Syria: Paris will host an “ambassador” of the opposition , Point , November 17, 2012 \u2191 a et b The Syrian opposition chief demands weapons from the international community , The world , November 13, 2012 \u2191 London recognizes the Syrian national coalition as the only legitimate representative , The world , 20 November 2012 \u2191 The EU recognizes the coalition of the opposition as a legitimate representative of the Syrians , The world , 19 November 2012 \u2191 Washington recognizes the Syrian national coalition , The world , December 12, 2012 \u2191 [first] , Figaro , December 12, 2012. \u2191 Arab League: the Syrian seat attributed to the opposition (TV) , Ria Novosti, 6 Mars 2013 \u2191 (in) Islamic groups reject Syria opposition bloc , France 24, 19 November 2012 \u2191 Syria: how the Syrian opposition was scuttled , Point , October 29, 2013 \u2191 The new observer : SYRIA. Why Syrian rebels reject the national coalition \u2191 “Syria: the coalition of the useful opposition if it dialogues with Damascus (Moscow)” , Ria Novosti, 12 November 2012 \u2191 Syria: Paris and the opposition reject any transition under the aegis of Assad , L’Express , December 27, 2012 \u2191 A B C and D Syria: “Western countries must respect their commitments” , The world , February 25, 2013 \u2191 Washington doubles his non-L\u00e9tale aid for the Syrian opposition , France 24, April 21, 2013 \u2191 France allocates 1.2 million euros to the coalition of the Syrian opposition , The world , November 26, 2012 \u2191 a et b The dynamics of the Syrian opposition seem to run out of steam , The world , January 29, 2013 \u2191 Syria: Obama unlocks ten million dollars in non -lethal aid to the rebels , The world , April 12,2013 \u2191 The reinforced Muslim Brotherhood in the opposition by the arrival of Al-Khatib , France 24, November 13, 2012 \u2191 Rapha\u00ebl Lef\u00e8vre: “The Muslim Brothers dominate the Syrian opposition” , La Croix, March 27, 2013. \u2191 (in) Will the New Syrian Opposition Survive? , Al-Monitor , November 27, 2012 \u2191 A sounding that breathes: the opinion of the Syrians , Political , October 20, 2015. 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