Treglia massacre – Wikipedia
The Treglia massacre He was committed in 1943 in the homonymous locality close to Split, Dalmatia, by the SS Freiwilligen Division “Prinz Eugen” commanded by Obergruppenführer Karl von Oberkamp, after the surrender of the Italian forces that presided over the square of Split.
On April 6, 1941, the German armed forces, together with the Italian and Hungarian ones, triggered the attack on Iugoslavia, who – torn by deep and previous internal conflicts, with the consequent defection of most of the Croatian military – collapsed in nine days: the Request for peace was made on April 15 and the surrender was signed on 17.
The subsequent partition of Yugoslavia predicted the Dalmatia division between the Kingdom of Italy and the new independent state of Croatia. In the part attached to Italy, the Governorate of Dalmatia was created, consisting of the three provinces of Zara, Split and Cattaro. [first]
In addition to these annexes, according to the agreements between Italy and Croatia, two distinct areas were established within the territories of the latter: the so -called second and third area (the first being the one annexed to the kingdom). In the second area the Royal Army exercised large government powers, while in the third area it had to depend on the wishes of the Croatian government.
The Italian military forces on the ground were reorganized several times. On the eve of the armistice, in Dalmatia they were arranged as follows:
- The Province of Cattaro was manned by the “Emilia” division (based in Castelnuovo). This division was part of the XIV Army Corps which, deployed in Montenegro (headquarters in Podgorica), depended on the East Army Group Command (headquarters in Tirana). [2]
- In the part of the Dalmatian coast between Cattaro and Split was deployed the VI Army Corps, with a jurisdiction that included a territory from Rastozza (in Croatian Exterior ) Until Ragusavecchia ( Cavtat ), and a depth of thirty kilometers inwards. In addition to this, the VI Army Corps presided over the Peninsula of Sabbioncello, the Italian islands of Curzola and Meleda and the Croated ones of Giuppana, Mezzo, Calamotta, as well as lagoon, already an Italian territory since the end of the Great War. [3]
- The north part and the central part of the region instead fell in the jurisdiction of the second army (command to Sushak, a suburb of the river), under the orders of General Mario Robotti, who supervised the entire chessboard that went to the side of Slovenia annexed to Italy In 1941 to the north up to central Dalmatia to the south. The Italian Dalmatia (excluding the Province of Cattaro) was manned by the XVIII Army Corps (General Umberto Spigo), based in Zara. [4] The latter armed body was in turn explained on the ground with a division to the north (“Zara”, general Carlo Viale and command in the city of Zara) and one to the south (“Bergamo”, general Emilio Becuzzi and command in the city of Split). [5]
On the German side, the arrangement of the forces was the following:
- The newly established armed group F ( Army group F ), stationed in Belgrade, under the command of the Generalfeldmarschall Maximilian von Weichs. He had the 2nd battleship ( 2. Panzer Army , headquarters in Kragujevac), in command of the Generaloberst Lothar Rendulic. On August 12, 1943, the Germans created the 15th mountain armed body inside the 2nd armped army ( XV. Mountains Army Corps ), to whose command General der Infanterie Rudolf Lüters was placed. The main departments that made up the 15th mountain army body were as follows:
- 4th Croatian Brigade Cacciatori ( 4. Croat. Jäger-Brigade )
- III Croatian body ( III. Croat. Corps )
- The Croatian body ( II. Croatian. Body )
- 373th Croatian Infantry Division ( 373. Infantry division (Croatian) )
- 369th Croatian Infantry Division ( 369. Infantry division (Croatian) )
- Volunteer Division of the SS “Prinz Eugen” ( SS voluntary division “Prince Eugen ) [6]
- 264th Infantry Division ( 264. Infantry-Division )
- 114. Jäger Division [7] [8]
The first reactions [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]
The reactions of the Italian military stationed in the Balcani Theater to the news of the signing of the armistice, with the proclamation of Badoglio on 8 September and the consequent decisions of the high officers and the troops are a tangible sign of the extreme improvisation of the entire operation. The events that were recorded range from the Farshesco to the dramatic.
In a report on the facts, the commander of the 9th Army (Albania) Renzo Dalmazzo recalls that the infantrymen autonomously “on the evening of the 8th of the curtains and the backpack reaped” to be ready to repatriate. [9] Wherever they are recorded jubilation scenes, fragment to frenetic attempts of the commands to contact their superiors to receive confirmation of the news thick times received not through the ordinary routes but thanks to listening to foreign radio. [ten] They are not rare even in the evening of 8 of the positions of absolute skepticism by officers who considered everything a propaganda invention of the enemy. [11]
The peculiarity of the situation in Dalmatia, with the simultaneous presence of Italian and German fighters, of Croatian and Cetnic collaborators, as well as of the Iugoslav partisans led by the Communists of Tito, made evident in the absolute heterogeneity of the decisions of the Italian commands: while in Cattaro And in Ragusa at least part of the Italians opposed with arms to the Germans, Split and Sebenico opened contemporary negotiations with the Germans and partisans, while in Zara to prevent the latter, we agreed with the first from the same from the same September 8 for their own Entry into the city: the Germans then entered Zara two days later. [twelfth]
The Germans – who already wary of the Italian ally – moved with extreme rapidity and decision as soon as he had news of the armistice, following the general directives for some time defined within the Alaric Plan, prepared precisely in anticipation of the exit from the war of the ‘Italy. The main purposes pursued by the Germans in Dalmatia were two: on the one hand ensuring the dominance of the whole territory already subject to the Royal Army, on the other hand preventing operations of grapping of material by the Iugoslave partisan forces. [13]
The situation in the areas of jurisdiction of the Bergamo division [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]
| The Bergamo division in 1943 [14] |
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Reinforced by:
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Sector of Sebenic [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]
The Piazza di Sebenico was commanded by Brigadier General Paolo Grimaldi (commander of the infantry of the 15th “Bergamo” Infantry Division), who had a battalion of the 4th Bersaglieri Regiment, a Mitraglieri battalion, a mobile territorial battalion, the 103rd group of Artillery from position and the “Maritime Militia of Artillery” (Milmart) with three batteries. By understanding the staff of the Maritime Military Command – under the orders of the Lieutenant of Vascello Pietro Tacchini – overall it was about three thousand men. [15]
The news of the armistice spread to the afternoon of September 8, often following unofficial routes: voices of the square or people who asked confirmed to the Italian soldiers themselves, completely in the dark until the moment when he arrived news of the Badoglio press release. [16]
In the morning of 9, General Becuzzi warned Grimaldi: “We are at war with Germany”, issuing a series of orders in execution of the Army Corps plans for the creation of a defense line up to the south of Split. Among these orders, the folding of the 89th Legion of Presidium in Dernis, which could not be performed. As for the demeanor to be held towards the Yugoslav partisans, Becuzzi authorized to “accept cooperation (…), if they want to fight with us against the Germans”, adding however to “do not let them enter Sebenic; For now, keep them where they find themselves ». [17]
In the afternoon, the command of the Army Corps ordered Grimaldi to bring together the departments on Sebenico who were in the locality of Pervich (16 km east): the 259th infantry regiment of the 154th “Murge” infantry division and the XXVI Battalion of the 4th Bersaglieri Regiment. This caused frictions with the Iugoslav partisans of the area, who feared to see the possibility of fading the armaments of the Italian departments, clearly in confusion: it was on this occasion that the first challenges between the partisan leaders and the commanders of the Italian departments occurred , with the partial delivery of war material. The following day, an Iugoslav delegation had a meeting in Sebenico with General Grimaldi: the presence in the city of the partisans aroused the enthusiasm of the population; Departments in arms tried to enter the city, however, being partially blocked by the Italian military. The chaos was the masters, while Grimaldi staggered – having received contradictory and partial orders – keeping the dialogue with the partisans open, but at the same time trying not to compromise too much in the eyes of the Germans, whose intervention was expected from an hour all ‘other. [18]
At 17:00 on 10 September Grimaldi received from Zara the text of an agreement that General Spigo had taken with the Germans: the Italian troops would have had to surrender to the Germans without opposing any resistance. [19] Groups of partisans infiltrated in Sebenic had already taken a seventies of Ustasha and anti -communist serbs among the population: a dozen serbs had been killed, then Grimaldi reacted vigorously obtaining the liberation of the other prisoners. At the same time, a list of one hundred Italians had already been prepared to be delivered: the police headquarters, belonging to the militia, officers and non -commissioned officers of the army, but the subsequent events made their detention impossible.
In the morning of 11, a meeting was convened between the partisan staff and the Italian command: Grimaldi managed to convince the Iugoslavs of the imminent coming of the Germans, informing them of the order received by Zara. Despite the extreme fluidity of the situation, the partisans left sebenic on the same day. At 16:00 on 11 September, the first German departments entered Sebenico.
The next day the commander of the 114th division of hunters ( 114. Jäger Division ), Generalleutnant Karl Eglseer, convened the entire official body at the Sector Command and spoke to them. Subsequently he asked the troop gathered in four different locations, proposing to continue the war alongside Germany or alternatively to be interned in captivity: most of the soldiers chose imprisonment, headed by General Grimaldi himself. [20]
Split sector [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]
From 8 to 10 September [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]
According to what General Emilio Becuzzi reported, in Split and immediate surroundings, about 13,000 Italian soldiers were concentrated out of a total of 20,000 at his command. Of these 20,000, 8,000 were in force at the 18th Army Corps, whose command had moved from Split to Zara on September 3, 11,000 men of the Bergamo division and 1,000 men in passing. [21] Most of the military from Bergamo were located in the crown detachments of the city and on the coast (Dernis, Signa, Sebenico, Macarsca, Almissa and Podgora) and on the islands (Zirona, Brazza, Buzza, Solta, Lesina, Lissa and Minori). The maritime command of Dalmatia (Maridalmazia) was also based in the city under the orders of Admiral Antonio Bobbiese, in addition to the maritime command of Split (captain of Corvetta Riccardo Lesca): more than 1,500 men between officers and sailors. In the city he lived the largest Italian community of Dalmatia – excluding Zara – with over a thousand Italian natives and about two thousand between officials, teachers, ports, railways and their families, who arrived from the peninsula. [22]
The first news of the armistice created a great confusion and according to General Becuzzi there were numerous cases of fraternization between the nationalist partisans and the Italian principals. [23] Becuzzi, who had already received the OP 44 memory which provided to fight the Germans if they had attempted to occupy Italian positions, [23] He found himself with the “Bergamo” closed between the former German allies and Ustasha and the old partisans of the Eplj. [23] In the early hours of September 9 Becuzzi ordered all sectors to refrain from contacts with the partisans; Following a telephone interview with General Spigo, the order was modified: the negotiations with the partisans were authorized, as long as they “move on to our addictions”. In the same way, they were issued in immediate succession to some external principals before the folding orders and then of the counterclaces, which contributed to increasing confusion. [24] Becuzzi himself went to Zara in order to obtain orders, but found the city already occupied by the Germans and resolved to return to Split. [25] In the same hours, General Alfonso Cigala Fulgosi – commander of the square of Split – proceeded with the disarmament of the German escort staff to a Romanian ship attacked in port, as well as the plantation of the German consulate. [26]
The confusion generated in the Italian departments convinced in addition to the Germans who were already approaching the Titini partisans from the north to concentrate their forces on Split in order to get their hands on the huge Italian armaments. [24] Immediately after having issued the order to deal with the partisans, Becuzzi had a series of contacts with the Cetnici, who in the Split sector had about 2,000 men framed in the voluntary anti -communist militia, under the command of the major Serbian Pavasović. [27] The latter asked Becuzzi who were the decisions of Bergamo, making his men available as long as we have provided weapons and ammunition. Becuzzi asked time to consult with the command of the Army Corps and in the afternoon he convened Pavasović to communicate the delivery of weapons for the following day, in order to constitute a battalion of 500 cetnic, to be located in Castel Vitturi (along the Riviera in the north of Split). [24] As soon as Pavasović started, Becuzzi received a delegation of communists and partisans of Split to establish the first foundations of an agreement. The Italian General had invited in the city for the following day Ivo Lola Ribar, of the Supreme Command of the APPJ, and the partisan head Vicko Krstulović, commander of the IV Operational area (Dalmatia), to organize a defense against the Germans. But in immediate succession the order to apply the armistial provisions “without bloodshed” had come from Zara, which made Becuzzi very uncertain about how to manage the situation. [28] [29] Meanwhile, the Slavic partisans, realizing the uncertainty of the Italian command, began to disarm the Italian military with strength and looting the warehouses. [28] Numerous Spalters of Slavic origin were combined with them. [28] Once the news has come that the army command had decided to give up the weapons to the Germans, Becuzzi informed the partisans of not intended to obey the order, however, suggesting that he was not even willing to resist against the Germans. [28] On 11 September, they gathered their officers, he informed them about the situation claiming that it was appropriate, given the impossibility of fighting the Germans, yielding weapons to the partisans and let the army skid. [28] At the hypothesis of Becuzzi it seems that only Cigala Fulgosi and Salvatore Pelligra opposed. [28] Meanwhile, the violence of the partisans against the Italian military continued without Becuzzi opposed [28] granting Yugoslavs the opportunity to recruit Italian volunteers. [30] Finally, on 12 September the delivery of weapons to the Yugoslav partisans for the following day was resolved in order. [30]
The disarmament of Italian troops [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]
The whole division, without clear orders, was easily disarmed by the partisans. [thirty first] General Becuzzi later stated that the majority of soldiers and officers were not willing to continue the war and therefore would not have opened fire or against the Germans, nor against the partisans. [32] However, the circumstance denied by the testimonies of numerous survivors who underlined that the soldiers protested loudly and that a lot of individual armament was made advertible or thrown into the sea in order not to be delivered, as many vehicles were overturned, while almost all cannons were made unnatural. [33] The major Bruno Koch, after protesting for the disarmament of his department on the night of September 12, committed suicide. [thirty first] [34] His name was then added to the victims of the Treglia massacre. [thirty first] Only one hundred soldiers were left with their armament and placed in guard of the barracks until they were moved to Spinuti, where the air bombings could take place effectively. [34] At the same time, in contrast to the agreements signed on 12 September, posters were posted in which the population was invited to report the Italian military who had taken part in reprisals against the partisans. [35] To the protests of the Italian officers Becuzzi replied that “it was the logical consequence of those who had acted badly”. [35]
On September 17, Becuzzi had a new meeting with the partisan leaders in Castel Vitturi in the presence of the majority of the OSS Deakin. The discussion faced the surrender and question of the alleged Italian war criminals. Becuzzi from the witnesses seemed interested in hiding the fact that the Italian military had been disarmed by the population and partisans and agreed to declare that they had made themselves disarmed voluntarily. [36] On the delivery of Italian soldiers, however, Becuzzi proved to be at least initially more detention even if in the end, having obtained the narrowing of the field of accusations, he agreed to the delivery of eleven soldiers called “war criminals”. [36] Starting from September 19, for a few days to follow, the anti-Italian repression began with shootings at the cemetery of San Lorenzo and in the nearby countryside. [37] Particularly affected was the police headquarters of Split who had 41 missing, of which he was then found in common pits. [37]
On 23 September from Bari arrived in Split four ships charged with war material to be delivered to the partisans. Becuzzi took place on the torpedoire Aretusa abandoning about eight thousand soldiers of Bergamo. Cigala Fulgosi and Pelligra instead refused boarding as long as all the soldiers of the division were not left. [38] On September 25, the partisans abandoned Split fearing to remain surrounded by the Germans of the 7th of the 7th. [39]
Hiring the control of the city, the Germans raked civilians who had made common cause with these during the short partisan occupation. General Salvatore Pelligra was ordered to gather all the Italian officers present in the city for a total number of 450. [39] Among these were also three generals, Policardi (Commander of the genius of Army Corps), Pelligra and Cigala Fulgosi (commander of the square of Split and father of Giuseppe Cigala Fulgosi, a multidage officer of the Regia Marina), several colonels, including Umberto Volpi , a lieutenant colonel, a greater and some subordinate officers. On the pretext of the transfer to Germany, this group was started on the trucks but, after being brought to a gravel quarry, all the officers were killed with submachine gunshots. On the massacre, forgotten by the Italian authorities, the daughter of one of the officers who disappeared after the surrender, Carlo Linetti, greater and commander of one of the infantry battalions of the division, threw light. [40] This, after years of research, without any help from the Italian authorities and between the suspicion of the Yugoslave ones, managed to meet an old inhabitant of the area who was aware of a massacre made by the Germans after September 8. After the excavations conducted on the site, a single infantry officer was found between the corpses now decomposed with the greater degrees, therefore identified as Linetti. The corpses were then repatriated in the 1950s and buried in the votive temple of Venice. [40]
At the signo furnaces on 1 October 1943 [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]
In Treglia on October 2, 1943 [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]
- ^ On the Constitution and the destinies of the Dalmatia Governorate, see D.Rodogno, The new Mediterranean order , Bollati Boringhieri, Turin 2003
- ^ Oddone Talpo, Dalmatia. A chronicle for the story (1943-1944 , Rome, General Staff of the Army – Historical Office, 1994, p. 1042.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1065.
- ^ The command of the XVIII Army Corps was moved from Split to Zara on 3 September 1943. On the date of the proclamation of Badoglio, a part of the staff was still located in Split.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , pp. 1085 ss.
- ^ On October 22, 1943 the division was renamed 7. SS Freiwilligen-Gebirgs Division “Prinz Eugen”. See about it George F. Nafziger, The German Order of Battle. Waffen SS and Other Units in World War II , Combined Publishing, Pennsylvania, 2001, p. 82.
- ^ Gerhard Schreiber, German revenge. 1943-1945: Nazi reprisals in Italy , Milan, Mondadori, 2000, p. 61.
- ^ XV. Mountains Army Corps . are Lexikon-Dehrmacht.de .
- ^ Renzo Dalmazzo, The armistice of 8 September in Albania , Rome, S.ed., 1953, p. 126.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , pp. 1041-1043.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1043.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1042.
- ^ On all this, see Chapter V of Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , pp. 1041-1328.
- ^ From the site 15th “Bergamo” infantry division . are Regiesercito.it .
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1125.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1126.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1129.
- ^ For a detailed description of all events, see Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , pp. 1128 ss.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1131.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1134.
- ^ Emilio Becuzzi, Report on events from 9 to 25 September 1943 , in Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1262.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1135.
- ^ a b c Elena Aga Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 139.
- ^ a b c Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 141.
- ^ Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 140.
- ^ Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1137.
- ^ The sources consulted do not indicate the name.
- ^ a b c d It is f g Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 142.
- ^ All convulsive events of 9 September are described in Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , pp. 1138-1140. e in Enzo de Bernart, From Split to Wietzendorf. 1943-1945. History of Italian military internees , Milan, Mursia, 1974, pp. 7 and seg.
- ^ a b Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 143.
- ^ a b c Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 15.
- ^ Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 144.
- ^ Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 144-145.
- ^ a b Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 145.
- ^ a b Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 146.
- ^ a b Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 152.
- ^ a b Franco Paolo . are cadutipolizia.it .
- ^ Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 154.
- ^ a b Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, on. Cit. , p. 155.
- ^ a b Life and death of the Italian soldier in the war without luck – ed. Ferni Ginevra 1971 Vol. Xii
- ^ Not to be confused with the children Giuseppe Cigala Fulgosi, Marina’s officer and also decorated with gold medal for military valor, and Agostino Giorgio Cigala Fulgosi, pilot lieutenant born in Milan on August 21, 1919, decorated with silver medal at Military valor, who fell in the Mediterranean sky on 11 June 1943.
- ^ The motivation of the gold medal to military valor was the following: “In a moment of general spiritual bewilderment, he reacted violently to the order to give him to give in arms. Despite having clear vision of the inevitable tragedy that looked out on the troops to his orders, keeping the faith unaltered to the laws of military honor, he shared the Established with conscious determination by subtracting the possibility of salvation proudly. Organized the resistance, he fed it with an indomitable insensitive value to the massacred aerial bombings and, although everything was now collapsed inexorably around him, he lasted it with heroic tenacity for a long time, inflicting the enemy Severe losses. Submerged by predominant opposing forces and taken prisoner, he faced the platoon of execution with supreme contempt of life, refusing to become blindfolded and waiting for the deadly to the cry of: “Long live Italy”. Fighter of three wars, Several times decorated, he fell as he lived, faithful to his oath as a soldier, bright example, to more, of precious military virtues ” . The motivation is taken from the ANPI website: Alfonso Cigala Fulgosi . are anpi.it .
- ^ The motivation of the gold medal to military valor was the following: “In a moment of general spiritual bewilderment, he reacted proudly to the order to give him to give in his artillery. The invitation of placing himself by embarking on Italy, maintained unaltered faith to the laws of military honor, remaining among the laws, remaining among the laws. his artillerymen with whom he serene the situation serene, despite having clear vision of the inevitable tragedy that looked out on the strong devoted to sacrifice. Organized the resistance, fed it with indomitable ardor insensitive to the massacred air bombings, and although everything was now collapsed inexorably ahead of He, he continued her with heroic tenacity for a long time by inflicting the enemy of the losses series. Submerged by predominant enemy forces, he escaped with conscious determination from any possibility of salvation so as not to abandon the glorious survivors and, with supreme contempt of life, faced the platoon of Execution waiting for the fatal burst into the severe position of military greeting, aimed at the distant homeland to which everything had given for the honor and prestige of the army. Fighter of the Great War, repeatedly decorated, fell as he lived, faithful to his oath as a soldier, bright example, to the most, of pre -esal military virtues ” . The motivation is taken from the ANPI website: Salvatore Pelligra . are anpi.it .
- ^ The motivation of the gold medal to military valor was the following: “Regiment commander, distinguished himself during a long operational period for high capacity, tireless activity and indomitable courage even in voluntary risky missions. At the time of the armistice, faithful to the laws of military honor, he actively participated in the struggle without hope, against Prosy German forces. Caught, he faced with stoicism the platoon of execution by supporting until the last, with words of high patriotism and faith, his companions of martyrdom, thus perpetuating the traditions of the Italian value over time. Magnificent figure of officer, animated as a noble spirit of sacrifice and proven value ” . The motivation is taken from the ANPI website: Umberto Volpi . are anpi.it .
- ^ The second lieutenant Zamarano was killed individually on September 2, being considered a Jew from the Obersturmführer Otto von Lorendorff. On this point, see the testimony of Lieutenant Ulisse donated in Oddone Talpo, on. Cit. , p. 1327.
- Enzo de Bernart, From Split to Wietzendorf. 1943-1945. History of Italian military internees , Mursia, Milan 1974
- Avio Clementi, Not only El Alamein , in Independent homeland. Periodical of the resistance and the former fighters , Year Lii, 23 February 2003
- Gerhard Schreiber, German revenge. 1943-1945: Nazi reprisals in Italy , Mondadori, Milan 2000
- Oddone Talpo, Dalmatia. A chronicle for the story (1943-1944) , General Staff of the Army – Historical Office, Rome 1994
- Life and death of the Italian soldier in the war without luck , Vol. XII, Publisher Forni, Geneva 1971
- Elena Aga-Rossi & Maria Teresa Giusti, A war apart , Bologna, Il Mulino, 2011, ISBN 978-88-15-15070-7.
Note on the bibliography [ change | Modifica Wikitesto ]
In Italian the sources published on the Treglia massacre are practically only those presented. In German you can see the volume of Thomas Casagrande, The Volksdeutsche SS division “Prince Eugen”. The Banat Swabians and the National Socialist war crimes. campus , Frankfurt on the least 2003. The text of Oddone Talpo is among the Italian sources the most complete, also drawing on oral memorials and testimonies. This study also presents on the pages 1249-1328 the transcription of a series of original Italian and German documents of fundamental importance to understand the context from which the massacre arose, in addition to Report by Lieutenant Ulysses donated on the Treglia massacre , completed in August 1945 and delivered by Donati to the Royal Carabinieri of Venice. On this it depends that the text of the Talpo is the most used source.
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