Explosion of the plague of Gaza — Wikipedia

L’ Gaza beach explosion is an event that occurred on June 9, 2006 , on a beach in the Gaza Strip, during which eight people (including three children) from the same Palestinian family died, and more than thirty other civilians were injured by an explosion whose origin is not formally established. It seemed to come from Israeli artillery fire, a version supported by several journalistic and NGO investigations, and mainly challenged by an investigation by the Israeli army.

These events intervene in the general context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as that of the rise in interpalestinian tensions, following the unilateral disengagement of Gaza in 2005, followed a few months later from legislative elections to unexpected progress, both in Israel than in the Palestinian territories.

The withdrawal of the Israeli army and colonies from Gaza, decided by Ariel Sharon, takes place from August to September 2005, provoking high dissensions within Likoud, which push Sharon to compose an alliance with the Labor led by Shimon Peres . The election of Amir Peretz at the head of the Labor in November threatens to burst the coalition. Sharon then resigns from Likoud, creating the Kadima Party (Center right ^{[ first ] , [ 2 ]} ), rallied by Shimon Peres, and anticipated legislative elections were scheduled for March 2006. In January 2006, Ariel Sharon was the victim of a serious cerebral attack which plunges him into a coma and puts, in fact, an end to his candidacy. Ehud Olmert then gradually emerges as his successor. In March 2006, Kadima came to the top of the elections, and in April, Olmert was officially appointed Prime Minister of a coalition including the Labor Party and the Shass religious party.

In January 2006 in the Palestinian territories, the legislative elections were held, the first in which Hamas participated. The polls and the first results give the favorite Fatah, but against all odds, the final results give Hamas 76 seats out of 132 to the Palestinian Legislative Council, against 43 for the Fatah of Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority ^{[ 3 ]} . These unexpected results constitute a shock for Western governments, the Israeli government and supporters of Fatah. Mahmoud Abbas asks Hamas to form a government, and the latter declares himself ready for “unity and partnership”. The Israeli government is threatening to no longer pay the taxes collected in the territories, and the diplomatic quartet (United States, European Union, Russia, UN) threatens to suspend aid from Palestinian authority if the government of Hamas does not accept Three conditions: 1/ renounce violence, 2/ Recognize the existence of the State of Israel, 3/ Recognize the previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements, which Hamas refuses, considering that these pressures are part of the policy of Israeli repression and occupation which constitute a form of collective punishment against the Palestinians ^{[ 4 ]} and that the recognition of Israel would mean in itself the “negation of the Palestinian people ^{[ 5 ]} ».

In March, economic sanctions are pronounced which threatens to plunge the Palestinian territories into economic chaos. Interpalestinian tensions are increasing, the disagreement between the two main parties relating in particular to the Israeli issue: Fatah recognizes the State of Israel and advocates a negotiated agreement in line with the Road Facing Leaf, two points that Hamas is not ready to accept, proposing for its part a long -lasting truce with the Hebrew state in exchange for the settlement of the Palestinian question.

The months preceding events are thus marked by a rise in violence between Palestinian factions in Gaza which makes dozens of deaths ^{[ 6 ]} , as well as a spiral of reprisals between daily rockets by Palestinian activists in Israel ^{[ 7 ]} , and Israeli shell fire on Gaza (more than 6,000 in the previous two months ^{[ 8 ]} ) – as well as the “targeted assassinations” – which make many Palestinian civilian victims.

The explosion of the Gaza beach is therefore part of a series of dramatic events which will lead in particular to the capture of Gilad Shalit, to the summer rains, then later to the blockade of the Gaza Strip.

Friday June 9, 2006 , on a Gaza beach where many families picnic, an explosion left seven dead (including three children) from the same Palestinian family, as well as thirty-five injured ^{[ 9 ] , [ ten ]} . The video of an 8 year old girl in distress running on the beach quickly goes around the world, arousing an important wave of emotion in opinion, which makes little Huda (or Hadil ^{[ 11 ]} ) Ghalia an “icon of the Palestinian struggle ^{[ twelfth ]} » ^{[ 13 ]} . The German daily newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung will publish an investigation which doubts the authenticity of the images in question ^{[ 14 ]} .

Quickly after the facts, an Israeli army spokesperson expresses deep regrets for the dead and indicates that the army suspends artillery fire until the cause of the explosion is determined. This declaration tends to make one think that the army initially postulates a poorly directed shot ^{[ 15 ]} ; Several dozen shells having been drawn today on positions positioned, according to the army, near the beach.

Amir Peretz, Minister of Defense, expresses his “regrets for members of the Palestinian family killed” – without engaging the responsibility of the army ^{[ 16 ]} . Ismaël Haniyeh (Palestinian Prime Minister at the time) denounces a ” war crime ” , and the president of the Palestinian authority Mahmoud Abbas qualifies the act of “Bloody massacre” ^{[ 17 ]} , decreeing a national mourning of three days ^{[ 18 ]} . In response to events, the armed branch of Hamas breaks a truce of sixteen months with Israel ^{[ 19 ]} .

International and Israeli media as a whole attribute responsibility for the Israeli army explosion ^{[ 15 ]} .

The following days, the Israeli army estimates that three causes may have caused the explosion: one of the artillery shells drawn that day, which aimed at the Qassam rocket launchers positioned-according to TSAhal-near the beach ^{[ 17 ]} and would have missed his target; an Israeli shell buried in the sand which would not have exploded during a shot prior to the explosion; or a Palestinian mine. The Israeli Minister of Defense orders the creation of a commission of inquiry ^{[ 20 ]} .

On June 13, the army commission of inquiry rendered its official conclusions according to which “all the possibilities that the explosion was due to one of the shells drawn today were refuted”, in particular by chronological elements and topographic ^{[ 16 ]} . The Israeli army rejects in fine The responsibility for the explosion on Hamas ^{[ 21 ] , [ 15 ]} , claiming to have evidence that he recently carried out systematic beach mining to prevent the landing of Israeli commandos ^{[ 15 ]} , what Hamas denies, considering that Israel “Tresses to flee his responsibilities” ^{[ 22 ]} . The same day, the American NGO Human Rights Watch – which commissioned Marc Garlsasco (in) , former Military Expert of the Pentagon, to direct his own investigation – publishes a press release saying that after a visit to the site and interviews with witnesses and medical staff, “the gathered elements strongly suggest that an artillery shot Israeli is the source of the explosion, “urging the Israeli army to submit to an independent and transparent investigation ^{[ 23 ]} . The scope of this internal investigation of the army is thus disputed, both in principle (as opposed to an independent investigation ^{[ 15 ] , [ 23 ] , [ 24 ]} ) that in its conclusions. Indeed, like Human Rights Watch, the Palestinian officials consider that the Israeli army hastened to clear ^{[ 25 ]} , while after the counter-investigation on the spot, several media question the reliability of the internal investigation and its conclusions ^{[ 26 ]} , some accusing the army of having concealed evidence ^{[ 27 ]} , what the army denies ^{[ 28 ]} . The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declares to consider the conclusions of the “very strange” internal investigation, before retracting, claiming to have reacted to “media speculation, and wait for the final results of the investigation ^{[ 29 ] , [ 30 ]} .

On June 19, Marc Garlaco and Lucy Mair (responsible for Human Rights Watch in Jerusalem) met the head of the Israeli commission of inquiry. At the end of this meeting, Marc Garlaco declared to Jerusalem Post Having reached a consensus with the head of the internal commission on “the most likely cause of the explosion” which would be an Israeli shell prior to events. Garlasco also affirms that the Commission has done a “competent work” in order to rule out the possibility that a shot is behind the explosion, adding “not to believe that the Israelis have targeted civilians” ^{[ thirty first ]} . However, Lucy Mair’s statements appear more mixed. Indeed, if it recognizes that the army made a “very good presentation”, Lucy Mair insists on the “questions that remained unanswered”. The same day, Human Rights Watch publishes a press release accusing the Commission for having dismissed the elements of evidence external to the army, and citing Garlaco according to which “an investigation which dismisses contradictory elements can hardly be considered credible” ^{[ 32 ]} . The NGO urges its appeal to the constitution of an independent commission, which Israel refuses ^{[ 33 ]} . A few days later, the army confirms its position, challenging the criticisms of Human Rights Watch, and claiming that none of the debris found comes from Israeli artillery shells ^{[ 34 ]} .

In a “case study” published more than a year after the facts in the appendix to a report on “indiscriminate shots” between Israelis and Palestinians, Human Rights Watch presents a detailed analysis of the elements at his disposal, and his “reasons to conclude that an Israeli artillery shell caused the explosion ^{[ 35 ]} ».