Syria foreign policy – Wikipedia

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The Syria foreign policy brings together all the diplomatic relations maintained by the Syrian Arab Republic since its proclamation in 1961.

From 2011, due to the Syrian civil war, a large number of essentially Arab and Western states decide to break their diplomatic relations with Syria, suspended from the Arab League the same year [ first ] .

The , Walid Moallem, head of Syrian diplomacy since 14 years old , died at the age of 79 years old [ 2 ] . The following days, no information concerning his successor is given by the Syrian regime [ 2 ] , but several names circulate like Bouthaina Chaaban, Bashar Jaafari and Fayçal al-Meqdad [ 3 ] . It is the latter who is ultimately appointed new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria [ 4 ] .

Table of Contents

United Arab Republic [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

The , Egypt and Syria unite, creating the United Arab Republic, which leads, in fact , the ban on Syrian political parties.

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But the union quickly ceases to exist. General Haydar al-Kouzbari made a coup , Syria seceding, and restores the Syrian Arab Republic.

Syrian Arab Republic [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

The following eighteen months will be marked by great political instability, with various blows or coup attempts. THE , a new coup takes place, installing the National Revolutionary Order Council in power, headed Amine Al-Hafez. This council consists of a group of soldiers and civilians, all socialists, who have assumed executive and legislative functions. The coup is the work of the Baas party, and the majority of the members of this council were members of the BAAS.

Baassist government [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Salah Jedid, instigator of the coup d’etat of February 23, 1966.

In May 1964, President Amine Al-Hafez promulgated a temporary constitution providing for the establishment of a National Revolution Council (CNR), designated parliamentarians composed of workers, peasants and unionists.

The , a group of soldiers, still from the Baas party, headed by Salah Jedid, managed to overthrow the government of Amine Al-Hafez. He is imprisoned. The new government dissolves the CNR, repeals the Constitution, and chases the historic founders of the Baas party in Syria (Michel Aflak, Salah Eddine Bitar and Akram Hourani), which allows them to have a regionalist policy and no longer Panarabe as wanted The Baas party. The heads of the coup then speak of “rectification” of the principles of the party. But the six -day war, lost by the Egyptians and the Syrians, at the same time weakens the government of Salah Jedid. THE , taking advantage of the impasse due to the involvement of the Syrian army in the crisis in Jordan between King Hussein and the OLP (Black September), the Minister of Defense Hafez el-Assad proceeds to a coup d’etat . Taking up Salah Jedid, he became thanks to his “corrective revolution” the new Prime Minister, and the strong man of Syria.

Dynastie el-Assad [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Hafez el-Assad, head of state from 1970 to his death in 2000, is confirmed in his functions as head of state by five successive referendums where he is each time the only candidate. He is, after King Hassan II of Morocco, the Arab head of state who has remained in power the longest. This longevity comes mainly due to the complete locking of political life. It was supported by religious minorities, including the Alawite religious minority. It is also supported by many farmers and by Syrians living in rural areas. The expansion of bureaucracy has created a middle class faithful to the government. But most of its power came from the Syrian army and its omnipresent security apparatus. Another factor in its continuation in power is nationalism, including among others the conflicts which opposed it and oppose Syria in the United States, Israel and Iraq of Saddam Hussein.

Bashar el-Assad succeeds his father the , after a modification of the constitution which lowers the minimum age for the candidacy for the presidential election from 40 to 34 (age of Bashar) [ 5 ] , [ 6 ] . Only candidate, he is elected by referendum [ 7 ] . The Syrians then evoke a “republic-monarchy” to qualify the hereditary republic [ 8 ] . Some, and in particular human rights activists, however, hope for a certain liberalization of the country, as well as hoping for many foreign political leaders; This is called Damascus spring.

This first spring does not last long: it ends in February 2001, when the security services freeze the activity of intellectual, cultural and political forums, and with the pursuit of human rights activists and their imprisonment. In this short six -month period, the spring of Damascus will have seen intense political and social debates, on the one hand, and on the other hand it has retained an echo which sounds in political, cultural and intellectual debates until 2011 .

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Syrian Civil War [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

At the beginning of 2011, the Arab spring reached Syria. Demonstrations in favor of democracy and peaceful take place throughout the country against the Baasist regime of President Bashar el-Assad [ 9 ] . These demonstrations are suddenly repressed by the regime and little by little, the protest movement turns into an armed rebellion [ 9 ] .

Many belligerents participate in the conflict. The free, nationalist Syrian army is the first movement to conduct rebellion but from 2013, it is supplanted by Sunni Islamist groups like Ahrar al-Cham, Jaych al-Islam or the Al-Nosra front, the Syrian branch Al-Qaeda. Rebel groups are mainly supported by Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. For its part, the Syrian regime is maintained thanks to the help of Iran and Russia. Iran deploys Syria for the body of the Islamic Revolutionary Cardians from the start of the conflict, thereafter of the dozens of Islamist Shiite militias sponsored by Tehran in turn win Syria; Like the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Afghans Hazaras of the Division of Fatimids or the Iraqis of the Badr and Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba organization. For its part, Russia intervenes militarily in And begins an air strike campaign in support of the regime.

Coming from Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) appeared in Syria in 2013, initially combined with Syrian rebel groups, he conflicts with them from . From , IS is the target of an air strike campaign carried out by a coalition led by the United States.

For their part, the Kurds of the Party of the Democratic Union (Pyd) and its armed branch, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), linked to the PKK, fight for the self -determination of Rojava.

Of To , the conflict has made 260,000 to 470,000 deaths according to estimates from various NGOs and the UN. Many massacres, war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed, mainly by the Syrian regime and the Islamic State. The loyalist camp is responsible for the majority of civilian war victims, often by the fact of air bombing. Between 100,000 and 200,000 people disappeared in the prisons of the regime, at least 12,000 to 60,000 were tortured there to death. Chemical weapons have also been used. Half of the Syrian population was moved during the conflict and between five and six million Syrians fled the country, a quarter of the population.

At the end of 2019, in order to settle the civil war, the Syrian Constitutional Committee was created under the aegis of the UN.

In June 2020, faced with a national economic crisis, President Assad dismissed Prime Minister Imad Khamis from his position to replace him with Hussein Arnous.

Conflict with Turkey [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

The , Turkey launches the operation source of peace in the territories in northern Syria, which are mostly Kurdish territories, aimed at creating a band of 32 km To neutralize the Kurdish bases on the verge of Turkey. The operation is transformed into a conflict between Turkey and the Syrian national army on one side and on the other the Syrian democratic forces and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Towards a diplomatic reinstatement of the regime [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

During the session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021, no less than ten foreign ministers in Arab countries met their Syrian counterpart Fayçal al-Meqdad, a first for ten years [ ten ] . Damascus gains go beyond the Arabic framework, as shown in the reintegration announced at the end of September of Syria within the Interpol information exchange system, from which Damascus was excluded in 2012 [ ten ] .

In April 2023, nine Arab countries met in Djeddah in Saudi Arabia to debate a return from Syria to the Arab League, before the next summit scheduled for May 19 in the Kingdom [ 11 ] . This meeting comes in the aftermath of a surprise visit to the Syrian Foreign Minister, Fayçal al-Moqdad, in Saudi Arabia, for the first time since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 [ 11 ] . At this stage, the only opponent of the return of Syria to the Arab League is Qatar, but the latter is ready to change position if there is an Arab consensus, a consensus which gradually takes shape, according to the researcher Randa Slim [ twelfth ] . According to researcher Aron Lund: “Assad simply rejected everything and waited for his enemies to throw in the towel, and it worked. They come back one after the other to shake hands with him, and pretend the last decade has not existed. »» [ 11 ] .

Relations with the Arab countries of the Middle East [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with Iraq [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Iraq and Syria share a border of 600 kilometers [ 13 ] , as well as strong historical and cultural ties. The two countries were part of the Ottoman Empire before its dismantling after the First World War. The border that separates them was drawn by the Sykes-Picot agreements, named after the French and British diplomats who have negotiated the sharing of the Ottoman Empire in the zone of influences controlled by these two countries.

Since 1945, Iraq and Syria have been both members and co -founders of the Arab League.

In 1979, relations between Syria and Iraq, governed by rival branches of the Baas party, deteriorate, Saddam Hussein going so far as to break his diplomatic relations with Damascus because of Syrian support for Iran, with whom he is at war [ 14 ] . Indeed, during the Iran-Iraq war, Syria supported Iran by arms deliveries and the closure of the oil pipeline connecting Kirkouk to the Syrian port of Baniyas, following which Iraqi oil exports would have been ruined without opening a new line by Turkey [ 14 ] .

In 1990, Syria until joining the international coalition led by the United States against Iraq during the Gulf War, Hafez el-Assad seeking to tighten links with Washington, after the collapse of the USSR [ 14 ] . This also welcomed the American president Bill Clinton in Damascus in 1994, while at the same time, Iraq is under embargo imposed by the United States [ 14 ] .

However, ten years later, the change of regime in Iraq which follows the American invasion created the conditions for a Syro-Iraqi rapprochement, like relations between Iraq and Iran, ally of Damascus .

From 2014, Iraq and Syria are simultaneously at the civil war, and fight the Sunni extremist group Islamic which establishes a “caliphate” covering a large area of ​​these two countries. The two Shiite governments collaborate on several fronts against this common enemy. Iraqi aviation leads several strikes in eastern Syria with the approval of the Syrian government [ 15 ] , [ 16 ] , [ 17 ] , [ 18 ] , [ 19 ] , while like the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite militias fight alongside the Syrian army [ 20 ] .

But Iraqi involvement in the Syrian civil war is not militated in war against the Islamic State, Iraqi Shiite militias also actively participating in the repression of the regime against the rebels, especially during the Battle of Aleppo [ 21 ] , [ 22 ] .

In October 2018, the border post located between the cities of Iraq and Syria Boukamal, and Al-Qaim was reopened following the resumption of these two cities in the Islamic State by the Iraqi and Syrian armies [ 23 ] . This position was before the start of the war in Syria in 2011 one of the strategic arteries for the passage of goods, tourists and the workforce [ 23 ] .

In the early 2020s, Iraq, like the United Arab Emirates, encouraged a reintegration of Syria in the Arab League [ 24 ] .

Relations with Jordan [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Jordan and Syria share a border of 375 kilometers , as well as strong historical and cultural ties, the two countries that were part of the Ottoman Empire before its dismantling after the First World War.

Jordan and Syria were stakeholders in the two Arab coalitions engaged against Israel during the Israeli-Arab wars of 1948-1949 and 1967 (Six Day War).

In 1970, the Syrian army supported an attempt to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy by the organization of liberation of Palestine, which failed following an Israeli intervention [ 25 ] . Following this event, Jordan refuses to participate in the Kippur War in 1973 alongside Egypt and Syria, and secretly warns Israel of the invasion of these two states [ 25 ] .

Despite these tensions and divergences, diplomatic and commercial relations continue during the following decades. In the early 2010s, annual bilateral exchanges between Jordan and Syria were estimated at nearly a billion dollars before the Syrian conflict [ 26 ] , while since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Syria had become the main trading partner for the Jordanians [ 27 ] .

In 2011, the Arab Spring degenerated in civil war in Syria. Jordan is then one of the few Arab countries not to close its embassy in Damascus, while welcoming nearly 650,000 refugees according to the UN, 1.4 million according to the authorities of the kingdom [ 28 ] . In 2014, diplomatic relations between Jordan and Syria deteriorate, and the Syrian ambassador was expelled from Amman [ 26 ] . But at the same time, the closure of the Syro-Jordanian border heavily impacts the economy of certain cities in the North Jordanian such as Irbid or Ramtha, whose exports transited to Syria to reach Iraq and the Gulf countries [ 27 ] .

Jordan actively participates in the war against the Islamic State in Syria, by providing its military means available and leading a series of air strikes in particular after the execution of one of its pilots by the jihadist group [ 29 ] . In , Jordan announces the reopening of the main crossing point between the cities of Nassib (Syria) and Jaber (Jordan), closed for three years for security reasons [ 30 ] . But the continuation of the fighting on the Syrian side, in particular the battle of Deraa prevents any lasting application of this measure, Jordan was forced to keep this border under close surveillance and to close it regularly, fearing for its safety [ 27 ] . From 2019, the COVVI-19 pandemic is a new stop to international trade, at the same time hitting Syro-Jordanian relations [ 27 ] .

In January 2021, the arrival of Joe Biden to the American Presidency, who affirms his desire to disengage his country from the Middle East, created an opportunity, from the point of Jordan who is a close ally of the United States, to convince the new American administration to soften its economic sanctions against the Syrian regime [ ten ] . In July 2021, King Abdallah II went to Washington to convince Joe Biden not to apply the sanctions provided for by the Caesar Act on the supply of Egyptian gas to Lebanon confronted with a serious energy crisis [ thirty first ] , via Jordan and Syria; The American president accepts this request [ ten ] . At the end of this interview, the king gives an interview to CNN to report the evolution of his thought: “The Syrian regime is there to stay. It is better to advance the dialogue in a coordinated manner than to leave it as it is ” [ ten ] .

In September, Syrian and Lebanese delegations meet in Amman, who hopes to benefit from a reinstatement of Syria in international trade to resume economic and commercial exchanges with Damascus, but also to consider the return of Syrian refugees [ 26 ] .

On the Syrian side, the total resumption of control of the Rebel region of Deraa makes it possible to consider the reopening of the Syro-Jordanian border post of Jaber-Nassib [ 32 ] . This reopening finally took place on September 29, 2021, followed by the lifting of the travel restrictions in place as part of the fight against the Pandemic of COVVI-19, and the resumption of direct flights between Amman and Damascus by the Jordanian national company, Royal Jordanian [ 27 ] .

With these decisions, it appears that Jordan leaves this ambiguity imposed for fear of American sanctions, declaring openly that after 10 years civil war in Syria, no one has offered solutions, and it is time to move on [ 27 ] . But it is above all the American green light that allows Jordan to envisage these measures, which means that the Jordanian decision remains dependent on a possible turnaround in Washington [ 27 ] . On October 3, King Abdallah officially talked by phone with Bashar al-Assad, for the first time since the start of the Syrian civil war [ ten ] .

Relations with Lebanon [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Lebanon shares with Syria a border of 375 km [ 33 ] . The question of uniting their two territories in one and the same country arose at the time of the Sykes-Picot agreements providing for the sharing of the Middle East in areas of French and British influences after the First World War [ 34 ] . Despite their separations into two states, their populations have kept strong similarities and affinities, several Lebanese personalities being of Syrian origin and vice versa. This is particularly the case of Emile Eddé, born in Damascus in 1884 and president of Lebanon from 1936 to 1941 [ 34 ] .

During the Lebanese civil war which lasted from 1975 to 1990, Syrian President Hafez el-Assad saw in a pacification operation the opportunity to post troops near Israel to threaten the Hebrew state. Under the Taëf agreement ending the Lebanese civil war, Lebanon was occupied by the Syrian army between 1989 and 2005. In 1991, Syria and Lebanon concluded a treaty of fraternity, cooperation and coordination.

In November 2011, Lebanon is the only Arab country with Yemen to oppose the exclusion of Syria from the Arab League [ ten ] . During the Syrian civil war, Lebanese Hezbollah sends thousands of fighters press the Syrian army against the rebels and jihadists [ 35 ] , playing a major role in the outcome of several battles like Qousseir in 2013 [ 36 ] et deir ez-zor between 2012 ET 2017 [ 37 ] . At the same time, more than a million Syrians affected by the war take refuge in Lebanon, the equivalent of a quarter of the population of Lebanon [ 38 ] .

In 2021, Lebanon, in recession since 2018 [ 39 ] Looking for new energy suppliers in gas and electricity and requests Egypt and Jordan, making Syria an essential partner for the transit of these resources on its territory [ 24 ] . In this context, a Lebanese delegation led by Minister Zeina Acar went to Damascus in August to meet the Syrian authorities, who hope to benefit from this attempt to bring together diplomatically, while the United States has agreed to make an exception to the César law which sanctions Syria to allow Lebanon to obtain their supplies [ 24 ] .

Relations with Saudi Arabia [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Although Hostile at the Revolutions of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia begins to support the rebels in Syria, a few months after the start of the Syrian Civil War [ 40 ] . In 2012, it officially broke its relations with Damascus, like most Arab and Western countries, to protest against the repression of the regime of the Syrian revolution that led the country to the civil war [ 41 ] .

The kingdom is in particular to contain the influence of Iran, its main rival in the region. It is based on the Conservatives, the deserting officers, the tribes and the liberals [ 42 ] , [ 43 ] , and supports Salafist groups, notably Jaych al-Islam, as well as the free Syrian army and moderate groups, on the other hand, it opposes the Muslim Brotherhood [ 40 ] , [ 43 ] , [ 44 ] . However, thousands of Saudis leave to fight in Syria and jihadist groups such as the Islamic State or the Al-Nosra Front benefit from financial support from private actors, associations, or businessmen, sometimes linked to some members of the royal family, who benefit from a certain state laissez-faire [ 45 ] , [ forty six ] .

Saudi Arabia ends up worrying about the rise of jihadist Salafists, who dispute the legitimacy of the Saudi dynasty, and fears that they cannot benefit from a certain attractiveness in the eyes of part of the Saudi Saudi population , which could destabilize the kingdom [ 43 ] , [ 44 ] . In The departures of fighters for Syria are made illegal by the Ministry of the Interior led by Prince Mohammed Ben Nayef Al Saoud [ 40 ] . In , the Saudi kingdom classifies the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State as terrorist organizations and prohibits any support or funding for these groups [ 40 ] , [ forty six ] . In , Riyadh joins the international coalition against IS.

The following years, although the two states have officially had no diplomatic relations, they cooperate in matters and security and information [ 41 ] . Syrian and Saudi intelligence leaders Ali Mamlouk and Khaled al-Humaïdan meet in particular in Saudi Arabia in 2015 and 2018 [ 41 ] . At the beginning of May 2021 Khaled al-Humaïdan went to Damascus and meets Syrian President Bashar el-Assad [ 41 ] . The reopening of a Saudi Embassy in Syria is mentioned during this meeting, but conditioned by Ryiad that Damascus takes his distance from Iran, his main enemy in the region [ 41 ] . In return for a revival of political influence to the rising, Saudi Arabia proposes to contribute to finance the reconstruction of Syria estimated at several hundred billions of dollars, that neither the Russians nor the Iranians have the means to pay [ 41 ] But the “Cesar” law passed by the United States threaten any person who would do business with the Syrian regime [ 47 ] . The following days, an Arab diplomat, however, minimized the scope of this meeting, emphasizing the fact that it is only a meeting between intelligence of intelligence [ 47 ] .

On June 8, 2021, the Qatari Al Jazeera channel reveals that Riyadh would be about to conclude a normalization agreement with the Syrian regime [ 48 ] . After having been one of the most fervent supporters of a fall in the Syrian regime, especially due to the privileged ties of the latter with Iran, Riyadh appears anxious to restore serene diplomatic relations with Damascus [ 48 ] . Two years later, in March 2023, Saudi media set out the imminent reopening of the Saudi and Syrian embassies in Damascus and Riyadh after more than a decade of diplomatic rupture [ 49 ] . This announcement occurs two weeks after the standardization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, one of the main external supports of the Damascus regime [ 49 ] . The following month, sources at the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the intention of the Head of Saudi diplomacy, Prince Fayçal Ben Farhane, to go to Damascus to give Bashar al-Assad an invitation to participate in the League of the League Arabic (whose participation of Syria has been suspended), scheduled for May 19 [ 50 ] .

Relations with the United Arab Emirates [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

In the early 2010s, like other members of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (with the exception of Oman on these two points), the United Arab Emirates broke their diplomatic relations with Syria in Syria reason for the Syrian civil war [ 47 ] .

The United Arab Emirates support the Syrian opposition and seek to protect themselves from Iran. However, they also carry out a very active policy against Islamists, in particular against the Muslim Brotherhood, and therefore oppose Qatar [ 51 ] . Close allies of the United States, the Emirates join the coalition in 2014 and their special forces would have participated in the training of combatants of the Syrian Democratic Forces [ 51 ] . After the Russian military intervention, Abu Dabi adopted a less aggressive line towards Damascus and favors the implementation of a political solution associating Russia and the United States [ 51 ] .

In December 2018, the Emirates reopen their embassy in Damascus, which is an exception, like Oman, in the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League [ 52 ] . They see Damascus as an ally with their objective of limiting the influence of political Islam and the states that sponsors it, including Turkey [ 47 ] .

Fin Mars 2020, Mohamed Ben Zayed Al Nahyane Propose 3 billions Dollars in Bashar al-Assad if the latter agreed to resume the fighting to Idlib against for the troops supported by Turkey in Syria or a fragile ceasefire had been signed between Ankara and Moscow the [ 53 ] . The attempts of the United Arab Emirates to relaunch the offensive of Idleb would aim to attach the Turkish forces in the conflict and to divert them from the campaign in Libya, where it helps the Fayez El-Sarraj government supported by the UN Against the ally of the United Arab Emirates Khalifa Haftar [ 54 ] .

In March 2021, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, Cheikh Abdallah Ben Zayed declared, alongside his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov visiting Abu Dabi, wishing a return from Syria to the Arab League, but that Caesar Act , American law economically punish the Syrian regime, makes this perspective very difficult [ 55 ] . He declared during the same intervention as the lifting of the economic sanctions imposed in Damascus must be “Clearly discussed in dialogue with our friends in the United States” [ 55 ] , as well as [ 47 ] :

“The return of Syria to the Arab lap is essential and has nothing to do with anyone or who does not want it. It is a matter of public interest and the interests of Syria and the region. »»

While waiting for an American green light, the Emiratis buy agricultural land, provide financial support and transfer to Syria vaccines against the COVVI-19 [ 47 ] .

On March 18, 2018, Bashar el-Assad went to the Emirates for the first time since the start of the civil war in 2011, and met the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed Ben Zayed, “Cooperation and coordination between the two brothers in order to contribute to security, stability and peace in the Arab world and the Middle East” , according to a press release relating their meeting [ 56 ] . The Syrian president also meets Mohammed Ben Rached Al-Maktoum, the leader of Dubai, the other great emirate of the country [ 56 ] .

In February 2023, the Minister Emirati of Foreign Affairs, Abdallah Ben Zayed al-Nahyane, went to Syria in February to share his solidarity following the 2023 earthquake in Turkey and Syria [ 57 ] . The following month, Bashar el-Assad goes again to Abu Dhabi where he is greeted by President Emirati Mohammad Ben Zayed, who announces talks aimed at developing relations between the two countries, and the need for Syria of Syria “Return to the Arab lap” [ 57 ] .

Relations with Oman [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

The Sultanate of Oman is one of the rare Arab countries, and in particular the member of the Arab League (of which Syria is suspended in November 2011 [ 58 ] ) to have maintained diplomatic relations with the Syrian regime since the start of the Syrian civil war [ 47 ] .

In , the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid Mouallem goes to Oman to inaugurate the new Embassy of Syria in Mascate. During this visit, Mr. Mouallem praises the supporters of Muscat with regard to Syria within the framework of international forums and praises economic cooperation between the two states [ 59 ] .

In , Syria signs with Oman a temporary loan agreement for museum collections for conservation and preservation, while the historical heritage of Syria is seriously threatened by the civil war [ 60 ] .

In May 2021, Sultan Haitham was the only Gulf leader to congratulate Bashar al-Assad for his victory in the presidential election, largely qualified as masquerade by his detractors [ 47 ] .

In February 2023, Bashar el-Assad went to Oman, marking himself a first official visit abroad since the start of the Syrian civil war twelve years earlier [ sixty one ] . He meets the Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq who shares his condolences and his support after the devastating earthquake that occurred between Syria and Turkey [ sixty one ] . According to researcher Aron Lund this disaster offered Bashar al-Assad an opportunity to “Boost bilateral relations” , the economic and diplomatic sanctions which were imposed on it being considered as factors aggravating the suffering of the Syrian population [ sixty one ] . In this Oman context, thanks to its “benevolent neutrality”, is an interesting gateway to the Syrian regime for a possible regional reinstatement in the Middle East [ sixty one ] .

Relations with Qatar [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

At the start of the Syrian civil war, like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Qatar provided financial support to rebels in the first years of the conflict to bring down the regime [ 47 ] .

In May 2021, questioned about normalization of links between Doha and Damascus, Qatari Foreign Minister Cheikh Mohammed Ben Abderrahman Al-Thani sweeps this possibility of a backhand by declaring that he has no motivation to restore the Links with the Syrian regime [ 47 ] .

Relations with Bahrain [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

In the aftermath of the reopening of the United Arab Emirates Emirates Emirates in 2018, Bahrain said that the activities of his diplomatic mission in Damascus had continued without interruption, without specifying if this was the case since 2011 [ 47 ] .

Relations with Kuwait [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Kuwait claims to expect other Arab countries to follow up on the water, while specifying that it would stick to the directives of the Arab League with regard to the Syrian regime [ 47 ] .

Relations with non-Arab countries in the Middle East [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with Iran [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

The strategic relationship between Syria and Iran is largely built by Hafez el-Assad, from the Alawite community, which Tehran considers the support of minority Shiites in the Arab world [ 62 ] .

During the Iran-Iraq war, Syria ranks on the side of Iran, in particular by deliveries of arms and the closure of the oil pipeline connecting Kirkouk to the Syrian port of Baniyas, following which Iraqi oil exports would have been ruined without the opening of a new line by Turkey [ 14 ] .

From his accession to power, Bashar el-Assad takes over his father’s foreign policy by allying, on the one hand, with Iran and Hezbollah, and, on the other hand, with Saudi Arabia which hoped ‘Having under his wing by supporting him financially [ 62 ] . Syria is part according to Iran of “the axis of resistance” against Israel, or of the “Shiite corridor” connecting the four capitals, Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut [ 63 ] .

During the Syrian civil war, Iran militarily supported the Syrian government, of which it is one of the main allies on the international scene with Russia [ 62 ] . ASSAD benefits from this double alliance to rival its two sponsors with sometimes divergent objectives in Syria [ 62 ] .

At the same time, Iran takes advantage of its intervention in the Syrian civil war to implement paramilitary forces near Israel, causing a series of air strikes from the Hebrew state from 2012, killing hundreds in The ranks of pro-Iranian forces [ sixty four ] .

Relations with Israel [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Israel has no diplomatic relations with Syria, the two states being still officially at war after facing each other during the Israeli-Arab war in 1948-1949, of the Six Day War in 1967, of the war of the war of Kippur in 1973, during which Syria and Egypt attack Israel to force it to restore the territories conquered in 1967 [ 14 ] . Taken by surprise, the Israeli army finally resumes the upper hand at the cost of severe losses, then an agreement on the disengagement of forces in the Golan was signed in May 1974 [ 14 ] . Note that the Israeli and Syrian armies also clashed by supporting opposite camps in Jordan during the attempted coup of the OLP against the monarchy in 1971, and in Lebanon during the civil war in 1982.

The Golan Plateau, which is still officially part of Syrian territory was taken by the Israeli army in 1967, then officially annexed in 1981 (its annexation was recognized by American President Donald Trump in March 2019) [ 65 ] .

The 1990s were marked by an lull in the Israeli-Arab war, when following the Oslo peace agreements, several Arab countries opened links in Tel Aviv [ 66 ] . If Syria is not one of them, President Hafez el-Assad nevertheless declared himself ready to promote diplomatic action to end the conflict [ sixty seven ] . But peace talks between Israel and Syria launched thanks to the Oslo agreements were interrupted in February 1996, Damascus demanding a total restitution of the Golan Plateau, rejected by Tel Aviv [ 68 ] .

In August 1997, Hafez el-Assad received a delegation from 50 Israeli Arabs in Damascus from his invitation, not to play the mediators between Syria and Israel, but for “Ensuring a connection, a mutual knowledge of the Palestinians who have remained in Israel and their Arab brothers” [ 68 ] .

Since the start of the 2011 Syrian Civil War, multiple incidents regularly oppose the Syrian and Israeli armies, essentially in the form of Israeli air strikes in Syrian territory [ sixty four ] .

In , three months after the Abraham agreements normalizing relations between Israel on the one hand, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain on the other hand, several media evoke a meeting between Israeli and Syrian delegations on the Russian air base of Hmeimim, at northeast of Syria [ 69 ] . The Syrian regime, which categorically denies this meeting, could have been forced there by Moscow, its main ally on the international scene, with the aim of putting pressure on Iran to reduce its influence in Syria [ 69 ] .

A month later, the authorities of the two countries announced a exchange of prisoners thanks to a mediation of Russia, concerning civilians arrested after having crossed the border: two Syrian shepherds on the Golan Plateau, and an Israeli Jewish Orthodox illegally entry into Syria [ 70 ] . But the main clause of this agreement concerns the acceptance by Israel to finance the sending of hundreds of thousands of Russian vaccines “Spoutnik V” against the COVID-19, for Damascus [ 70 ] .

This agreement would be indicative of the reality of Israeli-Syrians reports: secret relations led by a certain pragmatism but hidden behind official denials [ 70 ] . Despite its strikes in Syrian territory targeting the regional allies of Damascus (mainly Iranian), the Hebrew state has restraint on the Syrian issue, preserving the situation when in the Golan Plateau and refusing to take a stand between the diet and the rebels [ 70 ] .

Turkey relations [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with the Caucasus [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with Armenia [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations between Armenia and Syria are old and particularly good on the diplomatic and cultural level, although limited on the commercial level [ 71 ] . The governments of the two states are also both of the strategic and historical allies of Russia, which is an important factor of rapprochement [ 71 ] . Like Lebanon, Syria is home to a large, well integrated, qualified and enterprising Armenian community in the country, which is an important factor in good relations between civil societies of the two countries [ 72 ] . These are descendants of those who fled the Armenian massacres in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War [ seventy three ] , most having been deported by the Turks in the Syrian desert of Deir Ez-Zor, but a number of them could be rescued by the Arabs [ 71 ] .

In 1991, Syria was among the first countries to recognize the independence of Armenia, while the following year, 1992, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad donated 6,000 tonnes of wheat to Armenia when an energy blockade paralyzed the country at war against Azerbaijan [ 71 ] . Syria also provides Armenians with a large free zone in the Christian district of Tilel in Aleppo to facilitate the export of current consumer goods to Armenia [ 71 ] . The first president of the new Republic of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian was born in Aleppo.

In 2010, Syrian President Bashar el-Assad encouraged a normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey, two countries which he is then close [ 74 ] . In 2011, on the eve of the Syrian Civil War, around 350,000 inhabitants of Armenian origin were established in Syria, including 150,000 in the city of Aleppo in the north of the country, of which the Midane district houses a large Armenian community [ 72 ] .

After the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, a weekly flight continues to link Damascus and Aleppo to Yerevan, provided by the company Cham Wings (the round trip Aleppo-Erevan costs 500 dollars ), but the Armenian diaspora established in Syria is starting to leave the country due to insecurity [ 71 ] . Ten years later, in 2021 only 10,000 Armenians were still established in Syria, including 8,000 in Aleppo, 1,000 in Damascus, 200 in Qamichli, and 100 families In Kassab, a city mainly populated by Armenians before the war [ 72 ] .

The Syrian city of Kassab in 2010.

This city was attacked in 2014 during the civil war by pro-Turkish Islamist fighters who take control of it, before being pushed by the Syrian army supported by Lebanese Hezbollah [ 75 ] . Among the Syro-Armenians who go to Armenia, only a minority remains there (10,000 are established in erevan in 2021), most of those who arrive in the country choose to leave to North America, France, or ‘Australia [ 71 ] . The Damascus regime regularly sends representatives to try to convince them to come back knowing that they are favorable to him, and that they are among the most qualified Syrians [ 71 ] .

On the diplomatic level, while most Western countries have broken their relations with Damascus since the start of the Syrian civil war, and strongly dispute the legitimacy of this ballot [ 76 ] , but Armenia maintains its embassy in Damascus [ 71 ] . In , Armenian President Serge Sarkissian congratulates Bashar el-Assad for his re-election [Ref. necessary] .

Between 2015 and 2016, the Armenian cathedral of forty-martyrs in Aleppo undergoes significant damage during the Battle of Aleppo [ 77 ] , while the old town of Aleppo where the church is located is controlled by rebel and Islamist groups. In , the whole city returns under government control, and work is undertaken to restore the building, where masses are again celebrated since [ 78 ] . In 2017, the Armenian Café d’Aleppo, a famous symbol of city multiculturalism, reopens its doors after being also seriously damaged, being located on the front line during the Battle of Aleppo [ 72 ] .

The , the Syrian parliament officially recognizes the Armenian genocide [ 79 ] .

In 2022, the Syrian president appointed Nora Arissian, a former deputy for the Armenian community of Damascus in the Syrian Parliament and close to the First Lady Asma Al-Assad, Ambassador of Syria in Yerevan [ 71 ] . In the wake of its taking office, it brought together around fifty Syro-Armenian entrepreneurs to examine the potential of a Syro-Armenian bilateral relationship considered to be under-exploited [ 71 ] .

Relations with Azerbaijan [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with Russia [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations between Russia and Syria are friendly. Syria has an embassy in Moscow while Russia has an embassy in Damascus and a consulate in Aleppo, closed in 2012 due to the Syrian civil war. Russia is an important support for the Syrian government in the crisis that Syria is currently experiencing and has imposed its right of veto on several resolutions of the United Nations Security Council aimed at sanctioning the Syrian government, and intervenes militarily on Syrian territory, officially Since September 30, 2015.

Vladimir Putin and Bashar el-Assad meet in 2015, in May 2018, and in September 2021 [ 80 ] . That year, Moscow multiplies contacts in order to bring Bashar el-Assad back in the good graces of Arab leaders, the objective is also to have the reconstruction by the Gulf Petromonarchies financed [ 47 ] .

Relations with Asia-Pacific [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with China [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with Bangladesh [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the use of chemical weapons “By any part and in all circumstances” After a chemical attack in Syria in 2013 [ 81 ] . He asked that he was put an end to the conflict by “Diplomatic and peaceful means” [ 82 ] . Some Bangladais have joined the Islamic State in Syria [ 83 ] , [ 84 ] . A number of British from Bangladesh, including whole families, have also joined the Islamic State [ 85 ] , [ eighty six ] . Tamim Chowdhury, a Canadian of Bangladesian origin who fought in Syria, becomes the head of the Islamic State unit in Banglades [ eighty seven ] .

On the resolution of the conflict in Syria, a civil servant of the Bangladais government said that “In the current context, a neutral position does not always satisfy all parties” . Another government official added: “We support peace. We want a peaceful solution to the situation, thanks to which Syria will retain its sovereignty ” . The government said that he had no official position concerning Syria’s attack by the United States, the United Kingdom and France [ 88 ]

Relations with European and Western countries [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with Europe [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with France [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Syria broke its diplomatic relations with France following the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 (assault by France, Israel and the United Kingdom of Egypt Nassérienne, which follows the nationalization of the canal). Relations were restored in 1961 after the episode of the United Arab Republic. On the occasion of the Six Day War, France affirms its pro-Arab policy and adopted an intransigent position vis-à-vis Israel. In 1973, following the Kippur War, France was dismissed by the United States and the Soviet Union of Peace talks.

Relations are spoiling again during the civil war in Lebanon. France first approves of the Syrian intervention within the framework of the Arab deterioration force in 1976. But quickly, it criticizes the Syrian interference, in particular because of the alliance of Syria with the Islamic Republic of Iran .

The French ambassador to Lebanon, Louis Delamare, is assassinated the And suspicions are heading for Syria. The assassination takes place in the Lebanese capital under the eyes of the Syrian soldiers, who do not intervene and let the killers set off. These are quickly identified as members of the Red Knights, a militia set up by Rifaat el-Assad, the very influential brother of the Syrian president, to intervene in Lebanon [ 89 ] . The internal notes of the DGSE conclude that Syria has commanded the attack in order to punish France for its diplomatic efforts aimed at peacefully resolving the civil war of Lebanon [ 90 ] .

In 1982, the President of the French Republic François Mitterrand did not condemn the massacre of Hama, during which the Muslim Brotherhood was fiercely repressed by Hafez el-Assad. In 1983, a new attack took place in Beirut, and Syria was accused again. This does not prevent François Mitterrand from going to Syria the following year.

In July 1998, Hafez el-Assad made a state visit to France, the first since 22 years old In a Western country, where he is warmly welcomed by President Jacques Chirac [ 14 ] . The , Jacques Chirac receives his son Bashar al-Assad at the Élysée Palace. The following year, following the death of Hafez el-Assad, he was the only head of state of West to go to the funeral of the former Syrian president [ 91 ] . However, in 2004, he supported resolution 1559 of the United Nations Security Council, which goes against Syrian interests in Lebanon, which causes new tensions between France and Syria. In 2005, they culminated with the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, close friend of Jacques Chirac. France accuses Syria and maneuver to isolate it diplomatically.

Relations will resume a normal course after the signing of the Doha agreement in 2008. This change leads to a succession of contacts and bilateral visits initiated by Syrian President Bashar el-Assad on the occasion of the Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean and that of French president Nicolas Sarkozy .

In the context of the Syrian civil war, relations are marked by a revival of tension, France denounced the massacres committed by the Syrian regime, ending by the recall of the French ambassador to Syria, Éric Chevallier, by the closure of Consulates General of Aleppo and Lattaquié the [ 92 ] , and by the expulsion of the Ambassador of Syria in France, Lamia Chakkour, the .

Subsequently, France is one of the countries most determined to act against the Bashar El-Assad regime: in , Alain Juppé, Minister of Foreign Affairs, argues that the days of the Syrian regime “are counted” [ 93 ] And declares that Bashar al-Assad must be tried by the international criminal court. France was then the first to recognize the Syrian National Council and then the coalition as “the only legitimate representative of the Syrian people”. Jointly, the French authorities were the first, “in particularly harsh terms”, of accusing Bashar al-Assad personally of crimes against humanity. France is thus at the origin of European sanctions against the Baasist Syria [ ninety four ] .

As part of the Syrian Civil War, François Hollande’s new government takes over the policy led by Alain Juppé with regard to the Bashar El-Assad regime [ 95 ] . François Hollande requests the departure of the Syrian president and the constitution of a transitional government, as well as intervention by the UN Security Council. In this context, he does not exclude armed intervention [ 96 ] At the end of 2012, despite the embargo of the European Union, France began to provide heavy weapons to the Syrian rebels (cannons of 20 mm , machine guns, rocket launchers, anti-chairs missiles …) [ 97 ] , [ 98 ] .

Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs, is one of the most committed Western diplomats against Bashar el-Assad, of which he estimates the near end [ 99 ] . He systematically condemns the massacre of the Syrian population by the Syrian regime [ 100 ] . END , François Hollande attributes responsibility for the use of chemical weapons within the framework of the Syrian civil war at the Bashar El-Assad regime, which he threatens with a punitive military intervention without going through a UN agreement. But this option is no longer favored after the negative vote of the British Parliament and the decision of the American president, Barack Obama, finally to request the congress on the issue. François Hollande is then criticized for his “go-war” side, the press titles presenting him as “trapped” on the international scene and “alone” on the internal front, in view of the opposition of the French to any military intervention [ 101 ] , [ 102 ] . The “debacle” of French diplomacy is widely commented abroad [ 103 ] .

During negotiations in Geneva concerning the regulations of the Syrian civil war in 2014, Laurent Fabius condemns the attitude of the Bashar El-Assad regime and again testifies to his unwavering support for the Syrian national coalition. These moral postures and this absence of diplomacy will be criticized by certain specialists in the Arab world for their lack of results and their catastrophic effects for Syrians [ 104 ] . The setbacks of French diplomacy in the Syrian file are confirmed by the lack of invitation from Laurent Fabius to meetings concerning Syria organized in Vienne in Vienne [ 105 ] .

In , the decision of François Hollande, in response to the attacks of the In France, to intensify the bombings of the positions of the Islamic State constitutes “a break with the ardently defended line” by Laurent Fabius in the Syrian conflict [ 106 ] , [ 107 ] , [ 108 ] . When Laurent Fabius leaves the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various media evoke his failure on the Syrian file [ 109 ] , [ 110 ] .

As part of the Syrian civil war, Emmanuel Macron remains on a line close to that of François Hollande [ 111 ] : he reaffirms his support for the Syrian opposition [ 112 ] but however changes rhetoric by asserting openly not to want to make “The dismissal of Bashar el-Assad a prerequisite for discussions. […] Daesh is our enemy, Bashar is the enemy of the Syrian people ” [ 113 ] , [ 114 ] .

In April 2018, the French army participated in the bombing of Barzé and Him Shinshar near Damascus, mobilizing nearly ten fighter planes and bombers, and several frigate [ 115 ] .

Relations with the United Kingdom [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

The wife of Bashar el-Assad and first lady of Syria, Asma el-Assad, to English nationality, having studied King’s College of London and worked in British capital in an investment bank, before returning to Syria [ 116 ] .

On April 14, 2018, the British army participated in the bombings of Barzé and Him Shinshar near Damascus, mobilizing four Tornado-bombers and four Typhoon hunters [ 117 ] .

On March 15, 2021, a preliminary investigation was opened against Asma El-Assad, by British police due to suspicions of incentive to terrorist acts during the Syrian Civil War [ 116 ] . Failing to risk any penalty in Britain, it risks being fallen from its British nationality [ 48 ] .

The next day, that the British government announced sanctions against the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Fayçal al-Moqdad and five other employees of the Syrian president [ 118 ] .

Relations with Germany [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

On July 28, 2021 the German authorities announced that he had charged a Syrian doctor, went Mousa, of crimes against humanity because of her acts of torture, sometimes followed by death, against 18 prisoners in Syrian military hospitals where he exercised before joining Germany in 2015 [ 48 ] .

Relations with Italy [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Italy accredits a diplomat from the Syrian regime to represent Syria in the United Nations Food and Agriculture, whose headquarters are in Rome [ 48 ] .

Relations with the Czech Republic [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

The Czech Republic has an embassy in Damascus, and is the only Member State of the European Union not to have closed it during the Syrian Civil War [ 119 ] .

Relations with the Netherlands [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

In March 2021, the Netherlands announced their intention to judge Syrian officials for acts of torture by invoking the UN Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or treatment; A process that could lead to a judgment at the International Court of Justice of The Hague [ 48 ] . Committed to the process of judicialization of managers of torture in Syria, the Netherlands were retorted by Walid al-Mouallem, in September 2020, that “The Netherlands are the last to have the right to talk about human rights” , invoking Amsterdam’s support to the Syrian YPG, a rebel Marxist group with links with the Turkish PKK, considered a terrorist group by Turkey, the European Union and the United States [ 48 ] .

Relations with Greece [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

In 2012, like all members of the European Union with the exception of the Czech Republic, Greece closes its embassy in Damascus to protest the repression of the Syrian revolution during the Syrian revolution [ 119 ] .

In May 2020, Greece appointed the former ambassador to Syria and Russia, Tasia Athanassiou, “special envoy to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Syria” [ 119 ] . A year later, a Syrian diplomat required anonymity indicates that the Greek embassy was reopened in Damascus at the beginning of 2021, in which a manager was appointed, but that did not was announced to avoid undergoing European pressures [ 119 ] . On June 24, Greece confirmed the official reopening of its embassy in Damascus [ 48 ] .

On the symbolic level, the presence in Syria of Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch is of particular importance for Greek cultural diplomacy [ 119 ] .

Relations with the Republic of Cyprus [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

The Republic of Cyprus and Syria share a maritime border drawn in 1974, about 50 kilometers .

In 2012, like all the members of the European Union with the exception of the Czech Republic, the Cyprus Republic closed its embassy in Damascus to protest against the repression of the regime during the Syrian revolution [ 119 ] .

In May 2021, the Union of Syrian lawyers reported to have signed a contract with the Cypriot Embassy Officer in Syria, Sivak Avedissian, in order to rent a property to house the representation of the Republic of Cyprus in Damascus, in The diplomatic district of Abu Remmaée, in the west of the city [ 119 ] . Shortly after this announcement, a Syrian diplomat who requested anonymity indicates that the Cypriot Embassy was reopened in Damascus at the beginning of 2021, in which a manager was appointed, but that did not was announced to avoid undergoing European pressures [ 119 ] .

Relations with Ukraine [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

The , the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announces to end diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Syria, after the Damascus regime recognized the same day the independence of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Lougansk, supported by Moscow since 2014 [ 120 ] .

Relations with North America [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with the United States [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

After taking the side of the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War, Syria decided in 1990-1991 to tighten its ties with Washington, after the collapse of the USSR [ 91 ] . Thus, Damascus rallies to the multinational forces of the coalition led by the United States against Saddam Hussein after his invasion of Kuwait [ 91 ] .

In October 1994, US President Bill Clinton went to Damascus and talked to the Syrian president [ 91 ] .

The United States is relatively passive at the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011. Five weeks after the start of the demonstrations in Syria Barack Obama called at the end of the repression, then he claims the departure of Bashar el-Assad in . But he wants to disengage the United States of Afghanistan and Iraq and does not intend to carry out other military interventions [ 121 ] . In , the American army withdraws from Iraq.

In 2012, the Americans began to provide information to the free Syrian army (ASL). In 2013, combatants of rebel groups were trained in Jordan by the Americans, the French and the British, and in April the United States undertook to carry 250 millions Dollars their “non -lethal” assistance to the rebellion. THE , the American presidency announces that it will provide “military support” to the rebels [ 122 ] . In September, the ASL brigades in southern Syria received their first weapons, the Americans deliver light and anti -tank weapons.

The priority is then given, from the , in the fight against the Islamic State and the United States engaged in a campaign of air strikes, after having formed an international coalition. This intervenes mainly in support of the Kurds of the YPG and overthrows the balance in their favor in the north of Syria. In , the United States begins the deployment of special forces [ 123 ] .

In 2015, the United States unlocked 500 millions Dollars and conclude an agreement with Turkey to form a body of 15,000 moderate rebels in order to fight the Islamic State, then a number reduced to 5,000. The program is a real fiasco, in July and only 120 men Enter Syria: the first group is immediately attacked by the Al-Nosra Front which made several prisoners, the second gives part of its weapons to the jihadists to obtain a right of way. Fighters of this “new Syrian force” desert or defection [ 124 ] , [ 125 ] .

The American position vis-à-vis Bashar El-Assad and the declarations of its officials are sometimes confused and contradictory, in particular on the question of negotiating or not with the Syrian regime. Until the end of his mandate, Barack Obama remains behind on Syrian file and in the whole of the Middle East, thus leaving the field open to Iran and Russia [ 126 ] .

Coming to power in 2017, the Trump administration does not break in the first months with the Obama administration policy [ 127 ] , [ 128 ] , [ 129 ] . However, she announces that the departure of Bashar el-Assad is no longer for her a priority [ 130 ] . Nevertheless, she openly displays her hostility to Iran [ 127 ] .

The massacre of Khan Cheikhoun of April 4, 2017 modifies the American position: for the first time the United States retaliated against the Syrian regime by destroying one of its air bases on the night of the 6 [ 131 ] . After this event, the United States declares that there can be no political solution with Bashar al-Assad at the head of the regime [ 132 ] . In , the American government puts an end to the CIA program for rebels, which set up four years earlier, provided these last weapons and training [ 133 ] . Syrian democratic forces of arms are continuing [ 134 ] .

Although the Islamic State has undergone several defeats and lost the majority of its territory, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announces in that the American army will stay in Syria with the objective of preventing jihadists from re-emerging, countering the influence of Iran and opposing the regime of Bashar el-Assad [ 135 ] , [ 136 ] . In , at least 2,000 American soldiers are present in Syria alongside Syrian democratic forces [ 137 ] . In , then in , Donald Trump announces the withdrawal of American troops from the Syrian territory, announcements which are only partially followed by effects [ 138 ] .

In , the United States adopts the “César” law, which imposes heavy economic sanctions on Syria, in particular by targeting states and third-party companies that trade with the Syrian authorities [ 139 ] .

In August 2020, the American administration declared that it is preparing new series of sanctions against the Assad regime and that it seeks to target the financial support networks outside the nation torn by the war. In its sanctions phase, the American Treasury and the State Department indicated that it was impatient to target the United Arab Emirates, which normalized relations in Syria for political and economic ends. And said that Cheikh Tahnoun Ben Zayed Al Nahyan, for his financial support of around 200,000 dollars to the niece of President Bashar Al Assad, Aniseh Shawkat, was targeted by the British authorities, who seized the bank accounts, for having circumvented the sanctions of the European Union against the Syrian regime [ 140 ] .

The arrival of Joe Biden at the White House does not radically change the situation, as soon as the new American administration continues to affirm that it will not normalize relations with Damascus [ 24 ] . However, this one adopts in parallel a less dogmatic approach to Arabic attempts to reintegrate Bashar el-Assad, while in Washington as in other capitals, the priorities are gradually moving; The Syrian file is no longer as burning as during the mandates of Barack Obama and Donald Trump [ 24 ] . Rather than prohibiting their Arab allies with all comparison with Damascus, the United States under Joe Biden prefer to make them obtain counterparts from Damascus on a ceasefire and a political resolution of the conflict of conflict [ 24 ] . While sanctioning the Syrian government, the United States allows Lebanon in an economic and social crisis, to import basic necessities not passing Syrian territory [ 24 ] .

In May 2021, questioned about a restoration of links between Gulf and Damascus countries, an official from the US State Department suggests that the United States Arab Allies in the region had to “Think carefully about their exposure to sanctions by dealing with this diet” , stating that “The emphasis should be on responsibility rather than the establishment of diplomatic relations” [ 47 ] .

On October 13, the head of American diplomacy Antony Blinken was sweeping away at a press conference any possibility of standardization of Syrian-American relations, declaring: “What we have not done and that we do not intend to do is expressing any support for efforts with a view to normalizing the relationships or rehabilitation of Mr. Assad. »» [ 141 ] . He reaffirms his support for a political resolution of the online conflict with the resolutions of the UN Security Council [ 141 ] .

Relations with the island of Dominique [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

On March 7, 2022, an agreement establishing diplomatic relations between Syria and the island of Dominique belonging to the Commonwealth in the Caribbean was signed by Bassam Sabbagh, representative of the Syrian regime at the United Nations, and its dominican counterpart Loreen Bannis-Roberts [ 142 ] . The two parties highlight their desire to establish bilateral partnerships, while the regime of Bashar el-Assad tries to escape isolation and sanctions while, the island of Dominique is a place known for the laundering of ‘Money and smuggling of certain Syrian officials [ 142 ] . This Caribbean island of 72,000 inhabitants has a particular system for acquiring nationality, which could also explain, in part this rapprochement: foreigners can be naturalized in exchange for $ 100,000 in the economic development fund of the island and investing $ 200,000 for the development of real estate [ 142 ] . Many tourism agencies report the travels of rich Syrians on the island, which hope to have a passport in their possession allowing to travel in approximately 150 pays and territories [ 142 ] .

North Africa [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with Egypt [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Between 1958, Egypt united with Syria to form the United Arab Republic, chaired by Nasser, dissolved in 1961 after the secession of Syria [ 143 ] . Egypt has retained the official name of “United Arab Republic” until 1971.

Syria and Egypt consult themselves in several offensives against Israel during the Israeli-Arab wars of 1948-1949, 1967 (Six Day War) and 1973 (Kippur War).

In , while most Arab countries have broken their diplomatic relations with Damascus due to the Syrian civil war, Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sissi publicly expresses his support for the Syrian army, saying that; “Our priority is to support national armies to strengthen army control over the territory and treat extremist elements.” [ 144 ] . A month earlier, the highest official of Syrian security services, General Ali Mamlouk, had visited Cairo and met General Khaled Fawzi, chief of national security in Egypt [ 145 ] .

Relations with Algeria [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with Morocco [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

In 1973, during the Kippur War, around 6,000 Moroccan soldiers were fighting in the ranks of the Syrian army against Israel.

Morocco and Syria are members of the organization of Islamic cooperation and the Arab League, but Syria is currently suspended due to the current civil war since 2011.

During the civil war, Morocco supported the rebellion and expelled the Syrian ambassador in 2012 to protest against the abuses committed by Bashar el-Assad.

Relations with Tunisia [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

In 2012, in response to the Syrian civil war, the Tunisian government of Moncef Marzouki broke its diplomatic relations with the Syrian regime [ 146 ] . This decision is then strongly criticized by the Tunisian opposition [ 146 ] .

In April, Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed decided to restore diplomatic relations with the Syrian regime, and asked his Minister of Foreign Affairs to start procedures to appoint an ambassador to Damascus [ 146 ] .

Sub-Saharan Africa [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

Relations with Sudan [ modifier | Modifier and code ]

In December 2018, in the midst of a Sudanese revolution who will lead to his overthrow a few months later, Sudanese President Omar El-Bechir went to Damascus and meets his counterpart Bashar el-Assad [ 147 ] . While Sudan is also under American sanctions, the Sudanese President declares to hope for a “Syria’s rapid return to the international scene, far from any foreign intervention in its business” [ 147 ] .

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  60. Syria signs an agreement with Oman for the preservation of its heritage » , on The East day , (consulted the ) .
  61. A B C and D In 2023, Assad’s return to the Arab lap? » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  62. A B C and D “Whenever the Russians put pressure on him, Assad calls the Iranians to help” , on The East day , (consulted the )
  63. How Iran has become the enemy of the Arab world » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  64. a et b Israel confirms 200 strikes in Syria in 18 months » , on Lefigaro (consulted the )
  65. Donald Trump signed the decree recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan », The Monde.fr , ( read online , consulted the )
  66. After Oman and Morocco, Tunisia … Pending Qatar the Arab countries let go of Israel, one after the other » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  67. Standardization with Israel remains a taboo subject, but … » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  68. a et b Damascus: Israeli Arabs in search of a role and legitimacy » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  69. a et b Rumor of Syro-Israeli meeting … Damascus formally denies » , on The East day , (consulted the )
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  75. Syria: the army takes up the city of Kassab, border of Turkey », The cross , (ISSN  0242-6056 , read online , consulted the )
  76. Bashar el-Assad re-elected with 88.7% of the votes » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  77. In Aleppo, Christians celebrate Christmas in a church ravaged by war » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  78. First mass in the Armenian Cathedral of Aleppo Restored » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  79. The Syrian Parliament recognizes the Armenian genocide » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  80. In Moscow, Assad Watch White Patte against Putin » , on The East day , (consulted the )
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  82. (in) Dhaka for quick resolution of Syria crisis » , on The Daily Star , (consulted the )
  83. (in) Air strikes kill ‘Bangladeshi militant’ in Syria » , on The Daily Star , (consulted the )
  84. (in) IS tricked Bangladesh origin UK family into Syria: Son » , on The Daily Star , (consulted the )
  85. (in) Bangladeshi family of 12 ‘may have gone to Syria’ » , on The Daily Star , (consulted the )
  86. (in) Why do British-Bangladeshi women join IS in Syria? » , on The Daily Star , (consulted the )
  87. (in) Searching for the shadowy Canadian leader of ISIS in Bangladesh » , on The Daily Star , (consulted the )
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  92. Juppé: “The Syrian opposition must organize » , on leparisien.fr , (consulted the ) .
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  97. Robin Verner, France provided weapons to the Syrian Revolution in 2012, explains François Hollande in a book , Slate.FR, May 6, 2015
  98. François Hollande confirms that he has delivered weapons to the rebels in Syria , The world , August 20, 2014.
  99. The end is closer to Bashar el-Assad , lepoint.fr, December 16, 2012
  100. Laurent Fabius wishes a “strength reaction” in Syria , Lefigaro.fr, August 22, 2013
  101. “Syria: Hollande” go war “:” alone “and” trapped “, according to the press” , L’Express .
  102. “Military intervention in Syria: the French let go of François Hollande” , Le Figaro , September 6, 2013.
  103. Olivier Rabbit, “Scathing debacle of French diplomacy” , Monde-diplomatique.fr, October 2013.
  104. Gilles Kepel, The Tribune , October 30, 2013
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  106. Syria: how the Fabius line of “Nei Assad ni Daesh” shattered , Lefigaro.fr, 19 November 2015
  107. Syria: “Fabius doctrine” is entering a turbulence area , Jean-Dominique Merchet, Lopinion.fr, November 15, 2015
  108. The security and military turning point relegates Laurent Fabius to the background , David Revault d’Allonnes, lemonde.fr, November 19, 2015
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  112. Syria: Macron confirms his support for the opposition, does not mention Assad , AFP , July 5, 2017.
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  114. Marianne Enault, Syria: the new position of Emmanuel Macron creates a controversy , Europe 1 JDD , June 22, 2017.
  115. Successful strikes and objectives achieved in Syria » , on Department of Defense , (consulted the )
  116. a et b A preliminary investigation opened against Asma El-Assad by British police, according to the Sunday Times » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  117. (EN-GB) Western powers strike Syria targets after suspected chemical attack » , on BBC News (consulted the )
  118. London announces sanctions against the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other officials », The East the day , ( read online )
  119. a b c d e f g and h Greece and Cyprus would prepare to reopen their embassies in Damascus » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  120. Zelensky puts an end to diplomatic relations with Syria » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  121. Sylvain Cypel, Obama’s will , Orient XXI , 23 mars 2016.
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  125. The United States reduces its rebels training program in Syria , France24.com with AFP, October 10, 2015.
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  127. a et b Caroline Hayek, For the time being, Trump is on the same line as Obama on Syria , Olj with agencies , February 18, 2017.
  128. Alain Frachon, Against the jihadists, Trump in the footsteps of Obama , The world , 30 mars 2017.
  129. Anthony Samrani, Syrian conflict: when Westerners change your … , Oil , first is April 2017.
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  131. After the chemical attack of Khan Cheikhoun, Donald Trump targets the Syrian regime , The world , April 7, 2017.
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  133. Georges Malbrunot, Syria: Donald Trump stops the rebels support program , Le Figaro , July 20, 2017.
  134. Syria: Washington continues to send weapons to the Kurds , Le Figaro with AFP , September 19, 2019.
  135. Faced with IS, Iran and Assad, the US military will stay in Syria , lemonde.fr with AFP, January 18, 2018.
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  137. Luc Mathieu, Syrian Kurdistan: the front that makes the contagion fear , Release , January 23, 2018.
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  141. a et b Washington can support a “normalization” with Assad Syria » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  142. A B C and D Syria normalizes its relations with the island of Dominique » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  143. Keyword: United Arab Republic – Le Monde Diplomatique » , on www.monde-diplomatique.fr (consulted the )
  144. Sissi expresses his support for the Syrian army » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  145. Syria: surprise visit to the head of security in Cairo » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  146. A B and C Syria and Tunisia in the process of restoring their diplomatic relations » , on The East day , (consulted the )
  147. a et b Sudanese president Béchir went to Damascus to meet Assad » , on The East day , (consulted the )

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