Accords Darlan-Kato — Wikipedia

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A wikipedia article, free l’encyclopéi.

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THE accords Darlan-Kato , signed the , govern relations between the Japanese Empire and the Vichy government in the territory of French Indochina following the Japanese invasion of 1940.

Following the French defeat of June 1940, the Japanese demanded from Governor General Georges Catroux the closure of the Chinese border to convoys landed in Hai Phong, transporting materials and fuels in China. Catroux is forced to assign the northern border to the Japanese. The Vichy authorities revoke him for authorizing a foreign intervention on French territory and replacing it with the vice-admiral of squadron Jean Decoux.

The , after a few procrastination, Decoux is forced to sign with the Japanese a territorial and military cooperation agreement, which, in exchange for the recognition of French sovereignty on Indochina, makes available to the Japanese, north of the Red River, Three aerodromes allowing parking of 6,000 men.

In addition, the Japanese army can freely cross Tonkin, north of the Indochinese peninsula, to fight Chinese troops from Yunnan. The agreement also stipulates that in the event of difficulties in the face of the Chinese, the Japanese would benefit from French aid for a possible reset to Hai Phong. However, the number of Japanese soldiers in Indochina is theoretically capped at 25,000 men.

This first agreement was quickly broken by the Japanese during the “Lạng Sơn affair” in .

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The Darlan-Kato agreements, negotiated by Jacques Benoist-Méchin, are signed the In Vichy and stop that France authorizes Japan to use its aerodromes in the south of Indochina and to park troops throughout Indochinese territory [ first ] .

Ambassador Kato says during negotiations that “The second reason for the business occupation was the need for military security” and declares that “Japan believes that certain foreign powers are based on a policy of encirclement of Japan and that the Japanese movement is purely a precautionary measure” .

The agreements pose the principle of a common defense, a provision which remains without effect. France later affirms its neutrality in the Pacific war and its refusal to participate in any offensive action. Japan also obtains raw materials and rice against commitment to respect French sovereignty on Indochina. The Japanese government is worried about a power cut in these foodstuffs, vital for Japan. The Japanese settle in Cambodia.

Negotiations for the application of agreements are left to the initiative of Admiral Decoux, which drags things to .

In the aftermath of the attack by Pearl Harbor, the Japanese still have an ultimatum to Decoux requesting the application without delay and without restriction of the Kato-Darlan agreements, where Japan will ensure total control of the Indochinese territory [ 2 ] .

The Vice Admiral of Wing Decoux obtains Japanese the distribution of defense areas. Surveillance of the Chinese border is entrusted to the French since we know that China has no intention of invading Indochina. All the ribs are entrusted to Japanese defense against the possible American or British landings.

The secretary general of the Government Georges Gautier justifies the behavior of Decoux during the month of , who believes that if Decoux had adopted a completely negative attitude and rejected Japanese requirements: “It was the facility solution, that which would have made it possible to carve a reputation as a resistant before the letter, on the ruins of French sovereignty. »» It would be necessary to add “on the horrible sufferings and on the graves of most of the 46,000 French people present in Indochina, whether military or civilians” [Ref. necessary] .

For its part, free France declared war in Japan the day after Pearl Harbor, the .

  • Michel Huguier, De Gaulle, Roosevelt and Indochina from 1940 to 1945 , The Harmattan, .
  • Philippe Franchini, The lies of the Indochina War , Paris, Perrin, (ISBN  2-262-02345-X ) .
  1. Philippe Franchini, The lies of the Indochina War , on. Cit. p. 22
  2. Michel Huguier, De Gaulle, Roosevelt and Indochina from 1940 and 1945 , L’Harmattan, 2010, chap. IX, p. 143

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