Battle of the Gulf of Leyte

Battle of the Gulf of Leyte part of the campaign of the Philippines of the Second World War
October 24, 1944: the Japanese battle ship Musashi Under attack by the US planes of the Task Force 38
Data	23-26 October 1944
Place	Gulf of Loyte Island, Iserte, Philippines
Outcome	Decisive tactical and strategic victory victory
Sides
Commanders
Effective
8 Portaere aircraft 8 read lapses 18 spare aircraft carrier 12 battle ships 24 cruisers 141 destroyer and minor units Numerous motorboats, submarines and auxiliary ships ~ 1 500 planes 1 aircraft carrier 3 I would read reading 9 battleships 14 heavy cruisers 6 light cruisers 35 destroyer about About 300 planes (including planes with ground base)
Losses
1 light aircraft carrier 2 spare aircraft carriers 3 destroyer 1 minor unit ~ 1 500 men 4 aircraft carriers (3 light) 3 battleships 10 cruisers 9 destroyer ~ 10 000 men
Voices of battles on Wikipedia
Manual

The Battle of the Gulf of Leyte It was an aeronaval clash of the Pacific Theater of the Second World War which, between 23 and 26 October 1944, saw the allied and those of the Japanese empire face. About 200 miles off of the Filipino island of the same name was held in four main clashes (the battle for the Sea of ​​Sibuyan and those of the Strait of Surigao, the island of Samar and Capo Engaño) as well as several minor clashes; The name derives from the gulf of the same name where the US amphibious fleets were concentrated, the primary strategic objective of the Japanese aeronaval offensive.

Sometimes cited as Battle for the Gulf of Leyte and in the United States also as Second battle of the Philippine Sea ^[first] , is generally considered the largest naval battle of the Second World War and also, according to some estimates, the largest naval battle in modern history, in terms of total size of the ships involved. ^{[2] [3]} The battle is also the first in which Japanese planes attacked the enemies using the suicide bomber.

On October 20, 1944, the US troops invaded the island of Leyte with the strategic objective of isolating Japan from the territories of Southeast Asia subjected to its domain, thus subtracting them essential industrial supplies, in particular rubber and oil from the Indies Dutch Oriental. In response to the American attack, the Japanese imperial navy mobilized almost all of its remaining major naval units, in an attempt to overturn the outcome of the clash, but was rejected by the third and by the seventh fleet of the United States Navy in four distinct fights; Numerous Japanese ships, including four aircraft carriers and three battle ships, were flowed and the Japanese counter -offensive fails to ruinously: the imperial navy was swept away as efficient military force and the possibility, in the last phase of the war, was precluded to face one New battle against predominant allied fleets. Most of the largest surviving units, due to the scarcity of available fuel and air crews, ended up remaining inactive at its bases until the end of the war in the Pacific.

The allied strategy [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

The allied campaigns conducted from August 1942 to March 1944 had rejected the Japanese forces from many of their insular positions of the southern and central Pacific, while isolating different bases (especially the Air Force of Rabaul). In June 1944, thanks to a series of amphibian landings supported by the Fast Carrier Task Force of the fifth American fleet, the Southern Marian islands were occupied: it was thus broken the innermost of the strategic defense rings of Japan and the allies conquered a base from which The long-ray Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers could have operated against the Japanese metropolitan territory. The Japanese contracted shortly after the success of the landings, committing a large part of their combat fleet but in the battle of the Philippines the American navy destroyed three Japanese aircraft carriers and about four hundred planes, leaving the Japanese imperial navy with a very weakened and private aeronaval force of expert crews ^{[4] [5]} .

For subsequent operations, the head of the naval operations, Admiral Ernest King, and other members of the joint staff suggested the isolation of Japanese forces in the Philippines and a main attack on the colony of Formosa, to give the allies the control of the maritime routes between the Japan and southern Asia. Army General Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of South West Pacific Area, however preferred an invasion of the Philippines, since they were along the refueling routes to Japan and also because leaving them in the hands of employment troops would have meant a blow to the US prestige; The islands had been under US domain since 1898 and the Japanese invasion had occurred despite a defense and military assistance agreement that committed the United States with the Philippines. In March 1942 MacArthur himself had been obliged to leave the command of the archipelago in front of the Japanese advance, however formulating the intention to return: the general believed therefore a point of honor to fulfill his commitment and regain the Philippines with a campaign terrestrial ^[6] .

Finally, the considerable aerial power that the Japanese had accumulated in the Philippines, both as the aviation of the imperial army and as a naval aviation, was considered a danger for the naval movements allied by many high degrees external to the joint staff (including the commander in the head of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz) and impossible to ignore. However, the initial plans of Nimitz and MacArthur were conflicting: the Admiral led to the invasion of Formosa and the recent Japanese refueling lines to and from Southeast Asia ^[6] ; The island could also serve as a basis for an invasion of China, which Macarthur, however, considered unnecessary. A meeting between the two high officers and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt served to confirm the Philippines as a strategic objective, but he had less influence than what has sometimes been supported in the final decision to invade the archipelago. Nimitz eventually changed his mind and agreed with the Macarthur plan ^[7] .

Perhaps the most decisive consideration against the China-Formosa plan, as hypothesized by Admiral Ernest King and by others, was that the invasion of Formosa would have requested a quantity of terrestrial forces much larger than those available in the Pacific at the end of 1944 e It would not have been practicable until the defeat of Nazi Germany had made additional divisions allied by the European War theater available ^[8] . In any case, in the Formosa-Filippine-Isle Ryūkyū-southern Ryppine area there were over 1 200 combat planes of the Navy and the imperial army, which constituted a serious threat to the allied naval forces; Therefore it was decided by the American Staff to eliminate or in any case resize this threat, implementing a series of attacks against the air bases of Formosa and the Philippines from 10 to 20 October ^[9] .

The Allied Operational Plan [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

As a bridge head for the reconquest of the Philippines, the island of Leyte was chosen, in the central part of the archipelago: the transport of the invasion force and the close naval support would have been provided by the seventh American fleet, commanded by the deputy amateur Thomas Kinkaid and also including units of the Royal Australian Navy ^[ten] . The third American fleet of beams William Halsey, with the aircraft carriers of the Task Force 38 (the “Fast Carrier Task Force” of the vice -ammamiral Marc Mitscher) as the main component, would instead have provided a distance coverage of the seventh fleet and support for the invasion, attacking the enemy air bases and any naval force that had tried to hinder the landings ^[11] .

In the framework of the preventive attacks and to divert Japanese attention from the Philippines, on October 12, 1944 the third fleet of Admiral Halsey began a series of incursions launched by the aircraft carriers against Formosa and the Ryūkyū islands, with the idea of ​​making sure that the Basic planes on site could not intervene in the landings in Leyte; The Japanese command replied by launching waves of air attacks against the aircraft carriers of the third fleet, and in what Morison reports as a “hard and exhausting struggle between planes based on the aircraft carrier and basic planes” the Japanese were defeated by losing over 500 aircraft in Three days, almost the entire air force in the region. Other diversive actions saw a bombing of the Marcus island on 9 October and incursions of the British aircraft carriers against the Nicobar islands between 17 and 21 October ^[twelfth] .

A serious and fundamental defect of this plan was that the allies would not have had a naval commander in the head of the operation: the seventh fleet was placed under the authority of General MacArthur, while Admiral Halsey depended on Nimitz ^[13] . This lack of a unified command, together with communication problems, would have produced a crisis and risked causing a strategic disaster for allied forces ^[14] .

The Japanese Operational Plan [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

The allied options were also clear to the Japanese imperial navy. The commander of the combined fleet, Admiral Soemu Toyoda, prepared four “victorious floors” (捷 １ 号 作戦 作戦 作戦 作戦 作戦 作戦 作戦 号 号 号 号 号 号 号 号 号 Shō Ichigō sakusen ): Shi-gō 1 it was an important naval operation in the Philippines, while Shi-gō 2 , Shi-gō 3 It is Shi-gō 4 As answers to the aerial attacks brought by the American on Formosa, the Ryūkyū islands and the Curile islands were configured respectively. The high Japanese command considered an invasion of the Philippines more likely, with Leyte as the first objective, but without having certainty it could not be taken preventive measures and therefore in any case the Japanese counterattack would have come to the completed landings ^[15] . The Japanese reaction speed was also compromised by the dispersion of its naval resources: the attacks of the submarine allies to the Japanese commercial routes had affected the refueling of fuel to Japan to such an , closer to the oil wells of the Borneo; Only the aircraft carrier had remained in Japanese waters, to allow the training pilots training ^[16] .

With the beginning of the US invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese navy passed to the plan Shi-gō 1 ^[14] But the serious losses of aircraft suffered in the clashes on Formosa forced the Japanese to review the original plan. Although it was still very relying on the basic planes on the ground to weaken the US forces, the invasion fleet was to be attacked and destroyed by a surface naval team, which is difficult to create until the Halsey aircraft carrier crossed in the area. It was therefore decided to attract the third fleet away from Leyte with a stratagem: the vice -ammite -aircraft team Jisaburō Ozawa (3rd fleet or northern strength) would have crossed off the coast of Luzon, acting as a bait to induce Halsey to move north. Once these had moved away, the combined fleet from Singapore would have fallen into the area of ​​landings with a pincer maneuver: the 2nd fleet or central force of the admiral Takeo Kurita, including the main units of the fleet, would have traveled the Strait of San Bernardino arriving from the North, while the smallest southern strength of the Admiral Shōji Nishimura (detached from the Great under the orders of Kurita) would have come from the south through the Strait of Surigao; Since the Nishimura unit was quite weak, it was at the last moment flanked by a third naval team from Japan, the 5th fleet led by deputy amateur Kiyohide Shima ^{[17] [18]} .

The last minute adaptations caused several problems: there was no unique commander, each Japanese admiral had a vague idea of ​​the movements of the other groups, Nishimura and Shima had no instructions on how to collaborate and the basic planes on the ground were not able to provide protection to Japanese ships, because they are sent to attack the US ones ^[17] . It was highly likely that one or more of the attacker forces would come, but Toyoda later explained the thing as follows: ^[19]

«If we had lost during the operations in the Philippines, even if the fleet had remained, the refueling line in the south would have been completely cut out, so that the fleet, even if she had returned to Japanese waters, could not have obtained its refueling of fuel . If he had remained in the southern waters, he could not have received supplies of weapons and ammunition. There was no reason to save the fleet at the expense of the loss of the Philippines. ”

At dawn of October 17, 1944 special units of the US Rangers began to attack the Japanese coastal artillery stations that presided over access to the Gulf of Leyte: in Tokyo the admiral Toyoda played these actions as the prelude to allied landings in Leyte and the 08:09 issued the alert for the plan Shi-gō 1 to all Japanese units, even if the final executive order was issued at 11:00 on 18 October; At 01:00 on 19 October the combined fleet left Singapore to the Bay Bay of Brunei, where the definitive orders were supplied and expected. At dawn on 20 October the US forces kicked off the landings in Leyte, quickly establishing a solid bridge head; That same afternoon, Ozawa’s aircraft carriers left Japan to Luzon, going unnoticed through the relevant allies’ detection line. At 08:00 on 22 October Kurita and her central force sailed to the Strait of San Bernardino, leaving behind the Nishimura unit which, having to travel a lower distance, remained in the port for another 24 hours; The reinforcement team of Shima Sallò from Japan on the morning of 22, remaining west of the Philippines during his long journey to reunite with Nishimura ^[20] .

Sailed from its base in Brunei, Kurita’s central force ordered the two supercoreties Yamato It is Musashi , of the oldest battleship Nagato , of the two fast battle ships Kongo It is Aaron , ten heavy cruisers ( Atago , Maya , Takao , Chokai , Myoko , Haged , Kumano , Suzuya , Tone It is CHIKUMA ), two light cruisers ( NOSHIRO It is Yahagi ) and fifteen destroyers ^{[21] [22]} .

Kurita’s ships passed the Palawan island around midnight between 22 and 23 October, where the Uss submarines Darter Euss Fit they were positioned on the surface. At 00:16 of 23 October the radar of Darter He identified the Japanese formation about 27 kilometers away and the captain quickly obtained visual contact. The two submarines move quickly on the hunt for ships and the Darter He made the first of three contact reports: at least one of these was captured by a radio operator of the Yamato , but Kurita did not take the appropriate anti-Sommerible countermeasures ^{[21] [23]} .

The Darter and the Fit , traveling to the surface at full speed, after several hours they obtained a launch position in front of Kurita’s formation, with the intention of making an immersion attack at the first light of dawn. At 06:34 the Darter He released a save of six torpedoes, of which at least four centered the flagship of Kurita, the cruiser Atago ^{[23] [24]} ; Ten minutes after the Darter , with another series of bombs, made two centers on the twin of the Atago , The Takao . Finally, at 06:56, four torpedoes of Fit they hit the cruiser Maya , belonging to the same class of the other two units ^{[21] [23]} .

L’ Atago and the Maya They sank quickly, so much so that Kurita was forced to swim to save herself before being rescued by one of the destroyers, the Kishinami , and transferred to the Yamato ^[25] ; the injured party Takao He returned to Brunei, escorted by two destroyers and chased by the two submarines. On October 24 at 01:05, while the damaged cruiser followed, the Darter He inclined on Bombay’s dry, in the Strait of Palawan: all attempts to free him failed and was then abandoned after an unsuccessful attempt at sabotage at 05:55, to then be sunk by the Uss submarine Nautilus ; The entire crew was however rescued by Fit ^[25] . The Takao He returned to Singapore, where he remained for the rest of the war under repair ^{[26] [27]} .

The third fleet had at that moment in the Task Force 38 his operating arm, divided into four Task Group of unequal aircraft carrier. On October 22, Halsey had sent two to the base of the fleet in Ulithi to supply and regain: when the report on the contact of the Darter , Halsey attracted the group of retro -education R. E. Davison (Task Group 38.4 – TG 38.4), consisting of two team launders ( Franklin ed Enterprise ) and a light ^[28] , but allowed that of the deputy amateur John S. McCain (Tg 38.1), thanks to three team launders ( Wasp , Hornet , Hancock ) and two escort ^[28] , to continue towards Ulithi; Halsey finally attracted McCain on October 24th ^[29] , but the delay meant that the most powerful group of U.S. aircraft carriers would play a marginal role in the battle that was outlined and the third fleet was in fact without almost 40% of its aerial force for most of the clash. On the morning of October 24, only three groups were available to hit any enemy forces approaching Leyte: in front of the Street of San Bernardino, the back 38.2 of the backstone Gerald F. Bogan was positioned, which was however also the weakest, having only one large aircraft carriers (the Intrepid , since the Bunker Hill had been detached for maintenance work the day before) and two aircraft carrier light ^{[21] [28]} ; Davison’s news 38.4 was in the south in front of the Gulf of Leyte while the last grouping, the news 38.3 of the countermerer Frederick Sherman, with two team holders (the Essex and the Lexington ) and two light, he was north off the coast of Luzon ^[28] .

During the night the ships of the Task Group of the third fleet had approached the coast, ready to launch air attacks on Kurita’s team; On the morning of 24, all the Task Group launched reconnaissance flights to detect the position of the units spotted by Darter : at 08:12 a aircraft of the Intrepid He almost locked the Kurita ships intent on dubbing the southern tip of Mindoro and enthusiasts in the sea of ​​Sibuyan ^[30] ; Underson that the goal of the Japanese was to travel the Strait of San Bernardino to fall on the area of ​​the landings in Leyte, Halsey ordered the news of Sherman and Davison to approach that of Bogan to attack the enemy. While these movements were underway, at 09:05 one of the reconnaissance of Davison warned the southern strength of Nishimura intent on crossing the Sulu sea: Halsey once again guessed the intentions of the Japanese, headed towards the Strait of Surigao, but believed that Kinkaid’s seventh fleet had sufficient strength to cope with this threat and returned to focus his attention on Kurita ^{[thirty first]} .

Planes of the Intrepid and of Cabot , belonging to the Bogan group, attacked the Japanese fleet around 10:30, hitting the battleships Nagato , Yamato , Musashi and seriously damaging the heavy cruiser Myoko . A second wave from the aircraft carrier Intrepid , Essex It is Lexington he later attacked: of the various air groups, the 15th of the Essex Centrò ten more times the Musashi ; while the latter retired, by turning a third wave of Babordo Enterprise and from the Franklin He hit her with eleven bombs and eight torpedoes ^{[21] [32]} .

Kurita brought her fleet back to get out of the aircraft ray, overcoming the damaged Musashi , which had already postponed back to 2:52 pm towards the Pescadores Islands under the escort of the destroyers KIYOSHIMO It is Hamakaze , and waited until 5:15 pm before reversing the march again and head towards the Strait of San Bernardino; there Musashi , seriously damaged, turned upside down and sank around 19:30, despite the attempts of his commander of getting it embedded ^{[21] [32]} .

In the meantime, the deputy amateur Takijirō ōnishi had directed three waves of the 1st air fleet located in Luzon against the aircraft carriers of news 38.3 of Contramiraglio Sherman (whose aircraft were committed to hitting the Filipino Air fields to prevent similar Japanese attacks against ships in the ships in Gulf of Leyte); Each of ōnishi attack waves consisted of 50 or 60 planes for 199 aircraft. The imperial army also launched its 2nd air division against the US fleet with three waves of 80, 38 and 29 planes, from 08:00 to sunset, but with poor results: a seaplane support ship and a landing vehicle were considered Sooled, two cruisers and five damaged transport ^{[21] [33]} .

Much of the Japanese planes took place was intercepted, demolished or put on the run by the F6f Hellcat of the air patrols of Sherman, especially by the two hunting sections of the Essex , led by frigate captain David McCampbell (to whom the demolition of nine enemy planes was credited in this only action); The losses of the aviation of Navy Navy were 67 planes against 32 US ^[33] . Anyway, a Yokosuka D4Y “Judy” bomber passed beyond the defenses and at 09:38 he hit the aircraft carrier Princeton With a 250 -kilo piercing bomb, causing a serious fire in the hangar of the ship: the emergency fire -fighting system did not work and the fire spread rapidly, quickly causing a series of strong outbreaks. The flames were gradually brought under control and some escort ships were sent to provide assistance: the destroyer Irwin , not being able to support the aircraft carrier because of the high waves, spread along the side of the nets to allow the sailors who threw themselves into the sea to get on board, while with gusts of machine gun they held the sharks at bay ^[34] ; The only Irwin He recovered 646 sailors and the episode yielded a navy unit commendation to the ship ^[35] . The destroyer Morrison , who had tried to approach after recovering 460 sailors, was slammed against the side of the Princeton losing the military tree and the front smoke ^[36] . While the rescue operations continued a new Japanese air raid: at 15:23 there was a huge explosion (probably in the bomb deposit), causing other victims on the Princeton and even heavier losses (over 300) aboard theunger Birmingham , supported to help tame the fire and forced to retire for the damage suffered; Other vessels nearby were also damaged. All attempts to save the Princeton they failed and it came in the end sunk with the torpedoes from the lightunner light Reno at 5:50 pm ^{[21] [34]} , while the survivors were reported by Birmingham , from Irwin and from Morrison in Ulithi on October 27th ^[36] .

On October 24, overall, the third fleet launched 259 sorties against the Japanese central force, largely composed of F6f Hellcat huntbombardieri, but this amount of attacks was not enough to neutralize the threat brought by Kurita ^[37] : most of the attacks in the sea of ​​Sibuyan were directed against a single ship, the Musashi , hit with a total of 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes from planes from the aircraft carrier Essex , Intrepid It is Franklin , and this left the other Kurita units relatively ^{[21] [38]} , with only the heavy cruiser Myoko forced to abandon the training after being damaged at 10:29 by a torpedo launched by a plane of the Intrepid . ^[39] Other ships were damaged, including the Tone hit by a bomb, but they could all continue the mission ^[40] .

At this stage, the US battle ships were still framed in the TF 38 task groups, precisely in news 38.2 and 38.3 ^[28] . As a result of the important decision that will be taken later by Admiral Halsey, Kurita was able to proceed through the Strait of San Bernardino during the night and to make an unexpected appearance off the coast of Samar the following morning ^[41] .

La Task Force 34 [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

After the central and southern forces of the Japanese were identified, but before the aircraft carrier of Ozawa, Halsey and the largest staff of the third fleet were located, aboard the battleship New Jersey , prepared an emergency plan to face the threat from Kurita’s team: their intent was to cover the Strait of San Bernardino with a powerful task force of fast battle ships supported by two of the groups of launder of the third fleet; This force would have been designated Task Force 34 and was to consist of 4 battleships, 5 cruisers and 14 destroyers, under the command of the deputy amateur Willis Lee ^[42] . The recipient Davison, of the Task Group 38.4, would have been in command of the supporting groups.

At 15:12 on 24 October Halsey sent a radio message to the commanders of the groups subordinated to him ^{[21] [43]} , providing the details of the emergency plan: the two fast battleships of 31 knots of the 7th division, the New Jersey and the Iowa , together with the Alabama and to the Washington (both of 27/28 knots), assisted by a robust escort, would have formed the Nerbo of the TF 34 and materially fought the clash, while the I would hold them of the two task groups 38.2 and 38.4 had to be held “away from surface fights”; The instructions to the other two Task Group 38.1 (thanks to 5 heavy cruisers and 3 light) and 38.3 (which also included the other two battleships South Dakota It is Massachusetts And the four light cruisers of the 13th cruiser division) would have been provided later. So, despite the fact that the 38.1 Tg was still in Ulithi for the refueling, the news 38.3, left free, would still have had a fire power comparable to that of the escort ships to the Ozawa aircraft carriers.

This message was sent in copy to Nimitz, at the Pacific Fleet headquarters, but not to the commander of the seventh fleet Thomas Kinkaid, who however learned “orignery” radio communications ^[42] ; The Task Force 34, however, was not immediately formed off the Street of San Bernardino as expected. This message would then lead to a disastrous misunderstanding and would have had a profound influence on the subsequent course of the battle ^{[21] [43]} . Lee had however repeatedly asked Halsey to detach a coverage force and prepare a battle plan, but he felt able to face the Japanese battle team by relying on the artillery of his units as well as on the two aircraft carriers with a total of about 60 aircraft ^[44] .

“North with three groups” [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

In spite of his role as bait for the allied forces, the northern force of Ozawa had continued to navigate unchallenged off the coast of Luzon without still having been spotted by the enemy; To attract attention to himself, at 08:20 on 24 October the admiral launched 76 of the 100 planes he had against the aircraft carriers of the news 38.3 of Sherman: the aircraft arrived in conjunction with the assaults of the Japanese forces based on land and Sherman, also engaged with the complex rescue maneuvers of the Princeton , does not notice that the new attack came from enemy aircraft carriers ^[45] . The lack of interest of the US for his training pushed Ozawa to be more decisive and at 14:30 the battleships detached Whereas It is Hyuga sending them to the south, closer to the third fleet; The move gave the desired result and at 3:40 pm two planes of the Davison group, returning to their aircraft carriers, spotted the Japanese battleships: the decrease in enemy attacks allowed Sherman to follow up on the sighting and at 16:40 i His surveyors identified the rest of the strength of Ozawa ^{[29] [forty six]} . Having obtained the attention of the US, Ozawa attracted the battleships, but that evening he intercepted a (erroneous) American communication that described the retirement of Kurita and therefore decided to retire too; However, his move was stopped by Toyoda at 20:00, who ordered all the forces to attack “confiding in divine assistance”: Ozawa reversed the route and headed south to Leyte ^[47] .

Halsey was convinced that northern force constituted the main Japanese threat and was determined to grasp what seemed like a golden occasion to destroy the remaining Japanese aircraft carriers. Believing in the exaggerated relationships of his pilots, who claimed many centers on Japanese ships ^[42] The admiral was convinced that the central force had been neutralized by the air attacks brought at the beginning of the day in the sea of ​​Sibuyan and that the rest was retiring; Halsey then communicated via radio to Nimitz and Kinkaid, the ships of which it had to protect ^{[21] [43]} :

( IN ) «CENTRAL FORCE HEAVILY DAMAGED ACCORDING TO STRIKE REPORTS. AM PROCEEDING NORTH WITH THREE GROUPS TO ATTACK CARRIER FORCES AT DAWN»

( IT ) “Very damaged central force according to the attachment relationships. I am proceeding north with three groups To attack the aircraft carriers at dawn ”

The word with three groups (“With three groups”) they would have proved to be misleading. In light of Halsey’s message of 24 October at 3:12 pm, Admiral Kinkaid and his General Staff understood, as well as Nimitz at the Pacific headquarters, that the Task Force 34 commanded by Lee had already been formed: they assumed that Halsey he was leaving this powerful surface strength to guard the Strait of San Bernardino, to cover the northern side of the seventh fleet, and that he was bringing only the three groups of aircraft carriers at his disposal north, in pursuit of the ships of Ozawa ^[48] . But the Task Force 34, although formed later that night, had not really been detached and Lee’s warships had remained aggregated to the aircraft carriers of the third fleet: Halsey consciously and deliberately left the Strait of San Bernardino without the slightest protection. As Woodward wrote: «Everything was taken away from the Strait of San Bernardino. A dragamine was not left ” ^[49] .

Halsey and its official staff officers ignored the information from an aircraft for the night reconnaissance that operated from the aircraft carrier Independence , according to which the powerful surface force of Kurita was returning to the Strait of San Bernardino and that, after a long darkening, the navigation lights in the Strait had been lit: when the Bogan recipient, under the command of news 38.2, sent for radio This information to Halsey’s admiral was dismissed by an officer of the General Staff who concluded: “Yes, yes, we have that information”. In the meantime, deputy amateur Lee had correctly deduced that the force of Ozawa served as a bait, but when it communicated the thing to Halsey was the same way ignored. Commodor Arleigh Burke and the commander James Flatley, of the General Staff of the deputy amateur Marc Mitscher (commander of the Task Force 38 and subordinate of Halsey, who was the commander of the third fleet), had reached the same conclusion: they were so worried about the situation who woke up Mitscher, who asked “Admiral Halsey has this relationship?”; When he was replied that Halsey was informed, Mitscher, knowing Halsey’s temperament too well, commented “if he wants my advice he will ask me” and went back to sleep ^{[21] [50]} .

The entire strength of the third fleet therefore continued to proceed in the north direction, moving away from the Strait of San Bernardino to 25 knots ^[43] .

Forces on the pitch [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

After being sighted at 09:05 on October 24, the Nishimura team had undergone an attack on the aircraft of the third fleet, however, reporting only minor damage: once the Davison’s Task Group was recalled north by Halsey, the Japanese ships they were left undisturbed to continue navigation towards the Strait of Surigao ^[51] . Nishimura’s strength included the battleships Yamashiro It is Melted , the heavy cruiser Mogami and four destroyers. About 40 kilometers back there was the SHIMA reinforcement unit: after detaching several units to perform secondary missions, its strength was reduced to the two heavy cruisers Nachi It is Ashigara , to the lightunner They are not standing and seven destroyers; spotted by a bomber of the US army around 12:00, it was attacked by the planes of the Franklin , who sank the destroyer Wakaba ^[52] , but otherwise it had been left undisturbed ^[51] . The radio silence and the fact that there were no instructions on how to collaborate meant that the two units of the southern strength actually acted independently and unbelieved; But also in Nishimura the obligation of radio silence prevented from becoming aware of the delays suffered by Kurita due to the air attacks suffered and when the southern force approached the Strait of Surigao, the central force was many hours behind the roadmap ^[51] .

In the meantime, the seventh fleet of Kinkaid was preparing a deadly trap for Japanese ships. Although conceived as a support unit to the amphibious operations of the army, the Kinkaid fleet had a good number of war units, albeit rather dated ^[53] : the contractor Jesse OludoRf with the Task Group 77.2 ordered six battleships West Virginia , Maryland , Mississippi , Tennessee , California It is Pennsylvania , all except the Mississippi sunk or damaged in the attack of Pearl Harbor and then repaired; They were assisted by the four heavy cruisers Louisville (flagship), Portland , Minneapolis and hmas Shropshire (Australian), from the four light cruisers Denver , Columbia , Phoenix It is Boise And from 28 destroyers, as well as 39 patrols PT Boats. Three of these cruisers, the Boise , it Shropshire and the Phoenix , they constituted the Task Group 77.3 in command of the Berkey Reporting Reporter together with the Destroyer Squadron 54 destroyers (Desron 54) and others: the group had been sent to OludoRf as a reinforcement and constituted his right side ^{[54] [55]} .

Assuming that Halsey was continuing to supervise the north side of the seventh fleet, all the war units of this were concentrated south against Nishimura: missing of reconnaissance planes, OludoRf arranged his motorboats in sections of three along the whole mouth of the Strait , so that they reported the passage of Japanese ships and launched a first attack with their torpedoes; Following would have been the destroyers who attacked, divided into sections arranged on the two sides of the central and terminal part of the Strait, always using the torpedoes. Finally, the Japanese ships would have been targeted by the battleships and the cruisers, arranged in line with a traverse at the exit of the Strait ^{[21] [56]} .

The fight [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

At 22:36 on 24 October one of the motorboats, the PT-131 , obtained the first contact with the Japanese ships in approach, kicking off the battle; At 00:25 on 25 October Oldndorf began to receive reports on contact, the first accurate indications on the position of the southern force for over fourteen hours. Until 02:13, section after section, the small US units launched themselves against Japanese ships only to be rejected by the intense fire of response of the enemy; of the thirty motorboats used in the action, none managed to score blows on the enemy units, the PT-493 it was sunk and ten fled damaged ^{[21] [54] [57]} .

As the PT reports reached OludoRf, he turned them to the commanders of the detachments of destroyer located further north; At 02:40 the McGowan Del Desron 54 was the first to spot the Nishimura units, now in the center of the Strait ^[58] . At 03:00 three units of the squadron launched their torpedoes against the Japanese ships on the straight side, while nine minutes later two others made the same on the side of Babordo: the Yamashiro he collected a torpedo without problems, but the destroyer Yamagumo he was hit in full and quickly sinked by 03:19, the MICHISHIO he was immobilized and it Asagumo he lost the bow, even if, moving slowly, he was able to retire ^[59] ; struck by one or two torpedoes and in the throes of flames, the battleship Melted He went out of the formation and at 03:38 exploded threaded by breaking into two sections, which drifted down the strait ^[59] . Oldndorf reported in his preliminary report that “[…] at 03:20 the Comesron54 [commander of the 54th game of destroyer] notified a hit and a large explosion on a ship, seen by the flagship” ^{[21] [60]} . It was then the turn of Desron 24, who between 03:23 and 03:26 managed to place a second torpedo on the Yamashiro and to finish the MICHISHIO ; The last attack of the destroyers was between 03:54 and 04:14 but did not get results, also because the US battle line had started to fire: the destroyer Albert W. Grant He ended in the middle of the cronged fire, collecting seven Japanese bullets and eleven US that caused a total of 34 deaths and 94 injured ^{[sixty one]} .

At 03:16 the radar of the West Virginia They identified the surviving ships of Nishimura’s strength at a distance of 38 kilometers in the plus bottom darkness and obtained a 27 -kilometer shooting solution. At 03:51 Oldndorf ordered the cruisers to open fire with the main pieces of 150 mm: the allied units unleashed a high volume of fire on the enemy, with the only Columbia Which fired 1 147 shots in eighteen minutes. Two minutes after the West Virginia opened the fire with the eight 406 mm cannons of its main batteries at a distance of 21 kilometers, hitting the Yamashiro with his first save; He then continued by shooting 93 bullets in total. At 03:55 the California and the Tennessee , which shot a total of 69 and 63 355 mm bullets: the shooting system controlled by the radar allowed these ships to hit targets at a distance that is kept out of the japanese shooting range, whose shooting control systems were Less advanced. The other three US ships, equipped with less advanced artillery control radar, had difficulty obtaining a shooting solution: the Maryland In the end he managed to obtain visual contact thanks to the splashes produced by the bullets of the other ships and fired a total of 48 bullets of 406 mm; there Pennsylvania He could not find a target and his cannons remained silent, while the Mississippi He obtained a shooting solution at the end of the battle and shot only a complete save of twelve 360 ​​mm shots ^{[sixty one]} . This was the last save never shot by a battle ship against another ship of the same category ^[62] .

Japanese units embodied a large number of shots without almost having the opportunity to respond: flooded beyond any control, the Yamashiro He turned upside down slowly and sank at 04:19, bringing with him Nishimura and most of the crew, while the cruiser Mogami , although set on fire and with the destroyed control bridge, he managed to veer and slowly retire to the Strait; survived the US fire storm, the destroyer Shigure , the last remaining of the Nishimura group, managed to turn, but a blow damned his rudder by obliging him to drift south ^[63] .

Shima si ritira [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

About 65 kilometers behind Nishimura, the strength of the admiral Shima was at that moment entering the Strait of Surigao: the group was immediately targeted by the US motorboats and at 03:25 the PT-137 he managed to hit the light cruiser with a torpedo They are not standing , forcing him to leave training. Continuing up the Strait, at 04:10 Shima warned the two half of the Melted , he exchanged for the remains of both battleships of Nishimura: convinced that the avant -garde of the southern strength had been swept away, at 04:24 he gave order to turn and retire. While this maneuver was underway, the drift of the drift of the Mogami He appeared on the scene and ended up colliding with the cruiser Nachi : for a few minutes the two ships were stuck until the Nachi He was unable to free himself, continuing the retreat to the south at reduced speed; The group of Shima managed to join the Shigure , who had managed to repair the damage to the helm ^{[sixty four]} .

Although started immediately, the pursuit of the enemy defeated by Olandorf proved unconvinced: at 05:20 his cruisers sighted and opened fire on the wreck of the Mogami , but fearing a Japanese counterattack in the uncertain light of the Alba Oldndorf ordered them to retire at 05:37, instead requesting the Kinkaid aircraft carriers to launch air attacks on the enemy units on the run; survived once again, the Mogami He continued his slow retreat, also managing to reject other PT attacks between 06:00 and 06:45. In the meantime, at 06:17, OludoRf had reconsidered his decision and reported the cruisers to hunt for the Japanese: the mutilated destroyer Asagumo he was intercepted while trying to continue south, finally ending up sank by the cannons of Denver he was born in Columbia at 07:30; Two minutes later the news of the start of the battle off the coast of Samar and OludoRf has hurried to bring his ships back to Kinkaid ^{[65] [66]} . The wreck of the Mogami Finally, it was intercepted by Taffy 1 formation planes (seventh fleet) and immobilized at 09:10 off the coast of Mindanao; At 12:30 the destroyer Akebono He sank the ship with a torpedo after saving the survivors ^{[sixty seven]} . The last loss of the southern force was the light cruiser They are not standing : escorted by the destroyer Kasumi , the unit had come to the port of Dapitan, from where he left the morning of October 27 temporarily repaired; However, it was identified by bombers of Fifth and Thirteenth Air Force who attacked him at 10:06 finally making it sink to 12:42 off the island of Negros ^{[65] [68] [69]} .

The battle of the Strait of Surigao represented the last clash between the battle ships of history, although the Yamashiro It was sunk as a result of the combination of torpedoes and hi of heavy artillery boarded. The only other combat of this type had taken place on 14-15 November 1942 off the coast of Guadacanal ^[70] . The battle was also the last clash in which one of the two forces on the field (the US) succeeded the cut of the T, however when this happened the Japanese formation had already been discharged and private of some units and the maneuver therefore had no effect on the result of the battle ^[62] .

Kurita passes the Strait of San Bernardino [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

Kinkaid had not hesitated to send all his battle units to the south to cover the Strait of Surigao, given that he was absolutely convinced that the third fleet was continuing to guard the Strait of San Bernardino to the north with the battleships of the Task Force 34: but All Halsey’s ships were running to intercept the aircraft carrier of Ozawa off the coast of Luzon, so nothing barred the path of Kurita’s central force.

Finally, the TF 34 was formed at 02:40 on October 25: Halsey decided to detach Lee’s battleships in front of its groups of aircraft carriers, for fear of clashing against the Japanese before the sunrise. The admiral communicated his decision to Nimitz and King, thus informing Kinkaid also thus, which continued to monitor radio traffic: Halsey’s communication, which after confirming the formation of the TF 34 ended with “my concentrated force in three groups He put Kinkaid in uncertainty, which at 03:12 explicitly asked the third fleet: “Is TF 34 check the Strait of San Bernardino?”; Since the two fleets, obeying different commands, could not communicate directly to each other, Halsey’s response came only at 07:04: «Negative. The TF 34 is with the aircraft carriers who are hiring now the enemy aircraft carriers ». Six minutes earlier, the central force had started attacking the units of the seventh fleet. ^[71]

At 11:20 pm on October 24, the last US night reconnaissance had left Kurita’s ships, now in view of the Strait of San Bernardino: at 00:35 the entire central force emerged from the Strait without anyone trying to hinder it; Surprised due to the lack of opposition, Kurita threw herself at full speed towards the south by skirting the island of Samar, in an attempt to recover the severe delay accumulated ^[71] . As the hours passed by, Kurita was increasingly worried about the lack of opposition from the American side, coming to suspect that the third fleet was to tend to be ambush at any moment. At 06:27, while the sun was rising, the Japanese radar reported air activities in front of Kurita’s ships: the admiral ordered to move from training for night navigation to the contrast formation, but while this maneuver was underway, the lookouts reported the appearance of trees on the horizon, trees identified then like those of aircraft carriers; Convinced that he went to clash against the nucleus of the third fleet, Kurita gave the order of “general attack” to his ships, who launched at full speed towards the enemy abandoning any training ^[72] .

Initial contact [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

The units spotted by Kurita were not the aircraft carrier of the third fleet, but the smallest escort aircraft carrier of the seventh fleet, sixteen units divided into three formations (Taffy 1, Taffy 2 and Taffy 3, from their radio identifiers): often obtained From the conversion of merchantiles, they were slow, not very armored and armed with a single 127 mm cannon, practically little more than a floating air base and completely unsuitable to support a naval surface combat ^{[seventy three] [74]} ; The planes they embarked (about two dozen per head) were mostly intended for the support of the wards on the ground or to the anti -Sommerible patrols and consequently in the holders’ holds of the aircraft carriers there were mainly 12.7 mm cartridges for machine guns, depth bombs, rockets and small fragmentation bombs, but few torpedoes ^{[seventy three]} . Each “taffy” had a defensive screen consisting of three destroyers and four spare destroyers, simplified and less powerful version of the previous ones and jokingly called “tin bins” ( tin cans ) in the US Navy ^{[seventy three] [75]} . Against this force the units of Kurita were directed, four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light and a dozen destroyer.

On the morning of the 25th, the spare aircraft carriers of the seventh fleet were engaged in their normal routine tasks: the Taffy 1 of the Admiral Thomas L. Sprague was a lot of south, off the northern tip of Mindanao, while Felix Stump’s Taffy 2 It was exactly east of the Gulf of Leyte; placed off the coast of Samar, 80 kilometers north of the Taffy 2, the Taffy 3 of the Admiral Clifton Sprague ^[76] He was exactly on the route of Kurita’s strength ^[72] . The surprise was absolute: at 06:30 a Gumman Tbf Avenger, in patrol to the north and piloted by the Guardiamarina W. Brooks, warned “[…] enemy surface forces made up of four battleships, four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and from ten to twelve destroyer »20 miles north-west of the Taffy 3, at advance at the speed of 30 knots ^[75] . It was thought that the pilot had exchanged the Task Force 34 for the enemy and therefore the Brooks was asked to control its identification; He went down to a lower altitude and at 06:47 he transmitted: “I can see the pagoda -shaped trees” ^{[75] [77]} . In a few minutes, even the crews of the Taffy 3 were able to observe these characteristics of the great Japanese ships standing on the horizon; At 06:59 they saw flashes coming from the Japanese battleships, which opened the fire to the limit of their range of shooting, and high water columns rising near the sprague flagship. ^[78]

The recipient immediately had his aircraft carrier to launch their airplanes, then he broke east to take advantage of the coverage of a rain storm; The other taffy also hurried to launch as many aircraft possible against the Japanese, although very few were armed with the effective torpedoes. Sprague also ordered the destroyer and the destroyer escort to issue smoke curtains to hide the retreat of his units: obeying orders, the fragile spare ships were the subject of the edges of the Japanese units ^[79] .

The counterattacks of the destroyers [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

Concerned about the enemy fire, the captain of Corvetta Ernest E. Evans, commander of the destroyer Johnston , the ship closest to Japanese training, suddenly decided to attack the opposing forces: the Johnston He was armed with five 127 mm cannons and 40 and 20 mm anti -aircraft cannons, but only with the ten Mk 15 torpedoes that embarked had some possibility of inflicting serious damage to Japanese battle ships. Moving constantly to avoid the enemy edges, the Johnston He broke towards the heavy cruiser Kumano , the flagship of the 7th cruiser division of the deputy amateur Kazutaka Shiraishi, to hit him with the torpedoes: arrived at a distance of 17 kilometers from Kumano , the American ship fired her 127 mm bullets in the direction of theunger and further approached her, she launched them against all ten torpedoes, crossing the bow. The cruiser Suzuya , twin of the Kumano , had to retire from the battle to give rescue to the affected ship ^[80] .

From a distance of 11 kilometers, the fast battle ship Kongo He hit the bridge and the machine room of the Johnston ; The speed had to be reduced more than half and the towers were no longer able to shoot. Shortly after three 155 mm bullets, perhaps from the secondary batteries of the Yamato , hit the Johnston , killing many crew members and injuring the same commander. The bridge had to be abandoned and Evans had to maneuver the ship with the aforementioned rudder ^[80] .

Encouraged by the attack of the Johnston , the other custitary of Taffy 3 launched the assault. The destroyers Hoel It is Heermann Japanese training attacked with determination, which was forced to break to avoid the torpedoes launched against; the same Yamato he avoided close measure two series of torpedoes probably launched by Heermann : Instead of making the ship turn and put it parallel to the traces of the torpedoes in order to try to pass through it, it was made to remove the battle for ten minutes on order given by Kurita to its commander, Contrameiraglio Matome Ugaki. The Heermann In the meantime, he had approached the other Japanese battleships that they could not fire, both for the impossibility of pointing their cannons so at the bottom, and for the fear of hitting friendly ships ^[81] .

Meanwhile it Hoel He had headed towards the nearest enemy battle ship, the Kongo , and launched a burst of torpedoes with a distance of 8.2 kilometers; there Kongo , as the Yamato , she was forced to get away from the battlefield for several minutes. The Hoel However, he was soon struck and put out of use, but it equally managed to battle a group of heavy cruisers, launching the remaining torpedoes against the head unit, it Haged ^[82] : probably one of these scored before the destroyer was surrounded and overwhelmed by the fire of the again arrived Kongo and heavy cruisers, sinking at 08:55 with the loss of 253 men ^[80] .

At 07:35 the escort destroyer Samuel B. Roberts Virtue and broke towards the Japanese ships: it only had two 127 mm cannons and three torpedoes, instead of the five cannons and the ten torpedoes of the normal destroyers, but nevertheless attacked the heavy cruiser with determination Chokai . Protected by smoke, the Roberts He managed to reach 4 kilometers from theunger, then he launched his three torpedoes whose one scored. Removed from the initial target, he fought with Japanese ships for an hour, shooting 600 127 mm bullets and with his anti -aircraft batteries the dead work of enemy ships. At 08:51 the Roberts He was struck twice and one of his cannons was put out of use, but with the other he however managed to hit the burst bridge CHIKUMA , which went on fire, before being further devastated by three 356 mm projects of the Kongo . At 09:35 the order was given to abandon the ship and the Roberts sank half an hour later with the loss of 89 crew members ^[83] .

Attack on the US CVE [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

In the meantime, the three taffy had continued to launch their appliances by equipping them with all available weapons, they were also machine guns or depth bombs; After having exhausted the ammunition, many planes also made passages around the ships to distract the Japanese. Although disordered, the air counterattacks were incessant and some, especially those launched by the Stump Unit, were quite heavy ^[84] . Many Japanese ships were seriously damaged and the heavy cruisers CHIKUMA It is Suzuya They were sunk by the torpedoes loaded on the Avengers by 09:35; The survivors of the CHIKUMA they were collected by the destroyer Came ^[85] . 230 kilos bombs released by planes gave an important contribution in the destruction of a third heavy cruiser, the Chokai , around 09:05 ^[84] .

The aircraft carriers of the taffy 3 continued to broke south-west to escape the enemy; The rising of the wind, in addition to hindering the take -offs and landings of the aircraft, dispersed part of the protective smoke curtain and they found themselves on fire with their only 127 mm cannon mounted at the stern against the Japanese units. Kurita’s ships were shooting perforating bullets suitable for penetrating thick armor, which in many cases pierced the fragile hulls of the sketch aircraft carriers without exploding: the Kalinin Mr. It survived a 356 mm blow and not less than thirteen of 203 mm, while the sprague flagship, the Fanshaw Bay , was centered by three 203 mm projects; proceeding to zigzag the Gambier Bay He avoided several shots, but when the distance from the enemy descended to 9 kilometers was hit several times and sank around 09:05 ^[84] .

Two hours after the start of the clash, the Evans commander, aboard the Johnston , noting a formation of four destroyers led by the Light Incruiter Yahagi who attacked with torpedoes the aircraft carriers of the sprague, broke to intercept them: the continuous fire of the Johnston He forced Japanese units to launch their torpedoes prematurely, thus missing their goals. They then turned against the Johnston : At 09:10 the Japanese hit the bow towers, making many of the 127 mm bullets detonate. The damaged engines stopped, so that the ship became an easy target of the enemy units, which stormed it of cannonate. At 09:45 the commander Evans gave the order to abandon the ship: the Johnston He sank 25 minutes later with the loss of 186 crew members. Commander Evans abandoned the ship with his crew, but was no longer revised: he received a posthumously one Medal of Honor to memory. ^{[eighty six] [eighty seven]}

Kurita’s retreat [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

At 09:20 Kurita suddenly interrupted the attack by ordering all the units of folding to the north to be grouped. The confused action had significantly scattered the ships of the central force and the losses caused by air and destroyer attacks were increasing: three heavy cruisers ( CHIKUMA , Suzuya It is Chokai ) were sunk and the others the Kumano he had lost the bow due to the torpedo of the Johnston , The Tone had been damaged by the airplane 2 planes and it Haged he had grossed a torpedo from Heermann ; Even the battleships were starting to accumulate damage due to the devices released by planes, even if all were still efficient. ^[88]

Kurita maneuvered her ships for three hours on a senseless route off the coast of Samar, while he meditated on what to do: his lookouts had sighted the hulls of the Taffy 2 on the horizon, but little accustomed to recognizing the shapes of the aircraft carrier They had mistaken them for “team aircraft carriers of the ranger class”; Still convinced of being facing the third fleet, the admiral believed that carrying out the action would be served shortly: even if he had managed to overcome the enemy resistance, the allies would have had all the time to clear the Gulf of Leyte from the transport of the Force of invasion, the real objective of the action, while the accumulation of more or less avaried ships would have prevented a rapid folding of the central force. Convinced of the utility of any other attack, at 13:10 Kurita gave order to her ships to retire passing again through the Strait of San Bernardino. ^[89]

While Kurita crossed uncertain about what to do, the small aircraft carriers of the seventh fleet found themselves experimenting with a new military tactic. While it was committed to sending its appliances in support of the Clifton Sprague units, at 07:40 the Taffy 1 was approached off the coast of Mindanao by six Japanese planes: one threw himself in the beaten towards the Santee , deliberately crashing into his flight bridge and triggering vast fires; The ship was hit at 07:56 by a torpedo launched by a Japanese submarine, but survived thanks to its excellent internal compartmentalization. Another spare aircraft carrier, the Suwannee , he knocked down two Japanese planes before a third crashed independently of the poppiece part of the hull: the ship did not sink but the damage reported they made it unusable. Taffy 1 was the first victim of the “special attacking force” of the deputy amateur Takijirō ōnishi, the first Japanese unit trained to implement attacking tactics kamikaze ^[90] .

Taffy 3 was also the victim of kamikaze by ōnishi. At 10:40, while they were still intent on recovering from the attack of Kurita, five Japanese planes rushed against the floating bases: one missed the Kitkun Bay , crashing into the water not far and causing damage to the dead work, while two others were demolished while throwing themselves on the Fanshaw Bay . The last couple tried to attack the White Plains , but the intense anti -aircraft fire knocked down one and convinced the other to turn and crash on the neighbor St. Lo At 10:51: penetrated to the level of the Hangars, the plane started a series of detonations, finally causing the sinking of the ship at 11:25, the first unit to be sunk by a suicidal attack ^{[91] [92]} .

Ozawa is attached [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

Preceded by the battle ships of the TF 34, the aircraft carriers of the third fleet had continued to navigate north to the hunt for the Japanese: Halsey had five large aircraft carriers at his orders ( Intrepid , Franklin , Lexington , Enterprise , Essex ), five light aircraft carrier ( Independence , Belleau Wood , Langley , Cabot , San Jacinto ), six modern battle ships ( Alabama , Iowa , Massachusetts , New Jersey , South Dakota , Washington ), two heavy cruisers, six light and more than 40 destroyers, supported by over 600 boarded aircraft ^{[21] [93]} . To this deployment of forces Ozawa could oppose the aircraft carrier Zuikaku and three aircraft carrier ( ZUIHO , Chitose , Chiyoda ), which in total board only 108 appliances; The stock included three light cruisers ( Oyodo , Right , Isuzu ), nine destroyers and two battle ships of the First World War partially converted into a launder ( Hyuga , Whereas ), whose stern towers had in fact been replaced by a hangar, a small flight bridge and two catapulte, which however did not transport aircraft ^{[21] [ninety four]} .

The first wave of US planes, thanks to 60 hunting Hellcat, 65 Helldiver bombers and 55 Avenger aerosiluctors ^[95] , took flight at 05:40 on October 25, while the reconnaissers hunting the position of the Japanese; At the first light of dawn Ozawa launched 75 devices against the third fleet, but many of them were shot down by the US air patrols without being able to inflict any damage and the handful of Japanese surviving aircraft I land in Luzon. Finally, Ozawa was located by US reconnaissance at 07:10, 320 kilometers east of Capo Engaño and 240 kilometers north of Halsey ^[96] ; The first attack wave reached 08:00: the approximately 30 Japanese hunting left in Ozawa were simply too few to be able to hinder the enemy attack and the US aircraft had the opportunity to carefully choose the targets. The aircraft carrier Chitose It was centered in full by a certain number of bombs, came out of the formation and slowly sank at 09:37, while the largest Zuikaku He was struck by a torpedo towards the end of the attack and had to proceed strongly inclined, forcing Ozawa to abandon it to move to theunger Oyodo . The cruiser Right He was hit by a torpedo but remained to the surface and maintained a certain speed, while the destroyer Akizuki , reached by at least one bomb, was torn by a formidable explosion and sank just before 09:00 ^{[97] [98] [99]} .

At 09:45 the second US aerial group made up of 14 Hellcat, 6 Helldiver and 16 Avengers arrived, which concentrated on the Chiyoda : struck by different bombs and a torpedo in the machine room, the ship took a significantly and Ozawa detached the Hyuga and the destroyer Maki To bring them assistance ^{[97] [100]} . A third attack arrived at 11:10: the already affected Zuikaku It was centered almost simultaneously by three torpedoes, left the formation and sank at 2:15 pm, while the ZUIHO He reported serious damage due to three bombs scored, while managing to remain afloat. A fourth formation was launched at 11:45 and reached the missing Japanese fleet around 13:00; The US aircraft ended up the ZUIHO , which he finally sank at 3:26 pm, and they targeted with particular fury the Hyuga and the Whereas , which however did not report damage ^[101] . The continuous attacks, however, prevented the Hyuga to recover the survivors of the Chiyoda and Ozawa ordered her to retire and leave the aircraft carrier to her destiny ^[102] . A fifth air attack came at 4:10 pm, followed by a sixth at 18:00: the two battleships once again catalyzed the attention of the US riders, but they only underwent the shots of the strip ^[103] .

The seventh fleet asks for help [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

Shortly after 08:00, while the planes of the third fleet had started hammering Ozawa, Halsey had received a direct message from the seventh fleet: for more than an hour and a half the Taffy 3 was facing the units of Kurita and Kinkaid was requesting pressing the sending of aid in the form of “fast battle ships”. Halsey was surprised by the Japanese attack and by the fact that Kinkaid and Sprague had let themselves be caught unprepared, but believed that between the spare aircraft carriers and the armored battleships, the seventh fleet had sufficient fire power to cope with the enemy: this Despite the fact that Kinkaid had updated him on OludoRf’s involvement in the Surigao area, much further south. The admiral continued to believe that the task of his third fleet was to neutralize the threat of enemy aircraft carriers and not to limit himself to watching his shoulders to Kinkaid. Between the two admirals, the exchange of clear messages continued dense: if Kinkaid continued to ask for Halsey’s help, he just ordered McCain’s news 38.1, on the way back from Ulithi, to direct fully towards the location of Taffy 3, knowing well that he would take many hours to arrive; For the moment, Lee’s TF 34 was maintained with the third fleet ^[103] .

The requests for help from Kinkaid were also captured by Nimitz, in his headquarters of Pearl Harbor at 5,000 kilometers away; At 10:00 he sent a concise message to Halsey ^[104] :

( IN ) «TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG FROM CINCPAC ACTION COM THIRD FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF SEVENTY-SEVEN X WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS»

( IT ) «The Tacchino Trottella towards the water GG from Cinpac [Commander of the Pacific fleet] Action to the Commander third fleet info [forwarding for information] to the commander in the lead and to the commander Task Force 77 x [point] where I repeat do ‘It is the Task Force 34 RR the world asks ”

The first four words and the last three were a “filler” to confuse enemy radio operators; The beginning and end of the real message were reported by two double consonants. Halsey communications employees canceled the first words of the message, but maintained the last three words: these were probably selected by the officers employed in the communications of the Nimitz headquarters as a free quote from Alfred Tennyson’s poem The charge of the light brigade ^[105] , but they were not to be understood as a comment to the ongoing crisis in Leyte. However Halsey, reading the message, thought that the last three words – the world wonders – They were a severe criticism from Nimitz; It seems that the admiral then had thrown his cap on the bridge by extending in “” sobs of anger ” ^[104] .

At 10:55, when the frosted remains of the Ozawa team were now located just 65 kilometers from the cannons of the third fleet, Halsey divided its strength: the TF 34 of Lee (with the flagship of Halsey himself) and the aircraft carrier group of Bogan viral to the south proceeding to fully force towards the Strait of San Bernardino, while the news of Sherman and Davison were commissioned to complete the elimination of the unit of Ozawa; Halsey was firmly convinced that running in help of Kinkaid was a waste of resources, given that his forces would not arrive at the Strait of San Bernardino before 01:00 on 26 October, also because his destroyers were short of fuel and not it could proceed at the maximum speed possible ^[104] . In an extreme attempt to intervene in the battle off Samar, Halsey ordered McCain to launch an air attack with a maximum distance possible: after having traveled 530 kilometers (one of the longer distance attacks launched by a aircraft carrier in the war) the planes of the Tg 38.1 arrived on Kurita’s ships at 13:15, but they were unable to inflict significant damage ^[91] .

At 16:22, as the last expedient to make at least a part of the third fleet in the waters of Samar, Halsey formed a new Task Group (34.5) under the command of the Badger Contramolgeglio, consisting of the two fastest battleships (the Iowa and the New Jersey ), by three cruisers and eight destroyers detached from the Task Force 34; This group was at full speed to the south followed by the other forces of Lee and Bogan. The Badger units came to the mouth of the Strait of San Bernardino around 00:40, already too late: three hours before Kurita had managed to pass through the mouth of the Strait, leaving the area of ​​the clash unchallenged ^[106] ; The only victim of news 34.5 was the destroyer Came , left behind by Kurita to recover the Japanese shipwrecked and quickly poured with the loss of the whole crew. ^[107]

Latest events [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

When at 11:15 Halsey had made the Task Force 34 viusted south, had detached a group of four cruisers and nine destroyers under the orders of the recipient Laurance T. Dubose (Task Group 30.3), sending him to finish the wrecks of the units of Ozawa already affected: Dubose ships found the immobile hull of the aircraft carrier Chiyoda And they pulled him down at 16:25 with the loss of the whole crew ^[108] ; Around 19:00 the US units hooked a group of three Japanese destroyers, but after a long struggle they managed to sink only one, it Hatsuzuki , at 20:59. These actions delayed the US forces enough to allow Ozawa to retire north, even if the admiral evaluated for a while the possibility of dealing with doubts with his two battleships ^[109] . The last loss of northern force was the light cruiser Right , already damaged and remained isolated, which was identified and poured out by the submarine Jallao at 11:10 pm on 25 October ^[110] . Apart from some air attacks that took place on October 27th and remained without consequences, the impaired 3rd fleet of Ozawa returned undisturbed in Japan ^[111] .

On the morning of October 26, Halsey reconnaissers were able to locate Kurita’s team intent on retreating to the west and, starting from 08:10, the Japanese ships were subjected to new air raids: the light cruiser NOSHIRO He was hit several times and finally sank off Panay at 11:13, while the destroyer Hayashimo , damaged by air attacks on October 25th and was left behind, he was hit again and made a little sandy off the coast of Caluya ^[109] . The heavy cruiser Kumano , without the bow, was hit by a bomb but managed to take refuge in the port of Manila; Seriously damaged, he was unable to leave the Philippines and was finally sunk in an air attack on November 25 in the bay of the town of Santa Cruz, north-west of Manila ^[112] .

Due to the considerable dimensions of the clash and its long duration, there are various estimates on the number of lost units in the actual battle, distinct from those sunk in different, immediately previous or subsequent actions. The following list is taken from various sources ^{[113] [114]} :

US losses

The United States lost seven warships:

• 1 light aircraft carrier: Princeton
• 2 spare aircraft carrier: Gambier Bay It is St. Lo
• 2 destroyer: Hoel , Johnston
• 1 escort destroyer: Samuel B. Roberts
• 1 motoring: PT-493
• 19 other ships were damaged: the aircraft carrier Kalinin Mr. , Fanshaw Bay , White Plains , Santee , Suwannee ; the destroyers Albert W. Grant , Heermann ; The escort destroyers Raymond , Dennis and ten motorboats.

Total tonnage of sinked ships: about 37 000 tons.

Japanese losses

The Japanese lost twenty -four war ships:

• 1 aircraft carrier: Zuikaku , flagship of northern force
• 3 I would read light: ZUIHO , Chiyoda , Chitose
• 3 battleships: Musashi , Yamashiro , Melted
• 6 heavy cruisers: Atago , Maya , Suzuya , Chokai , CHIKUMA , Mogami
• 3 light cruisers: NOSHIRO , They are not standing , Right
• 8 destroyer: Came , Hayashimo , Yamagumo , Asagumo , MICHISHIO , Akizuki , Hatsuzuki , Wakaba
• Serious damage also reported three battleships ( Nagato , Aaron , Kongo ), six heavy cruisers ( Kumano , Haged , Myoko , Nachi , Takao , Tone ) and the destroyer Shigure ; minor damages were reported by the lightunner light Oyodo ^[115] .

Total tonnage of sinked ships: about 303 000 tons.

Halsey suffered criticism because of his decision to launch north with the entire third fleet in pursuit of Ozawa rather than remaining the side of the seventh fleet, as well as to be at the rescue of Kinkaid with serious delay, after that He had asked for help ^[116] ; The nickname “La Corsa del Toro” was coined in the US navy (in English Bull’s Run ) for Halsey’s actions, alluding to the nickname “Bull” with which he was known in the US Navy environments.

Halsey replied to the criticisms by supporting the priority of the destruction of the force of aircraft carrier of the Japanese fleet, indirectly recognized also in the instructions he had received before the battle: after ordering the third fleet to cover and support the seventh, Nimitz added: “[.. .] In the event that the possibility of destroying large portions of the enemy fleet can be offered or can be determined, this destruction becomes the priority mission ” ^[13] . The serious losses of aircraft suffered in the previous months decreased the war potential of Ozawa’s ships, but the US could not know it: the aircraft carriers were unanimously recognized as the main war tool for the war in the Pacific and their destruction was a primary objective ^[96] ; Already on October 15th Halsey had informed MacArthur of the possibility of moving the third fleet to the north of the Philippines hunting for Japanese units and which consequently no support for the landing operations in Leyte had to be expected until the “clarification of the situation” was clarified ^[41] .

Halsey attributed a pre -eminently offensive role to his third fleet and, as he himself admitted in his relationship after the battle, found “Puerile remaining statically to supervise the Strait of San Bernardino” ^[29] : When the reconnaissance sighted Ozawa, the admiral did not hesitate to send all his forces to the north to destroy them; Halsey preferred to believe the too optimistic relationships of his pilots who reported having semi -destroyed the Japanese central force and, therefore, he believed that no serious threat would weigh more on the side of the seventh fleet ^[42] . In hindsight, it was argued that Halsey could have detached the battle ships of the TF 34 and a group of aircraft carriers to garrison the Strait of San Bernardino and proceed north only with the other two groups of aircraft carriers, a more than enough force for having Ozawa reason ^{[forty six]} : Halsey discarded this possibility because he believed that two groups of aircraft carriers would be insufficient to be reason for an enemy force whose dimensions were not yet certain; On the other hand, leaving the TF 34 without air support would have exposed it to the attacks of the Japanese basic aircraft on the ground ^{[forty six]} . The decision to retain the TF 34 at the third fleet only did nothing but exclude this grouping from any important action of the battle: the firepower of the battle ship of the third fleet never entered into action except to finish one or two light ships already damaged ^[117] And, as Lee commented Laconically, “the vessels operating in the TF 34 have not suffered or have inflicted any damage” ^[118] .

The suspicion was advanced that in the decision it is to move to the north both to retain the TF 34 with the aircraft carriers were Halsey’s personal motivations. The admiral had had an exemplary career in the US navy but still had not personally obtained a victory in an important naval clash: the destruction of the aircraft carriers of Ozawa could have represented the success he sought ^[96] And if the TF 34 had remained to guard the Strait of San Bernardino, the ship on which Halsey was embarked (the battleship New Jersey ) would have been left behind rather than hiring the “definitive” clash with enemy aircraft carriers, as Halsey wanted ^[109] .

Halsey criticized the serious problems that afflicted the US command chain ^[109] , first of all the lack of a superior commander at sea, given that the commanders of the third and seventh fleet were in no way hierarchically subordinated to each other: Kinkaid, commander of the seventh, was subordinated to MacArthur as a commander of the SWPA, despite being administratively subordinate to Nimitz as a commander of the Pacific chessboard, while Halsey reported directly to Nimitz, who however was in Honolulu. Therefore the disorganized communications between the two fleets did not favor an orderly and much less coordinated development of the US actions ^[119] : Due to this fragmentation, Kinkaid was convinced that the north side of the seventh fleet was firmly presided over by Halsey, even if he did nothing to ascertain it except when it was too late ^[109] .

The battle of the Gulf of Leyte saved the bridge heads of the US 6th Army in Leyte from maritime attacks. In any case, still harsh fighting would have occurred so that the island fell completely into the hands of the allies at the end of December 1944: the battle of Leyte was fought in parallel to refueling operations by sea (reminiscent of the Tokyo Express in Guadalcanal) undertaken by the Japanese commands to feed the resistance of the troops to Leyte; MacArthur and Nimitz responded with the intensification of air raids and, finally, with a series of landings in the hormoc bay protected by the embarked aviation, culminated with the capture of the city and the collapse of the Japanese garrison ^[120] .

The Japanese imperial navy had suffered the heaviest losses hitherto suffered. The failure of the entire operation meant the inevitable loss of the Philippines, which in turn caused a strategic disaster for Japan, which was cut out of the territories of Southeast Asia: they caused vital resources to the Japanese war machine, in particular they were rich in oil, of which the aeronaval forces needed; The problem was that a real maritime artery was needed to bring the resources necessary for the war to Japan, where the shipyards and the arms factories were located. Lost the Philippines, the oil tankers and the merchant ships were even more faulty by the submarines and US aircraft. Finally, Leyte’s loss favored US global planning which, thus, was able to begin the study of the invasion of the Ryūkyū islands for 1945 ^[14] .

The large battle units of the Imperial Navy, survived the battle and to the return to the port, had almost no longer part in the war and mostly praised in their bases. The only surface operation of some relevance, undertaken later, was the disastrous sortie of April 1945 (Ten-go operation) implemented in response to the landings on Okinawa; ended with the sinking of the Yamato , of the lightunner Yahagi And of four destroyers, destroyed by the groups embarked American very north of the island.

J.F.C. Fuller, in his book The decisive battles of the western world , writes about the consequences of the battle of the Gulf of Leyte:

«The Japanese fleet had ceased to exist and their enemies, if the attacks launched by planes based on the ground, had conquered an undisputed domain of the seas are excluded. When admiral Ozawa was questioned by the Americans, after the war, he said: ‹After this battle the surface forces became completely auxiliary and relying only on the earth forces, on special attacks [suicide bomber] and on planes … not Duties were more assigned to ships, if those entrusted to some special ships ›are excluded. And Admiral Yonai, Minister of the Navy, stated that he understood that Leyte’s defeat ‹was equivalent to the loss of the Philippines›. ‹As for the more general meaning of the battle›, he said, “I felt it was the end› [4] . »

The US Navy dedicated the Aircraft Aircraft of the Essex Uss class Leyte (CV-32) and the Lanciamissili Uss cruiser Leyte Gulf (CG-55), of the Ticonderoga class. Also the nineteenth episode of the US series Victory At Sea of 1952 was dedicated to the battle ^[121] . During the sixtieth anniversary of the clash, the president of the Philippines Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo commemorated the clash at the memorial that celebrates the landing of General Macarthur on the coast of the island.

• Claude Bertin, The struggle for the Pacific. Vol. 5: Hiroshima , Geneva, Edizioni Forni, 1972, ISBN not existing.
• ( IN ) Thomas Cutler, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944 , Annapolis (MA), Naval Institute Press, 2001, ISBN 1-55750-243-9.
• ( IN ) J.F.C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World – Volume III , Londra, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956, ISBN 1-135-31790-9.
• ( IN ) G. Hermon Gill, Chapter 17 – Leyte ( PDF ), in Volume II – Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945 , Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1957. URL consulted on November 9, 2011 .
• ( IN ) James D. Hornfischer, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors Bantam, 2004, ISBN 0-553-80257-7.
• Bernard Ireland, The largest aeronaval battle in history , Osprey Publishing, 2009, ISSN 1974-9414 ( WC · Acnp ) .
• Douglas MacArthur, XIII. Struggle For Leyte , in Reports of General MacArthur , Japanese demobilization offices Records, 1994, isbn non -esistant. URL consulted on March 5, 2012 (archived by URL Original September 7, 2011) .
• Donald MacIntyre, The battle of the Gulf of Leyte , Bologna, Ermanno Albertelli, 1971, ISBN not existing.
• Bernard Millot, The Pacific War , Milan, Rizzoli Universal Library, 2002 [1967] , ISBN 88-17-12881-3.
• ( IN ) Samuel Eliot Morison, The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12–15 November 1942 , in History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 5: The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943 , Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1958, ISBN 0-316-58305-7.
• ( IN ) Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 12: Leyte, June 1944-January 1945 , Champaign (IL), University of Illinois Press, ISBN 0-252-07063-1.
• Kenneth Poolman, Allied submarines of the Second World War , La Spezia, Fratelli Melita Editori, 1993, ISBN 88-403-7387-X.
• ( IN ) Howard Sauer, The Last Big-Gun Naval Battle: The Battle of Surigao Strait , Glencannon Press, 1999, ISBN 1-889901-08-3.
• ( IN ) C. Vann Woodward, The Battle for Leyte Gulf , Skyhorse Publishing, 2007 [1947] , ISBN 1-60239-194-7.
• ( IN ) U.S. Army Center of Military History, Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Volume II – Part II , Reports of General MacArthur. URL consulted on November 9, 2011 (archived by URL Original September 7, 2011) .

• ( IN ) United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) . are ibiblio.org .
• ( IN ) Animated History of The Battle of Leyte Gulf . are Historyanimated.com (archived by URL Original July 20, 2008) .
• ( IN ) Battle Experience: Battle for Leyte Gulf . are ibiblio.org .
• ( IN ) Task Force 34 Action Report: 6 October 1944 – 3 November 1944 (VAdm Lee) . are ibiblio.org .
• ( IN ) Task Force 77 Action Report: Battle of Leyte Gulf (VAdm Kinkaid) . are ibiblio.org .
• ( IN ) Orders of Battle – Sibuyan Sea . are navweaps.com .
• ( IN ) Orders of Battle – Surigao Strait . are navweaps.com .
• ( IN ) Orders of Battle – Cape Engaño . are navweaps.com .
• ( IN ) Orders of Battle – Samar . are navweaps.com .
• ( IN ) Glorious Death: The Battle of Leyte Gulf . are microworks.net .
• ( IN ) The Battle Off Samar — Taffy III at Leyte Gulf . are bosamar.com .
• ( IN ) Return to the Philippines . are ibiblio.org .
• ( IN ) The Battle for Leyte Gulf Revisited . are Militaryhistoryonline.com .
• ( IN ) Japan’s TA-Operation: A Blueprint for Disaster . are Militaryhistoryonline.com .
• ( IN ) Loss of the USS Princeton (CVL-23), 24 October 1944 – United States Naval Historical Center . are History.navy.mil . URL consulted on June 8, 2008 (archived by URL Original November 16, 2009) .

Audiovisual media [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]

• ( IN ) Lost Evidence of the Pacific: The Battle of Leyte Gulf . History Channel TV
• ( IN ) Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy . History Channel. TV
• ( IN ) Battle 360: Battle of Leyte Gulf . History Channel. TV