Operation Bamberg – Wikipedia
L’ Operation Bamberg is a counter-guide operation carried out by the German police in the territory of the General Commission of Ruthenia Blanche. Launched at the end of the month of mars 1942 , this operation is the first major German military response to the development of resistance movements in Belarus. Quickly, this operation was designed by its promoters, the Waffen-SS, as an example to follow for all operations intended to be carried out later against the supporters positioned in the forests of Belarus. Indeed, this operation not only includes a strong military dimension, aimed at reducing the partisan presence in a given area, but also economic issues, thus aiming to integrate populations and regions within the German war effort that were then kept away.
Quickly conquered, the Belarusian territory quickly became the main area of action of Soviet supporters behind the German lines.
First months of occupation [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
Since the month of , the territory of Soviet Belarus is occupied by the Reich ; from the month of , it is formally entrusted to a mixed administration, depending on both the Ministry of the Territories occupied in the East and the SS.
In addition, from the , Stalin appeals to resistance, initially widely ignored by the population [ first ] . Operating this call, Hitler and his close advisers encourage the extermination of all those who oppose, within the framework of a “Weight war” led by activists and communist officials within the occupied territories, to the policy led by the occupation forces [ 2 ] .
At the same time, organized famine, reprisals, contempt and racism testified by the occupation authorities towards the Russians and the Belarusses participate in creation, then in the development of a feeling of hostility against the occupants Germans and their administration [ 3 ] . Faced with this hostility movement, the occupation authorities multiply the executions of civilians, especially in Minsk; These executions follow one another at the rate of ten per day between the conquest of the city and the beginning of 1942 [ 4 ] .
Appearance of resistance movements [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
Appeared from the first days of the occupation, the resistance movements were initially composed of soldiers left behind by the speed of the German advance of the first weeks of war [ 5 ] . These soldiers, disadvated and not very organized [ first ] , [ 6 ] , then develop strategies intended to allow them to survive in places away from the territories under German control rather than projects of offensive actions against the occupant [ 7 ] , [ 6 ] .
The resistance is organized, however, thanks to the patient coordination and centralization of command, carried out during the fall of 1941 [ 6 ] . These reorganized maquis are beginning to constitute a major obstacle to German control in the territory of the General Commission of White Ruthenia, forcing the Reich to strengthen the units responsible for maintaining order positioned in the regions entrusted to the civil administration [ 8 ] .
In the Minsk region, maquis are quickly put in place [ 3 ] , are equipped with weapons often removed during the conquest [ 9 ] . These maquis, considerably reinforced by the German inclinations of the population control [ 9 ] , launched, from the beginning of 1942, major actions, in particular by promoting the projects of prisoners of war [ 3 ] .
Economic needs [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
In addition, faced with the bleeding in winter 1941, the German military authorities faced needs for increased men, fulfilled in particular by the transition to the comb of the rear services, industries and services in the Reich [ ten ] .
In addition, control by the resistance of large areas reduces the German possibilities of predation of labor and wealth produced in occupied Russia [ ten ] .
Forces in the presence [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
Faced with the thousand Soviet supporters, the occupation authorities, increasingly confined to the communication areas [ 11 ] , put online a force made up of two infantry divisions, one from the Wehrmacht, one from the Slovak army [ N 1 ] , [ twelfth ] , reinforced by the 315 It is police battalion [ 8 ] , inaugurating an intensive collaboration between the police units, helpless in the face of the maquis of supporters, and the army units [ 13 ] .
Most of the occupation units committed to carry out the operation is made up of Wehrmacht units, mainly due to the weakness of the security forces on the ground [ twelfth ] . In addition, to this deployment of force is added the Dirlewanger brigade, engaged in Belarus since the beginning of March [ 14 ] .
Operational plans [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
The strategy implemented is to surround a zone of 750 km² , in the eastern sector of the Pripat marshes, and entrust the grid to hunting commandos [ 11 ] .
The surrounding sector, abundantly recognized by small recognition groups [ N 2 ] , [ 15 ] is then reduced, by a sweeping and a systematic putting [ 8 ] , at the end of the junction, at a topographic point chosen beforehand, of the units engaged in the operation [ 16 ] .
The operation is designed on the model of a hunt: a group disorganizes the lives of supporters, assimilated to “Game” , while another group acts as a cord of shooters [ 17 ] .
The operation is launched from rear bases, often secure villages, near the area held by supporters; For example, the village of Kopatkeviči, south of Bobrujsk, is one of these operational bases, essential for the success of this operation [ 18 ] .
Progressing along the country roads, the units engaged make their junction in the center the surrounding area, in accordance with the plan defined by the German strategists [ ten ] .
However, despite its tactical success, this operation is a strategic failure, the maquis in the region having not been eradicated, the majority of supporters who have been able to escape [ 19 ] .
Losses [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
At the end of rating operations, losses amount to seven dead and eight injured for German forces, while the number of Belarusian supporters and civilians killed during the operation amounted to 3,423 victims [ 18 ] .
Actions against civilians [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
Despite statistical presentations, the small number of weapons found indicates that the main victims of the operation are Jews and villagers who are refugees in areas out of the achievement of German occupation troops [ 8 ] .
The choice to target Belarusian civilians constitutes one of the objectives of this sweeping operation; Indeed, it is a question of cutting the supporters of the environment around them, while starting the large-scale ethnic cleaning, planned for the post-war period [ 20 ] .
Destructions and looting [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
At the end of this operations, the civilians encountered are systematically questioned by the police forces, while the villages and the hamlets are systematically destroyed, in order to deprive supporters of any logistics base [ 8 ] .
At the end of operations in which police forces participate as a priority [ twelfth ] , when taking control of the villages, hitherto completely spared by the regulated cutting policy of the occupied territories, agricultural wealth is systematically looted [ 8 ] .
A model [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
The modalities of preparation and implementation of this systematic sweeping operation of an isolated zone far from the front line is closely followed by the soldiers and the SS officials of the maintenance of [ 19 ] .
Indeed, this operation constitutes a turning point, by its magnitude and its preparation, in the struggle of the German occupation troops against the supporters [ 18 ] . Indeed, the fight against supporters changes paradigm: at the start of the occupation, the occupation units are content to closely control the roads and the agglomerations, leading outside these controlled spaces than reprisal operations. This operation offers another model for the fight against supporters, consisting in carrying out large rating operations in a demarcated area [ 6 ] .
At the end of tactical and strategic analysis, this operation ” pilot ” constitutes a model for 55 Operations following the fight against supporters established in the Belarus forests launched between the spring of 1942 and the , date of completion of the last operation launched before the Soviet reconquest [ twelfth ] .
Indeed, from that moment, in fact, the military success of the operations to fight against the supporters requires coordination between the Wehrmacht and the SS, the units of these two bodies acting in connection with each other [ ten ] .
A redistribution of roles [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
At the end of operations, military officials of occupation troops draw the conclusions of the involvement of Wehrmacht units in this operations. Indeed, a few months later, in August 1942 , the general district of the Wehrmacht, Georg Thomas, hitherto responsible for the occupation policy, is unloaded; This sector is entrusted to the OKH, responsible for military operations on the Eastern Front [ ten ] .
In addition, from that moment, German military units specialize in the operations to fight against supporters carried out on the model of Operation Bamberg, and enjoy a certain renown; The brigade commanded by Oskar Dirlewanger is thus haloed by the success met in early 1942 [ 21 ] .
Notes [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
- These units are reported by the brutality they show in the operations to combat the maquis.
- These groups carefully avoid contact with supporters.
References [ modifier | Modifier and code ]
- Agul 2015, t. Ii, p. 1753.
- Baechler 2012, p. 304.
- Cerovic 2006, p. 75.
- Cerovic 2006, p. 78.
- Eismann et Martens 2006, p. 75.
- Ingrao 2006, p. 27.
- Eismann et Martens 2006, p. 77.
- Baechler 2012, p. 307.
- Agul 2015, t. Ii, p. 1766.
- Eismann et Martens 2006, p. 63.
- Agul 2015, t. Ii, p. 1769.
- Eismann et Martens 2006, p. 80.
- Eismann et Martens 2006, p. 79.
- Ingrao 2006, p. 28.
- Ingrao 2006, p. 143.
- Ingrao 2006, p. 152.
- Ingrao 2006, p. 145.
- Cerovic 2008, p. 253.
- Baechler 2012, p. 308.
- Ingrao 2006, p. 127.
- Ingrao 2006, p. 129.
- Alya Aglan ( you. ) it Robert Frank ( you. ), 1937-1947: War-World II , Paris, Gallimard, , 1073 p. (ISBN 978-2-07-046417-3 ) .
. - Chistian Baechler, War and extermination to the east. Hitler and the conquest of vital space. 1933-1945 , Paris, Tallandier, , 524 p. (ISBN 978-2-84734-906-1 ) .
- Masha Cerovic, « From peace to war: the inhabitants of Minsk in the face of German occupation violence (June 1941 – February 1942) », International relationships , vol. 2, n O 126, , p. 67-79 (DOI 10.3917/ri.126.0067 ) .
- Masha Cerovic, « “To the dog, a dog death”. Supporters in the face of “homeland traitors” », Russian Notebooks , n O 49, , p. 239-262 ( read online ) .
- Masha Cerovic, The children of Stalin: The War of Soviet supporters (1941-1944) , Paris, Seuil, , 371 p. (ISBN 978-2-02-112167-4 ) .
- Gael Iceman a stefan Martens , German occupation and military repression: the policy of “maintenance of order” in occupied Europe, 1939-1945 , Paris, otherwise, , 259 p. (ISBN 978-2-7467-0930-0 ) .
- Christian Groin , Black hunters: the Dirlewanger brigade , Paris, Perrin, , 284 p. (ISBN 978-2-262-03067-4 ) .
- Geoffrey Roberts ( trad. from English), Stalin wars: from World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 , Paris, Delga, , 545 p. (ISBN 978-2-915854-66-4 ) .
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